

China, January–September 1971

102. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Ambassador Bogdan, Map Room, January 11, 1971

Ambassador Bogdan told me that after the conversation with the President, Ceausescu sent his Vice Premier to Peking and Hanoi.² In Peking he had extensive talks with Chou En-lai. Chou En-lai handed him the following message:

“The communication from the U.S. President is not new. There is only one outstanding issue between us—the U.S. occupation of Taiwan. The PRC has attempted to negotiate on this issue in good faith for 15 years. If the U.S. has a desire to settle the issue and a proposal for its solution, the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking. This message has been reviewed by Chairman Mao and by Lin Piao.”

Chou En-lai added the comment that since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking.

The Vice Premier found nothing new in Hanoi.

Comment: (a) The Chinese note indirectly refers to the Yahya communication. It also validates it because it is almost the same.

(b) It is free of invective.

(c) It strongly implies that the war in Vietnam is no obstacle to U.S.-Chinese rapprochement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. Nixon was in San Clemente, California, January 5–14. Kissinger and Bogdan met in Washington from 12:30 to 12:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² See Documents 20 and 94.

(d) It remains to be seen whether Peking will accept a proposal for a solution with a long time-fuse.

(e) If they answer our communication through Yahya, we may get a clue.³

³ The President noted at the bottom of this memorandum: "I believe we may appear too eager. Let's cool it. Wait for them to respond to our initiative." Kissinger and Bogdan met again on January 29. According to a memorandum of conversation drafted by Halperin, "Mr. Kissinger began by saying that we had found the communication from the Chinese very interesting and helpful; Mr. Kissinger then asked if he was correct in thinking that China will negotiate with us only if we agree in principle on Taiwan ahead of time. Ambassador Bogdan was noncommittal in responding to this. Mr. Kissinger then said that we are willing to talk about a whole range of Sino-American problems including the problem of Taiwan. We have always said that the degree of our military presence in Asia is related to the degree of tensions in that area—and we would reduce our military presence as the tensions diminish." Kissinger added that the United States was willing to hold talks outside of Warsaw, which he described as "a very public place." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)

103. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Information Items

[Omitted here is one paragraph on fighting in Cambodia.]

Edgar Snow's Interview with Chou En-lai: Our Consulate General at Hong Kong has commented on the first part of a four-hour interview between Edgar Snow and Chou En-lai which appeared in an Italian magazine last month.² While the interview reveals no strikingly new departures in Chinese policy, it is a notable expression of the return of "peaceful coexistence" as the general line of China's foreign policy,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 30, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The magazine was *L'Epoca*. Much of this paragraph is taken verbatim from Airgram A-369 from Hong Kong, December 31, 1970. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 CHICOM) A version of this interview is also in Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung," *Life*, April 30, 1971, pp. 46-48.

including its relations with the U.S. and the USSR. The rationalization for this policy springs from what Snow described as “cautious revolutionary optimism,” i.e., 90 percent of the people of the world will want revolution “sooner or later” but in the meantime flexible policies which serve China’s immediate interests are in order. Only passing reference is made in this first account to Vietnam and none to Cambodia. Instead, Chou stresses the importance in Sino-U.S. relations of the Taiwan problem and he indicates that a major goal of the PRC’s current diplomatic offensive is the strengthening of its position vis-à-vis the Taiwan issue.³

[Omitted here is information on Jordan, Berlin, USSR, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Ethiopia.]

³ This analysis did not differ significantly from a January 4, 1971, INR Intelligence Note, which includes an annex of PRC statements on the Taiwan issue during the 1955–1970 period. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM-US)

104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Remarks by Chinese Communist Deputy Foreign Minister on U.S. Relations with Communist China

Our Ambassador in Oslo has reported a conversation on February 4 between the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking and Chinese Com-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Ohio. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In an attached February 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge recommended that this memorandum be sent to the President. Norwegian diplomats also relayed information about the PRC to U.S. officials in Washington. The Norwegian Ambassador to the United States, Arne Gunneng, discussed Sino-American relations at least three times with U. Alexis Johnson during 1969. (Memoranda of conversation, February 27, September 18, and December 17, 1969; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 96 D 695, U. Alexis Johnson Files, Memcons, 1969) During his visit to Washington in November 1970, Norwegian Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China Ole Aalgaard suggested to Johnson that he [Aalgaard] could serve as a conduit for messages between the United States and People’s Republic of China. (Memorandum of conversation, November 16, 1970; *ibid.*, Memcons, 1970)

munist Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan Hua in which Chiao noted that:²

—The Chinese are aware of a new trend in America's position vis-à-vis China and greater flexibility as regards the Taiwan question.

—However, because of Indochina it is impossible to resume the Warsaw meetings now, both out of respect for China's friends in Indochina and because U.S. escalation is bringing the war closer to China's doorstep.³

—The Chinese and the Americans nevertheless must sooner or later sit down and straighten out our relationships. Chiao implied interest in a meeting with me.

—Chiao requested that the above be brought to our attention and hoped that Norway could continue to be a channel of communication. (They probably chose Norway for this on the grounds of Norwegian friendship and reliability—others such as the Pakistanis might not fit as well.)

Comment:

The remarks by Chiao Kuan Hua can be considered authoritative and probably representative of current Peking thinking on U.S. relations with Communist China. Significant points of this conversation are as follows:

—This is a formal Chinese approach, as evidenced by the fact that Chiao specifically requested that his remarks be brought to the attention of the Americans.

—The Chinese are aware of our more forthcoming position on U.S. relations with China, e.g. Chiao's remarks on our flexibility on the Taiwan question. Our efforts to get this message across have therefore succeeded.

—The Chinese attitude was non-polemical. It of course comes as no surprise that Indochina is an obstacle to a resumption of contacts,

² In telegram 390 from Oslo, February 8, Ambassador to Norway Philip K. Crowe reported that Aalgaard transmitted the Chinese statement on February 6. The Norwegian Foreign Office gave it to Crowe on February 8. A notation by Kissinger on the telegram reads: "Summary for President, HK." (Ibid.) On March 24 Holdridge informed Kissinger of another conversation between PRC and Norwegian diplomats, during which the "Chinese bore down very heavily on the fact of a US military presence in Taiwan as the key issue between the US and Communist China. He [Deputy Foreign Minister Lo Kuei Po] did not mention our treaty with the GRC or political support for Chiang Kai-shek as stumbling blocks." (Telegram 846 from Oslo, March 19, attached to Holdridge's memorandum to Kissinger; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

³ The President underlined the word "Indochina" and the rest of the paragraph beginning with the word "respect."

but even on this point the Chinese position was a moderate one. Importantly, Chiao's dispassionate remarks were made on the same day Peking issued a strong Foreign Ministry denunciation of our actions in Laos, suggesting a Chinese disposition to play down the effects of Laos on long-term U.S.-Chinese relations.

—Chinese willingness to get together with us in due course was emphasized. Chiao's implied interest in meeting with me can probably be read not just as a mere gesture of politeness, but rather an expression of more serious intent to arrange a high-level meeting.

In short, the Chinese have let it be known authoritatively that they are indeed interested in dealing with us at an appropriate time and level, and recognize that our position has changed. Perhaps we might find flexibility on their side as well.

105. Draft Response to National Security Study Memorandum 106¹

Washington, February 16, 1971.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

NSSM 106—China Policy

I. THE SITUATION FACING US

A. The Present Problem

It is obviously undesirable, as well as potentially dangerous, for the world's most powerful country and the world's most populous

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-177, NSSM 106. Secret. Green was responsible for coordinating the Department of State's response to NSSM 106. (Memorandum from Cargo to Green, November 28, 1970; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files; Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 106) Representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury, and ACDA, USIA, and the CIA met on December 23 to discuss the draft response. Green noted: "With the exception of some differences on specific points, the other participating Agencies appeared to support the general thrust of State's draft." (Memorandum from Green to Rogers, January 8, 1971; *ibid.*) In an undated memorandum, Green wrote to the Under Secretary of State that the Interdepartmental Group had reviewed the response to NSSM 106 on February 11. According to Green, "However, some differences between DOD and State remain on specific points, notably in the sections dealing with the strategic importance of Taiwan and our military presence there and in the final section on possible arms control discussions with Peking." (*Ibid.*, S/S Files; Lot 82 D 126, NSC Files, SRG Meeting on NSSM 106) A March 6 briefing memorandum from Levin, Sonnenfeldt, and

country (itself growing in power) to remain as hostile toward each other as they have been for two decades, with virtually no peaceful international intercourse—diplomatic, economic, scientific or cultural. The historical reasons for this are well known. The question is whether this circumstance is now alterable, and if so, whether it is in the US interest to attempt to alter it.

This problem has been given added urgency in the light of recent developments in China, in Asia, and in the world's attitudes towards China. Much has been said concerning the drawing to a close of the "post-war era" in Europe. We may have reached a similar watershed in Asia, with the Nixon Doctrine both a harbinger of it and an accommodation to it.

For two decades the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been in control of nearly a quarter of mankind, yet has been outside the mainstream of international affairs. Its isolation has been partly self-imposed, a result of both its conscious policy and its abusive behavior, and partly imposed on it by the efforts of non-Communist countries under US leadership. Denied a seat in the United Nations and faced with Taipei's participation in international conferences, it has been loath to take part in any multilateral consideration of problems of global concern, such as arms control, law of the sea, offshore oil and seabed rights, airline hijacking, control of narcotics traffic, etc.—and it has generally not been invited to do so. It has also been generally unwilling to associate itself after the fact with international agreements reached without its participation.

In the mid-sixties the PRC had begun to improve its international standing—epitomized by French diplomatic recognition and a tie vote in the UN on Chinese representation—but the confused and extravagant conduct of the Cultural Revolution halted the trend toward increased international support. With the violent phase of the Cultural

Kennedy to Kissinger explained that NSSM 106 "in effect, poses the issue of how far we want to go to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, since attempts to achieve these improvements must come, if at all, at some cost in our relations with the GRC and will raise some questions in our relations with the Soviets." In a March 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge emphasized that NSSM 106 involved conventional, not nuclear forces, and suggested that these matters would be better discussed in the context of NSSM 69, U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia. (Ibid.) Materials prepared for Kissinger including this response to NSSM 106, the Department of State's Issues Paper, NSDM 17, and NSSM 106 are *ibid.* According to a March 25 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, there was also an "Intelligence Annex" to the response to the NSSM, which had the concurrence of INR, DOD, and the CIA. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84-B00513R, DCI/Executive Registry Files: NSSMs)

Revolution now over, the PRC is attempting to end its isolation. While there is reluctance in the world community to impair the standing of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (GRC), given the seemingly irreconcilable confrontation between the two Chinese regimes a growing number of governments elect to support the PRC at the expense of the GRC whenever the issue is forced in the UN or elsewhere.

As a result, the US is finding fewer allies in its support of the GRC's international position. If present indications materialize, within the next two or three years most of our European allies will have recognized Peking; and Japan, under heavy domestic pressure, is seriously examining its options, though a move toward recognition is not imminent. In the China context, diplomatic recognition and support in the United Nations tend to be mutually supportive acts. Accordingly, given the present trend in recognition, we can also expect increasing support for Peking in the UN which is likely to lead to PRC seating and GRC expulsion this year or in 1972. Our policy is being regarded more and more as unrealistic and out of date, both internationally and within the American body politic.

However, it is one thing for Canada, France, the UK or a host of other nations to recognize the PRC and support it in the UN; it is quite another thing for the US to do so. We are largely responsible for the very existence of the GRC; we have a defense treaty commitment to it (though we would not stand in the way of a peaceful resolution of the "Taiwan problem"), and we have a degree of responsibility for the people of Taiwan. We therefore have a moral obligation as well as political, economic and military interests arising from our long association with the GRC.

Thus important and valid but mutually incompatible interests of the United States in the China tangle have long presented us with dilemmas in our China policy. For most of the past two decades these dilemmas could be, and were, fairly successfully submerged, but developments of the past year have brought them into stark focus.

As a result, a number of insistent questions arise: Why does US-PRC hostility persist? Can anything be done about it? What future course would be most promising? Is any change in US policy likely to prompt a desired change in PRC policy? If improvement in US-PRC relations is to be further sought, how can our obligations to the GRC best be honored? What are the confines of US policy maneuverability? What are the likely costs and benefits from moves within those limits? This paper examines the issues raised by these questions and presents policy alternatives relative to them.

Before addressing these questions, however, certain strategic factors in the situation facing us should be noted.

B. Strategic Factors

1. The Nixon Doctrine and the Asian reaction.

For years the US has deployed strategic and conventional forces in forward positions throughout East Asia. These have been directed against the military potential of the USSR and China and the specific military threats from North Korea and North Viet-Nam.

The presence of these forces has brought important gains in exchange for certain costs. They have helped deter overt conventional military aggression by Asian Communist countries. They have added significantly to the confidence of allied governments in their ability to resist Communist domination and influence. At the same time the presence of foreign troops to some extent has engendered frictions with local populations within the host countries, as well as with governments sensitive about what the presence of those troops implies for their sovereignty. The presence of US troops, particularly in mainland Asia, has also projected a threatening image of the US in the eyes of the Chinese and other Asian Communists, constituting one of the barriers in the way of improvement in our relations with them.

In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine the US is now reducing its close-in military presence (which Peking has long cited as proof of US hostility and presumption) and is increasing military assistance to selected allies so that they can assume primary responsibility for their own non-nuclear defense. It should not be assumed that Peking will interpret these reductions as an effort toward *détente* on the part of the US. Indeed, reduction of US forces in other parts of East Asia without concomitant reductions on Taiwan could well be regarded by Peking as an indication of US interest in keeping Taiwan permanently separate from the mainland, as a US base directed against the PRC.

The reduction of US force levels thus presents the US with political, military and psychological problems as well as opportunities. It has raised questions among our allies as to US determination to maintain its commitments, led them to start thinking more actively about how they might shape future arrangements with Peking, and may provide the PRC with opportunities to expand its political influence in the area.

So far as we can determine, the reduction of US force levels as such has not produced any change in Chinese deployments directed against Korea, Taiwan or Southeast Asia, although the PRC apparently has begun to alter traditional deployment patterns in South China in order to strengthen conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Chinese are and will continue to be deterred from overt massive aggression across their borders by US and Soviet nuclear and conventional power.

The PRC probably views the Nixon Doctrine with mixed feelings. While it welcomes the first significant US troop reductions in East Asia since the end of the Korean War, it is probably concerned that strengthened indigenous non-Communist governments left behind may be harder for “liberation” movements to handle. Furthermore, Peking has seen benefits in what it regards as the over-extension of American resources and in the US domestic political disruption connected with the Viet-Nam War, and would like to see these continued—though not at the expense of an enlarged threat to China.

Peking’s considerations related to the American presence are greatly magnified where Taiwan is concerned. Any favorable PRC reaction toward the over-all reduction of US military presence in East Asia would be more than offset if the net effect should be strengthening the US presence on Taiwan.

As for reactions elsewhere, while some Asian leaders appear to have been reassured about US intentions and agree with the Nixon Doctrine as a practical approach if it is carefully implemented, many opinion makers are skeptical. The media in Asia continue to reflect doubt and concern. Asian non-Communist nations in general continue to look upon the Chinese colossus with suspicion and fear. While they regard the threat of overt invasion as much less likely than was once believed, Chinese-abetted “people’s wars” are looked upon as a constant threat, and one difficult to counter. They fear the potential of Maoist-oriented Communist indigenous elements, particularly in view of the large Chinese minorities found in most Asian countries.

Conservative Japanese leaders are disturbed by the pace of US military force reductions and have hinted that we should slow down. Those who have questioned Japan’s alignment with the US see the reductions as evidence of the unreliability of our commitment and are more than ever inclined to urge that Japan should consider alternative options.

Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia and to a lesser extent South Viet-Nam often express the hope for even greater American material assistance in strengthening their defense capabilities.

In the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand there is growing interest in contact with Communist states as a means of reducing tensions and protecting the peace and security of Southeast Asia, whereas Korea and Taiwan continue to oppose such contacts, preferring to rely on some kind of regional military arrangement as effective deterrence. The latter may also be true in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

2. *Great power interrelationship in Asia.*

Although changes have been gradual, the interaction of the US, China, Japan and the USSR in East Asia has made each country more conscious of the complex balance of power and potential for manipulation inherent in an increasingly—but by no means fully—quadrangular power interrelationship. The shift from alliance to confrontation in Sino-Soviet relations and the rapid emergence of Japan have altered the nature of the game.

Sino-Soviet tensions, which in late 1969 built to the point where open hostilities seemed possible, have eased somewhat; but the Soviet threat is a more real and immediate worry for Peking than any danger from the US. Although some normalization in state relations has taken place between the two, re-establishment to any significant degree of the Sino-Soviet relationship of the 1950's is highly improbable for the foreseeable future. Most likely Sino-Soviet relations will remain in a state of controlled tension with both sides avoiding armed conflict but neither side willing to make major concessions. Nevertheless, given recent history the possibility of a significant deterioration of relations cannot be discounted.

The virulence of the hostility between the PRC and the Soviet Union has contributed to China's interest in maintaining some contact with the US—while other factors dictate that such contact be sporadic and tenuous. It is unlikely that the Chinese expect these contacts to lead to early and substantial results, but they apparently calculate that they not only serve to disturb the USSR but also may aggravate uncertainty about US intentions among the population and leaders of Taiwan.

The USSR and the PRC are highly sensitive to shifts in the US-Sino-Soviet relationship. In 1969 during the period of greatest Sino-Soviet tension, both were especially suspicious about US contact with the other. Although the Chinese remain nervous over possible US-Soviet collusion, the Soviets, noting Peking's cool response to US overtures, have for the time being relegated collusion by the other two to the realm of potential rather than imminent danger. Nevertheless, should there be a marked improvement in US-PRC relations, the Soviets would carefully assess the potential effect of such changes on their own interests. They are particularly concerned that the US might provide, or permit third countries to provide, the PRC with scientific information and technology which would directly or indirectly help PRC military potential vis-à-vis the USSR. Should the Soviet leaders judge that changes in our trade policies might facilitate the strengthening of PRC military potential to their detriment, US-Soviet relations in other areas could, as a result, noticeably chill.

China's power position has been challenged by the emergence of Japan. Although the latter's economic capacity has not been matched

by a commensurate political role, the Chinese as well as other Asians sense Japan's tremendous potential for influence in the region. Aside from jealousy over Japan's economic success as such, the Chinese are bothered by the prospect of a Japanese economic influence in Asia which will carry prestige and political weight as well. They fear a resurgence of Japanese military power and are disturbed about the protective role they suspect the Japanese have in mind for Korea and particularly Taiwan. They are acutely aware that some influential elements in Japan believe Japan's large and growing investments in Taiwan and its strategic interest in the Island should determine Japanese China policy, even at the expense of a permanent breach with the PRC.

At the same time certain countervailing factors inhibit the Chinese from indulging in all-out hostility toward Japan: China depends heavily on Sino-Japanese trade; it desires to weaken US-Japanese security relations; it does not wish to antagonize unnecessarily those already significant Japanese elements who favor a more accommodating policy toward Peking; and it wishes to avoid providing a concrete threat which Japanese rightists could seize as a rationale for rearmament.

So far, Japan's emergence has had a lesser impact on the positions of the US and the USSR. The relative weight of the US in the area will, nevertheless, diminish with the lower profile envisaged under the Nixon Doctrine. The importance of close coordination with Japan on our China policy is obvious.

II. US OBJECTIVES

The President said in 1970 that it is "certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking."² Given the inherent conflicts in US interests relating to the China question, we must decide how strongly we desire improved relations with the PRC, since presumably they must come—if they can come at all—at some cost in our relations with the GRC and perhaps in other interests as well.

In formulating long (4–8 year) and short (1–3 year) term goals, we have taken into account (1) the advanced ages of the two key leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, (2) the fact that the GRC is approaching a crossroads in its international position and may later face the problem of greater Taiwanese political participation, and (3) the state of flux in PRC policy issues in the post-Cultural Revolution era.

² "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 18, 1970," in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*: p. 182.

Toward the PRC

A. Long Range (4–8 year) goals

1. Avoid a direct US–PRC armed confrontation or conflict; work toward a relaxation of tensions in the area facilitating an acceptable settlement in Southeast Asia.

2. Deter PRC aggression against non-Communist neighbors.

3. Secure PRC recognition (albeit tacit) that the US has a legitimate role in Asia.

4. Encourage Peking to play a constructive, responsible role in the international community.

5. Achieve more normal political and economic relations with the PRC, including participation in the growing trade with it.

6. Encourage a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

7. Prevent an offensive alliance between Peking and Moscow directed against the US or its Asian friends and allies.

B. Short Range (1–3 years) goals

1. Discourage the use of force by either side in the Strait area.

2. Achieve a relaxation of Sino-US tension through expansion of contacts including a resumption of the dialogue at Warsaw or elsewhere.

3. Allay Peking's fears of US-Soviet collusion against and encirclement of China.

4. Do what we can to make possible Peking's constructive participation in international conferences on world-wide problems, including measures for arms control and disarmament.³

5. Initiate controlled, direct economic relations.⁴

Toward the GRC and Taiwan

(The assumption is made that during the next eight years the PRC will be unable to bring Taiwan under its control.)

C. Long Range (4–8 years) goals

1. Encourage movement toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue between the governments in Peking and Taipei.

2. Insure the security of Taiwan from external attack, including achievement of a local defense force capable of contributing to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and supportable by local resources with decreasing US assistance.⁵

3. Encourage other governments to maintain relations with the Government on Taiwan consistent with its de facto status.

4. Encourage the evolution of more representative political institutions which would provide the Taiwanese community a greater voice

³ See Document 109.

⁴ Specific steps involving trade and travel were covered by the Under Secretaries Committee report (see footnote 3, Document 111).

⁵ See Document 110.

in central government decisions.

D. Short Range (1–3 years) goals

1. Discourage the use of force by either side in the Taiwan Strait area.
2. Encourage restructuring and modernization of GRC forces to achieve adequate defense capabilities supportable by GRC resources without impeding continued economic growth.
3. Maintain access to Taiwan to the extent necessary to meet our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and our strategic requirements in East Asia.
4. Encourage the GRC to adopt more flexible policies concerning the Chirep issue and third country recognition so that we can more effectively support it internationally.
5. Encourage Taiwan's continued growth and its increasing contribution to regional development.

[Omitted here are 48 pages divided into sections: III. PRC Strategy; IV. US Strategy; V. Difficulties in Improving Relations; and VI. Policy Options—Room for Maneuver. Also omitted are a 6-page Top Secret annex written by the Department of Defense entitled "US Military Presence on Taiwan" and a 3-page document, "Extracts from Terms of Reference for CHMAAG, China."]

106. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 13–10–71

Washington, February 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

SNIE 13–10–71: Communist China's Reactions to Developments in Laos

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 14, Geopolitical File, China, Chronological File, Trips, July 1971, Background Materials, 1970–71. Top Secret; Umbra; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIE and SNIE Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the representatives from the FBI and AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678.

THE ESTIMATE

Chinese Response Thus Far

1. Peking trailed both Hanoi and Moscow in reacting to recent developments in southern Laos.² The Chinese did not speculate publicly on the possibility of cross-border operations into Laos until 2 February when they began to cite press commentary from Hanoi, which had begun some days earlier. Since then Peking has issued a number of authoritative commentaries as well as several Foreign Ministry statements. At first, these pronouncements dwelt on the same themes: the US is expanding the war in Indochina; the people of Indochina will certainly surmount the new challenge; and China will continue to provide “powerful backing and support.” More recently, Peking has strengthened its rhetoric, claiming that the allied move into Laos is “a menace to China” and that it “definitely poses a grave threat to China.” The latter statements are an escalation of the rhetoric that followed Cambodia last spring, and suggest that Peking now takes a more serious view of the situation in Indochina.

2. Large rallies have been held in Peking and Shanghai to condemn allied actions in Laos, a pattern that will no doubt be repeated throughout the country. Nevertheless, all authoritative comment on the situation in Indochina since the beginning of the month has placed Chinese assurances of assistance in terms of rear base support.

3. It is reasonable to assume that Peking and Hanoi have been consulting on the present situation, but there is no evidence of a high-level conference. Rumors of important Chinese—e.g., Chou En-lai and Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng—attending communist strategy sessions in Hanoi in late January and early February appear to be unfounded. A Vietnamese negotiator, however, has been in Peking recently to sign a supplemental agreement on military and economic aid to North Vietnam.

² Consul General Osborn submitted a report from Hong Kong on PRC intentions and capabilities in Indochina that was forwarded to Kissinger on January 18. Osborn noted: “Peking possesses limited leverage with which to force events in Indochina to conform to its desires, and the intentions and behavior of other will largely shape the eventual outcome of the struggle.” He continued: “If, as seems likely, the Chinese fear that total victory for Hanoi would perhaps be a mixed blessing, they should be further encouraged in their flexibility and restraint.” Osborn predicted that the PRC would send combat troops only in response to a “fundamental shift in the balance of forces in the area” that Beijing saw as threatening its security interests. Osborn concluded that “the longer a negotiated political settlement in Indochina is delayed, the greater will be Chinese influence in the area, and the less likely China itself will be to favor accommodating but neutralist governments in the area.” (Airgram A-2 from Hong Kong, January 7, and Summary Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, January 18; both in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 11 Chronological Files, 2 Jan.–16 Feb. 1971)

4. No unusual military movements—either on the ground or in the air—have been detected in South China.³ [4 lines of source text not declassified] It could, however, presage an expansion of the Chinese roadbuilding activity.⁴ The recent discovery of heavier anti-aircraft guns [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the area of the roadbuilding can not be related to developments in southern Laos [1½ lines of source text not declassified].

[Omitted here are paragraphs 5–15, under the subheadings of Chinese Options and Probable Courses of Action, and a 5-page annex, Chinese Communist Military Forces in Laos.]

³ This judgment is based primarily on information [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; no photography is available to confirm this. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ This roadbuilding activity is discussed in the Annex. [Footnote in the source text.]

107. Memorandum From Frank Chapin of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 5, 1971.

[Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, China. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

108. Memorandum for Record of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

I-35275/71

Washington, March 12, 1971

SUBJECT

Senior Review Group Meeting of 12 March 1971, on NSSM 69, US Nuclear Policy in Asia and NSSM 106, US China Policy²

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger—Chairman
Mr. John Irwin, Under Secretary of State
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (present for consideration of NSSM 106 only)
Mr. David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Armistead Selden, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
General William Westmoreland, JCS
Lt. General Cushman, Deputy Director, CIA
Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA
Mr. Frank Shakespeare, Director, USIA
Various Deputies and Assistants

*NSSM 69—US Nuclear Power in Asia*³

Dr. Kissinger posed three levels of issues presented by the NSSM 69 study:

1. The degree of reliance to be placed on strategic forces⁴ to counter conventional threats in Asia, considering the growth of PRC nuclear capabilities and our choice of strategy.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Top Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0207, Asia, 471.61, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limdis. Prepared by Colonel Paul Murray on March 18 and approved by Armistead Selden (ISA). According to Kissinger's record of schedule, the meeting took place from 3:07 to 4:40 p.m. A short, handwritten note appears at the bottom of the page: "Interesting—worth reviewing." A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on March 22. Two other records of this meeting exist. One, written by Gathright of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69; and the other is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. According to the NSC record, the meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The NSC version is virtually a verbatim record of the meeting.

² NSSM 69 is Document 18 and NSSM 106 is Document 97.

³ In a March 9 briefing memorandum to Kissinger, K. Wayne Smith noted: "This study has a long and tortured history. It was initiated in July 1969—almost 20 months ago—and responsibility for it was given entirely to OSD (ISA)." He added that the "basic study" was completed in July 1970, and agency comments were received by September. After discussing some of the disputes in drafting the report, both inside DOD and among other agencies, Smith wrote: "DOD after being given complete responsibility for the study almost two years ago, has again failed to come up with a document that is substantively and bureaucratically ready for Presidential consideration." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-053, SRG Meeting, Nuclear Policy for Asia, (NSSM 69) 3/12/71)

⁴ A handwritten note, apparently by Laird, describes "strategic forces" as "nuclear."

2. The degree of reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to counter conventional threats, with consideration given to location and quantity of deployment.

3. The posture and employment of General Purpose Forces.

Mr. Packard agreed that this was a fair statement of the issues and made the point that the situation with regard to the PRC was different in that we have nuclear superiority. Further, we are not likely to be in a position to counter PRC aggression with conventional forces. Thus, in the Asian situation, there is greater reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, for countering the threat of nuclear attack, and against conventional attacks. Deterrence in Asia implies the use of strategic forces different from other areas. Tactical weapons can also be used in a strategic role, i.e., bombers, fighter bombers, and the like.

There followed a discussion of PRC nuclear capabilities and the potential of the PRC nuclear arsenal to present problems to our use of nuclear weapons. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could employ “battlefield” nuclear weapons without attacking PRC strategic weapons, since the disparity in nuclear strength might cause the PRC to consider any use of nuclear weapons by us as an attack on PRC strategic capabilities. Mr. Packard replied that for the present, we should combine any use of nuclear weapons with pre-emptive strikes against PRC nuclear capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger noted that there were several places in the study where the JCS warned that our nuclear capabilities against the PRC should not be at the expense of degrading SIOP capabilities, to which Mr. Packard replied that our capabilities should be increased so as to prevent such degradation.

The discussion then turned to the weapons deployment levels necessary in Asia. Mr. Packard reiterated that we must maintain the capability to use tactical nuclear weapons and to execute pre-emptive strikes. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Irwin stated that there was agreement that we must maintain a capability but the issue was at which level to maintain such capability. They advanced the thesis that as US conventional force levels in Asia were reduced, the level of deployed nuclear weapons should be similarly reduced. Mr. Packard observed that, in general, tactical nuclear weapon levels should conform to the presence of conventional forces, except for weapons delivered by aircraft.

General Westmoreland stated that we must maintain the capability to fight a war if necessary, and that war games show that the use of nuclear weapons would be necessary against major aggression in Asia.

This led to a discussion of the validity of the estimates of enemy attack capabilities used in the war games, the degree to which the use of tactical nuclear weapons would reduce the requirement for con-

ventional reinforcement, the use of nuclear weapons in Korea and elsewhere, the degree of warning we might expect of a major attack, and related issues.

Dr. Kissinger concluded this portion of the discussion with the statement that the necessity for a tactical nuclear capability was established, but the question was where it should be based.

Mr. Packard stressed the importance for deterrence of a visible, ready for employment capability. [1 line of source text not declassified]

In response to Dr. Kissinger's observation that the Department of State had a different opinion from a political point of view, Mr. Johnson said that State had no problem with the deployment of the F-4 squadrons, [1 line of source text not declassified] in Korea.

Mr. Packard said that he tended to agree but that the JCS had a different view which he was in the process of discussing with them and, in any case, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

[2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger then said that the NSSM 69 study was not complete enough to be forwarded to the NSC. An analysis was required, similar to that conducted regarding NATO, of the relationship between strategic, tactical nuclear, and general purpose forces, and how they should be employed in Asia. Another look should also be taken at the projected threat.⁵ He stated that a working group should be constituted to conduct the analysis and that he would be in touch with Mr. Packard on this matter in the next few days.

NSSM 106—US China Policy

Prior to addressing NSSM 106, Dr. Kissinger announced that the Secretary of State had requested an NSC meeting on NSSM 107, UN

⁵ On March 30 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Helms, Moorer, McCracken, and Shultz requesting further work on the response to NSSM 69. Kissinger essentially repeated questions 1–3 in the record of this meeting. He asked for the information by May 25 and expected that the Defense Program Review Committee would review the reports in June. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, NSC Files, Senior Review Group, February–August 1971) The NSC did not review NSSM 69 in 1971. On December 14, 1971, Kissinger noted that the December 8 meeting of the DPRC had agreed that further work was required on the response to NSSM 69 before submission to the NSC. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Helms, Johnson, Packard, McCracken, and Shultz; National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69) A 61-page executive summary of the October 1971 draft NSSM 69 report is *ibid*.

Membership and US China Policy. It was agreed that the meeting would be on Thursday, 25 March 1971.⁶

Dr. Kissinger then stated that the U/SM 91 study on trade and travel with Communist China was in the hands of the President.⁷ With regard to relaxation of travel restrictions, there were some problems raised by the Justice Department regarding validation of passports, but no other discernible problems. As for relaxation of trade controls, the President would probably want to take it in small steps.

Dr. Kissinger then asked about the status of the ACDA paper on Arms Control Talks with the PRC which was mentioned in the NSSM 106 study.⁸ Mr. Farley replied that it had already been forwarded to the Under Secretaries Committee. When Mr. Irwin indicated no knowledge of the matter, Dr. Kissinger said that he would inquire further.

Dr. Kissinger then opened the discussion of NSSM 106 by addressing the five options pertaining to US military presence on Taiwan.⁹ It was quickly agreed that Options 2 and 3 calling, respectively for the increase in US non-combat and combat military presence on Taiwan were not viable options in the current political climate.

Dr. Kissinger then addressed Option 5, which calls for the removal of US military presence from Taiwan, contingent upon a renunciation of force agreement in the Taiwan Strait Area between the US and the PRC, while retaining re-entry rights and maintaining our defense commitment to Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger asked if the Warsaw Talks were to resume, could we agree to remove our military presence from Taiwan if the Chinese Communists agreed to a renunciation of force?

Mr. Packard stated that the Department of Defense is concerned that the position of Taiwan in our total Asian posture has not been adequately addressed.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Interagency Group had looked at what forces we have on Taiwan and how they got there. When the DOD Annex of the study was mentioned as containing information on person-

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 342.

⁷ See Document 111.

⁸ See Document 109.

⁹ The five options were set forth in Section IV of the draft response to NSSM 106 (Document 97), which is not printed. They are: "1. Maintain present levels and composition of US military presence now on Taiwan. 2. Increase US non-combat military presence on and use of Taiwan. 3. Increase deployment of combat forces to Taiwan. 4. Decrease US military presence on and military use of Taiwan, while preserving reentry rights and retaining the contingency command and current advisory presence. 5. Contingent upon PRC willingness to agree to a mutual renunciation of force in the Strait area, remove all US military presence from Taiwan and the Strait area, except for a small liaison group on Taiwan, while retaining reentry rights and maintaining our defense commitments to Taiwan and the Pescadores."

nel strengths and functions,¹⁰ Dr. Kissinger stated that it did not give the right kind of information. What was needed was a grouping of forces into those required for the defense of Taiwan, those associated with Vietnam, and those performing other functions which could be relocated or phased out.

Mr. Green pointed to the necessity of reducing our strength on Taiwan along with our reduction elsewhere in Asia in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. He pointed to an apparent tendency to shift more military presence to Taiwan as we phase down elsewhere in Asia.

Dr. Kissinger again returned to the question of removing US forces if the Warsaw Talks are resumed. [2 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Packard made the point that our dispositions in Asia were predicated upon existing policies and strategy. If there were a major change in policy, adjustments would have to be made.

Dr. Kissinger once more asked if it is a tenable position to remove forces from Taiwan if a renunciation of force agreement could be achieved.

In response to a query by Mr. Irwin as to how much our capabilities would be degraded if our military presence on Taiwan were removed, General Westmoreland replied that as long as the PRC was a threat, Taiwan would be an important piece of real estate.

Mr. Green stated that removal of our military presence from the Taiwan Strait Area was the only meaningful thing we can do to bring about any kind of a relationship with Peking.

Dr. Kissinger then asked if State could produce an examination of just what a renunciation of force agreement would entail. He then asked if DOD would produce a study showing the impact on our capabilities in Asia of the removal of US military presence from Taiwan.¹¹

General Westmoreland asked if the retention of MAAG was visualized, to which Dr. Kissinger replied that this was part of the question.

¹⁰ See footnote 1, Document 110.

¹¹ Kissinger sent a memorandum on March 17 to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, and Helms, requesting information on force levels in Taiwan and a possible renunciation of force agreement with the PRC. He requested that he receive these reports by March 22. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 106) Document 110 details the Department of Defense response. Eliot forwarded a 6-page paper entitled "Renunciation of Force Agreement with PRC" to Kissinger on March 24. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) The NSC staff distributed the paper to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness on the same day. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 106)

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

General Westmoreland cautioned that reduction in or removal of our military presence on Taiwan may require backtracking in our phasedown in Japan and Okinawa.

Note: A study directive will be forthcoming on the above mentioned DOD and State supplementary studies.

After a brief and inconclusive discussion of options concerning the GRC legal position and the future status of Taiwan,¹² the meeting was adjourned.

¹² Reference is to options set forth in Section IV of the draft response to NSSM 106 (Document 105), which is not printed. The four options are: 1. "Continue our present policy of maintaining diplomatic relations only with the GRC, keeping silent about its claim to be the government of all of China, but making clear that we deal with the PRC on matters of mutual interest." 2. "State publicly that the question of which government is the legitimate government of China is not one which the US can decide and that we regard this issue to be a matter for peaceful resolution by the parties directly involved." 3. "Make public statements to the effect that we do not support the GRC claim to be the government of all China, but recognize it as the de facto government of Taiwan." 4. "Publicly support GRC claim to be the legitimate government of all China." NSSM 106 was discussed briefly during the National Security Council meeting of March 25; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 342.

109. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

China and Arms Control

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action.

ACDA Acting Director Farley has sent you the ACDA issues paper on “U.S.-China Arms Control Talks” which you asked about at the Senior Review Group Meeting on Friday, March 12 (Tab B).² In the paper it is proposed that the U.S. initiate with the Chinese an exchange of views on one or more of the following control measures:

- A renunciation of force declaration.
- A Washington-Peking hot line.
- Information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards.
- Agreement not to possess biological weapons.
- Pugwash-type unofficial arms control talks.
- A conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communication.

Regarding unofficial arms control talks, Mr. Farley notes that we have already suggested to the Romanians that they invite Chinese participation in the Pugwash Talks to be held in Bucharest this year. (The telegram was cleared with us.)³

In response to your request to Under Secretary Irwin, ACDA is now engaged in developing with State a renunciation of force declaration for negotiation with the Chinese.⁴

Mr. Farley states that other suggested recommendations in the paper need interagency review. These are summarized at Tab A. In order for you to have interested agency comments for consideration before the next SRG or NSC meeting on this subject, it would be advisable to have this paper circulated as soon as possible.

Recommendation

That you authorize Jeanne Davis to circulate the ACDA paper to State, Defense and CIA with a request for comments by March 24.⁵

² Attached but not printed. The 12-page issue paper, undated, was forwarded to Kissinger under a covering memorandum by Farley on March 16. (Ibid.) Farley and Green also sent a copy of the paper and a covering memorandum to Irwin on February 25. They hoped it would be considered in parallel with the SRG’s discussion of NSSM 106. (Ibid., RG 59, Lot Files: 74 D 164, Summaries of the Under Secretary’s Meetings with Kissinger, October 1970–March 1972) Handwritten notes on an agenda for a meeting between Irwin and Kissinger on March 16 read: “Briefly discussed. HK merely spoke of receiving it.” The meeting agenda is *ibid.* For the March 12 SRG meeting, see Document 108.

³ See Document 96.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 108.

⁵ There is no indication whether or not Kissinger approved this recommendation, but according to a note on the NSC Correspondence Profile attached to these documents, this effort was deferred. A short May 26 note from Holdridge to the NSC Secretariat observed that the document was being held because “more modest proposals on subject [are] being incorporated in NSSM [124] due June 4.” An attached anonymous note, September 7, reads: “HAK has deferred action on NSSM 124.” NSSM 124 is printed as Document 117.

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

**SUMMARY OF US-CHINA ARMS CONTROL TALKS
ISSUES PAPER**

Propose that the US and the PRC issue the following declaration, based on language and principles of the UN Charter:

The Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby declare their determination to settle all disputes which may arise between the two nations without resort to force or the threat of force, including nuclear force. As part of this declaration, both governments declare and resolve to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force, including nuclear force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

—Such a declaration would be a first step toward improving relations between the US and the PRC without any additional commitment on the part of the US since the language of the declaration would simply extend basic provisions of the UN Charter to the US-PRC relationship. Taipei would oppose such a US agreement with the PRC and would press us hard for reassurances that this would in no way alter the US agreement under the security treaty.

Propose that the United States and the PRC establish a direct secure communications link between Washington and Peking—a hot line.

—The advantage of a hot line would be its use during a crisis. The Chinese could easily accept this proposal without encumbering it with extraneous political conditions. The Soviets might take a gloomy view since it would provide an obvious means of secure communication between the Chinese and ourselves.

As a first step in discussing with Peking the problem of accidental nuclear war, we could provide the Chinese with the considerable amount of unclassified material available on US nuclear weapon safety program. We would invite an exchange of views and information on this subject.

—Whether or not reciprocated, this would benefit the US by focusing Chinese attention on the dangers of nuclear deployment. If the PRC responds we would gain valuable information on the Chinese weapons safety program, about which we now know nothing. The only cautionary involved is that this would have to be broached to the Chinese with very great care to avoid raising Peking's sensibilities that we were patronizing them.

After we ratify the Geneva Protocol, we could propose to the Chinese a joint statement renouncing the development, production and stockpiling of biological warfare agents.

—A proposal of this nature to the Chinese would be consistent with the President's public position and with our desire to encourage other states to renounce biological warfare. The principal disadvantage is that the Chinese might reject the approach due to our reservations regarding the use of tear gas under the Protocol or because of Chinese unwillingness to separate discussion of biological warfare from chemical warfare agents, a position taken by a number of other states including the USSR.

The United States, Britain and the USSR, the nuclear powers now active in arms control negotiations, could invite the other two nuclear powers, the PRC and France, to meet with them to exchange information and discuss accidental nuclear explosions or launchers, accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communications.

—All the nuclear powers have a real interest in this subject and the Soviets might not object because it would involve France as well as China and might meet some Soviet concerns as expressed in SALT. However, the Soviets might be suspicious of our motives in trying to include the Chinese in such talks. If the Chinese come they might use this forum to exploit differences among the nuclear powers.

110. Department of Defense Position Paper¹

Washington, undated.

DOD POSITION PAPER ON OPTION A-5 OF THE NSSM 106 STUDY

1. *Option A-5*: Contingent upon PRC willingness to agree to a mutual renunciation of force in the Strait area, remove all US military presence from Taiwan and the Strait area except for a small liaison group on Taiwan, while retaining re-entry rights and maintaining our defense commitment to Taiwan and the Pescadores.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-031, NSC Meeting, UN Representation and China, 3/25/71. Secret. See Documents 105 and 108. The Department of Defense also submitted a paper for the March 25 NSC meeting entitled "U.S. Military Elements on Taiwan." Davis distributed the DOD papers on March 24 under a covering memorandum. Both papers and the covering memorandum are *ibid.* Copies are also in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107. The March 25 NSC meeting focused upon Chinese representation in the United Nations and NSSM 107. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 342.

2. *Key Military Factors Requiring Consideration:*

a. A review of historical military problems in the Pacific have emphasized need for improved (1) reaction time as in the case of the *Pueblo* and EC-121 shootdown incident, (2) basing and logistical flexibility as in the early phases in Korea and Vietnam, and (3) timely and adequate intelligence in all cases. The current reductions of US force levels and increasing restrictions of basing arrangements in WESTPAC require that careful consideration be given to these factors. While the Nixon Doctrine reaffirms our current treaty arrangements, it emphasizes the development of the military capabilities of selected Asian nations. The improvement of the military capabilities of these countries will require constant, patient, and persistent US effort.

b. The rate of qualitative improvements in the PRC Armed Forces is such that it is predictable that this trend will continue to exceed improvements in GRC defensive capabilities. Thus, as this gap continues to increase, timely and effective support by US forces under the Mutual Defense Treaty will become more important.

c. Emphasis must therefore be continuously placed on the following key military factors:

- improvement of command and control capabilities, especially in emergency situations;

- development of a survivable intelligence system which will provide essential intelligence under all conditions and prevent critical intelligence gaps from occurring;

- dependence upon effective and survivable key communications systems to provide near real-time delivery of essential traffic such as command and control and intelligence traffic referred to above;

- adequate basing posture to support contingency plans with emphasis on maintenance of essential facilities to insure capability to conduct operations therefrom with minimal delay; and,

- development of designated friendly country military forces as rapidly as military assistance levels and country capabilities with US advice allow, which, in turn, would enable reductions of US force levels without significant reduction in overall US/Allied capabilities in East Asia.

3. *Analysis of Option as Stated:*

a. *Renunciation of Force Agreement:*

Although the type of agreement envisioned by the paper prepared by the Department of State decouples the troop reduction-withdrawal issue from the renunciation of force agreement,² certain assumptions are implicit in Option A-5 with regard to such an agreement:

(1) It would be unrealistic to attempt to decouple a US-PRC agreement from the Taiwan issue. The agreement must be acceptable to and adhered to by the GRC. Such an agreement would be, at least tacitly,

² Regarding the Department of State paper, see footnote 11, Document 108.

between the PRC and the GRC as well as between the US and the PRC. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the GRC would agree, especially in regard to the removal of US military presence and its political implications.

(2) It would not invalidate the Mutual Defense Agreement. While this agreement is considered essential by the US and the GRC, it is not evident that the PRC would agree to renunciation of force so long as the Mutual Defense Treaty remained in effect.

(3) The option as written assumes that the PRC would agree to a renunciation of force under terms which, from its viewpoint, would continue to remain essentially favorable to US interests, i.e., maintenance of Mutual Defense Commitment, re-entry rights, and small military liaison group. This appears to be an unrealistic assumption.

(4) If removal of US military presence is not linked to renunciation of force agreement and is accomplished prior to such agreement as an inducement to Peking, we will have degraded our own and the GRC capabilities as a political gesture. By tacitly ignoring the Taiwan issue in any US–PRC renunciation of force agreement, the removal of US military presence from Taiwan would be in the nature of a gamble, and not a response to reasonable assurances which should be implicit in any agreement consistent with our security interests. Ambiguity with regard to a PRC–GRC confrontation when both sides consider the matter a domestic issue of “one state” could serve as a stimulus to one or both sides to resort to force.

b. Other Implications:

(1) Removal of US military presence except for a small liaison group involves the removal of MAAG and TDC which would affect the key military factors cited in paragraph 2; elimination of other units and functions (e.g., communications and intelligence) would further compound this loss. The function and composition of “a small liaison group” should be clearly established. Such a group may not be acceptable to the PRC since they have announced that the removal of all US forces from Taiwan is a prerequisite to any US–PRC discourse. Moreover, despite a renunciation of force agreement, a nearly complete elimination of US military presence on Taiwan could be viewed by the PRC as a weakening of US resolve to honor commitments to the Mutual Defense Treaty, thereby lessening the restraints on PRC aggression against the GRC.

(2) The effect of the removal of US military presence on US ability to monitor GRC actions and react to PRC moves implies risk to US security interests in the absence of some means of effective and timely monitoring of possible PRC/GRC violations of a renunciation of force agreement.

(3) There is a requirement for comprehension of and careful definition of “US military presence” as used in the option. Military personnel are involved in such activities as MAP, FMS, loan, lease, co-production, mobile training teams, and similar activities. While they may not be based on Taiwan, frequent visits are made in connection with these activities, which are necessary to the maintenance of GRC military capabilities. To the PRC, such transient personnel may constitute “military presence,” as might routine and frequent calls at Taiwan of US military air and surface craft of various descriptions. A “military quarantine” could be an objective of the PRC, which would be unacceptable within the context of the option as stated.

c. Option A-5 vs Nixon Doctrine:

Inasmuch as Option A-5 would result in the removal of most US military presence from Taiwan, the impact on the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine would include the following:

(1) The removal of US military presence would severely impair or eliminate the ability of the US to either respond in emergencies in the Taiwan area or continue the advisory, technical, and logistic support necessary for the maintenance of the military capabilities of the GRC armed forces. Yet, it is an essential tenet of the Nixon Doctrine that indigenous armed forces are a part of the fabric of US security policy, and that those forces will be supplemented as necessary in the event of aggression, in accordance with our treaty commitments. It should be noted that the Military Assistance Act of 1961 as amended requires some form of US military presence in those countries receiving military assistance.

(2) The removal of our military presence from Taiwan would impact on other areas in East Asia where we are in the process of phasing down our military presence in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. The requirement to relocate various units and functions from Taiwan may cause some reversal in the process of phasing down elsewhere. Yet, there are political constraints on our ability to relocate to the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan. The combination of political sensitivities, fiscal constraints, and our overall policy of reducing our military presence in conformity with the Nixon Doctrine increasingly narrows the options available for maintaining our strategic posture in Asia.

(3) The impact on regional defensive capabilities of a US withdrawal from Taiwan would be counter to the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine which emphasizes that the defense and progress of other countries is primarily an individual responsibility, and secondarily a regional responsibility, to which US assistance and assurances are added. Japan has specifically expressed her concern over the continued security of Taiwan. The Philippines are also directly affected. Other nations throughout Asia could view a change in US policy regarding Taiwan with concern.

In his report to the Congress in February, 1971 on US Foreign Policy for the 1970's³, the President stated:

"In applying the Nixon Doctrine, we cannot move too fast without sapping the Asian sense of confidence and security which it is our purpose to sustain and nurture. And we cannot cut our own contributions to Asian security without providing for their assumption by our Asian friends. Thus, there is built into the decision to reduce our own presence the obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring. To do otherwise is to undercut our fundamental goal of creating a stable structure in Asia."

d. *Summary Comment:*

Although the option as stated may appear to be a credible course of action, analysis of the implications of the option render it largely academic. If the PRC were to agree to a renunciation of force agreement vis-à-vis Taiwan, they would be compromising their basic tenet that the Taiwan problem is a domestic affair, wholly within their own right and purview to settle in any manner they may see fit, and without outside interference. Although it is conceivable that the PRC might reverse their position on this matter as a tactic, it is scarcely credible that they would do so under terms largely favorable to US interests, as set forth in the option as stated. A more credible course of action by the PRC would be agreement on the renunciation of force issue only in return for a complete and unconditional US military evacuation of the area, to include renunciation of the US–GRC Mutual Defense Treaty. The PRC could conceivably enter a bilateral renunciation of force agreement with the US without reference to the present US–GRC Mutual Defense Treaty; however, any US commitment of force in support of the Taiwan Defense Treaty could be viewed by the PRC and other nations as a unilateral, US abrogation of the renunciation of force agreement.

The advantages and disadvantages of Option A–5 set out on pages 35–36 of the NSSM–106 response require careful consideration in conjunction with the more detailed US force compositions and mission statements furnished with this paper. The principal advantage of Option A–5 is stated as follows: "The PRC might be persuaded on this basis to set aside the Taiwan issue as the main obstacle to an improvement in US–PRC relations." This is at best a possibility not a probability since US military presence on Taiwan is but one facet of US–PRC disagreement over Taiwan as the NSSM response itself delineates. Most of the disadvantages of the option, however, involve neither possibilities

³ "Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 25, 1971," in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

nor probabilities but foregone conclusions and real costs in military capabilities. Therefore, as the option suggests, its adoption would result in a tenuous possibility vis-à-vis the PRC in exchange for high costs in military capabilities and at least a probable negative political impact on our Asian Allies.⁴

⁴ Defense officials continued to voice concerns on the issue of military presence on Taiwan. In JCSM-388-71, August 30, Moorer wrote to Laird that "A severe impact on US security interest would be caused by removal of US military presence from Taiwan." Moorer added: "Relocation can be accomplished but not without considerable difficulty and cost. The impact would be substantial in terms of politico/military considerations, reduced tactical and strategic military posture, and major increases in fiscal/budgetary requirements, including new construction at the relocation sites." (Washington National Records Center, RG 350, OSD Top Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0207, China (Nats) 323.3)

111. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People's Republic of China and the United States

As you requested, I have asked the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to produce some suggested changes in the U.S. trade and travel regulations with respect to Communist China with a view toward implementing additional relaxations in our present controls.² These steps would be intended to further your policy of broadening communications between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China by removing obstacles to personal and commercial contacts.

The Under Secretaries Committee went all out and developed a large package of proposals which sets a workable course in the direc-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² See Document 101.

tion which you desire.³ The Committee did so, not in the expectation of any substantial immediate increases in trade or travel, but because the adoption of these proposals would show the genuineness of our desire to improve relations and possibly eventually develop significant trade. No new legislation or negotiations with the Chinese would be required.

At the same time, however, the Committee's proposals would, if fully implemented, put a severe strain on our relations with the GRC and perhaps cause a crisis in U.S.–GRC relations. There would also be implications for our relations with the USSR. It therefore appears that a balance will need to be struck between furthering your objectives with respect to Communist China on the one hand, and the desirability of minimizing U.S.–GRC strains, and keeping a watch on Soviet reactions on the other. The questions of timing and the extent to which we should go in our approaches to Peking will clearly need to be carefully considered.

Accordingly, I have broken down the large package from the Under Secretaries Committee into three segments which we could carry out sequentially after an assessment of the results attained (including the Chinese Communist, GRC and Soviet responses) following each of the preceding segments. After assessing these results, we could then consider whether to go on to the next segment.

(Actually, in effect there were originally four segments, of which the first was the non-extension of U.S. passport restrictions on travel to the People's Republic of China after these restrictions expired on March 15. You have already approved this step on the basis of the position put forward by State, Defense, and other agencies—over the opposition of the Department of Justice—that the fabric of American society was strong enough to resist the additional strains which removal of the passport restrictions might put upon it via increased contacts between U.S. radicals and PRC intelligence agents.)

Group I—For Implementation Within the Near Future

Our purpose in this Group would be to show significant movement in the direction of easing travel and trade restrictions with Communist China while not going so far as to antagonize or alarm the GRC unduly nor complicate our relations with the USSR.

³ NSC-U/SM-91, Travel and Trade with Communist China, February 22, 1971, was forwarded by the Under Secretaries Committee to the White House on February 23. The report and covering memorandum are *ibid*. Information on the various drafts of this report is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, Under Secretaries Memoranda, NSC-U/SM 91.

—*Entry of Chinese.* Following the expiration of the restrictions against using U.S. passports to travel to Communist China, in order to establish our willingness to facilitate on a reciprocal basis a flow of people between the two countries, the Committee recommends a public statement by the U.S. Government offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the People's Republic of China to the U.S.⁴ This would implement your references to removing needless obstacles to broader opportunities for contacts in your Foreign Policy Report. Justice opposes this because it would afford the PRC better opportunities for intelligence acquisition, permit close clandestine contacts between American Maoists, advocates of domestic violence and the PRC, and make it easier for the PRC to recruit intelligence agents.⁵ Commerce favored increased travel as necessary to exploit commercial opportunities. State, Defense and the other agencies felt that the American people were sufficiently resilient to resist any added subversive burdens which the presence of Chinese Communist travelers might introduce. Very few Chinese are likely to apply in the foreseeable future.

—*Currency Controls.* Relaxation of our currency controls to permit Chinese use of dollars would be essential in conjunction with a decision to permit direct trade with China (discussed below), but could also be put into effect independently.

—*Bunkering.* The Committee recommends the ending of restrictions on American oil companies providing bunkers except on Chinese owned or chartered carriers bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This relaxation covers ships as well as planes, but would not affect our existing controls on entry of PRC carriers into U.S. ports.

—*Shipping.* The Committee recommends granting permission to U.S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and U.S.-owned foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports.

All of the foregoing moves involve relatively minor adjustments on our part and would inspire little or no reaction from the GRC and the USSR. The main GRC objection would be regarding the admission

⁴ On March 12 Kissinger indicated that the President had approved the end of passport restrictions, as suggested by the Under Secretaries Committee. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Department of State, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71, Vol. X) Kissinger also approved a Department of State telegram informing diplomatic posts of the new policy. (Telegram 42808 to posts in East and Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, March 13; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM-US) The Department of State announced the new travel policy on March 15. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 12, 1971, p. 510)

⁵ Kleindienst relayed these concerns, primarily from the FBI, to Hartman in a February 21 letter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

of Chinese Communists into the U.S., and we could anticipate receiving an official GRC expression of concern at the Ambassadorial level. The totality of our moves would of course bother the GRC, but probably not to a point where real trouble would ensue. The Soviets would be suspicious of our intent and also suspect some behind-the-scenes U.S.-Chinese contacts, but are not likely to make much of an issue out of the individual moves.

There is, however, a more complex proposal in Group I which deserves special attention:

—*Trade*. The Committee recommends that we should now commence relaxation of our controls on direct trade between the United States and China. With Defense and Commerce dissenting, it observes that, "The closer our treatment of trade with the PRC approaches that applied to the Soviet Union, the more seriously our assertions of willingness to improve relations with the PRC will be believed, and the more likely it becomes that Peking will eventually respond favorably to our initiatives." Defense and Commerce take the position that we should not set in advance a policy of bringing our trade controls with China into line with those affecting the USSR.⁶ In fact, a public policy of placing China trade on a par with Soviet trade would be galling to both the GRC and the Soviets. The Soviets would take the equal treatment of China with them as an intentional slight, and would profess to believe that this signified U.S. intentions to go further in the political field. Even though many of the trade measures would obviously be in the U.S. commercial interest, the Soviets would not accept such explanations. The GRC's view would be that a stated policy of putting China trade on the same basis as that with the USSR, when added to the totality of the other moves in Group I, indicated a definite U.S. intention of downgrading GRC interests in favor of improving relations with Communist China. In the formal sense, the GRC's response would probably be to lodge a diplomatic protest, but we might in addition expect GRC non-cooperation in other matters of joint concern such as Chirep tactics.

Nevertheless, the recommendation for commencing relaxation of our controls on direct trade was unanimous, and the upshot was to leave as an accepted course the approach favored by Defense and Commerce: to place individual items under general license for direct export to the PRC only after interagency review to determine if they are of

⁶ The views of Packard and McLellan, representing the Departments of Defense and Commerce respectively, are spelled out in their March 1 and 5 letters to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

strategic significance. No material adverse reaction would be anticipated from either the USSR or the GRC, although a pro forma protest from the latter could be expected.

Once direct trade of a limited nature is on the books, the Committee would then favor direct imports from China of a similar and correlated limited nature.

Group II

A reasonable period after implementation of Group I, and following an evaluation of the results and the PRC, GRC, and Soviet reactions, the Under Secretaries Committee would report to you the effect of these moves on our relations with Moscow, Taipei, and Peking, and request approval to implement additional moves, as set forth below. In making these moves, we would be going beyond steps of a limited and still quasi-symbolic nature and working toward the development of substantial two-way trade. With the Group I steps already on the books, we would be making it plain that the relationship we seek with the Chinese is one of substance and not just show.

—*Exports.* Approve export to the PRC of all commodities currently under general license to the USSR except those deemed to be of strategic significance to the PRC.⁷

—*Imports.* Authorize direct commercial imports into the U.S. from the PRC on essentially the same basis as the Soviet Union in a manner correlated with allowing direct exports.

—*Aircraft Sales.* End the restriction against the sale by American and foreign airlines of older American civil aircraft not under COCOM restrictions, on a case-by-case basis, after strategic equipment is removed. This would provide the airlines with the capital to buy new American aircraft—which would be much welcomed by our industry.

With the Group II moves we would be coming close to placing trade with China and the USSR on much the same basis, and both the

⁷ Nixon wrote to Kissinger on April 27: "I note that the present line with regard to our China initiative is that trade with China should be on the same basis as trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. I realize this is our final objective. The question is whether we should consider now the timing of such announcements and whether this might not be a good move to make at an earlier time than we have anticipated for reasons that are obvious." (Ibid., Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memoranda, 1971) On April 28 Haig wrote to Kissinger: "Henry: We got a barrage of these [Presidential directives] today—all of which I have initialed action on. This one leaves me wondering whether the President reads his mail. I suppose the best bet is to review for him again, in more general and brief terms, the menu of Phase II and III actions that we have on the docket and your belief that they must be carefully orchestrated and the temperature tested every step along the way as we proceed towards the ultimate goal of comparability [*sic*] in our trade with China and the Soviet Union." Kissinger initialed the option marked "Proceed this way" at the bottom of this memorandum. According to an attached May 12 note from the NSC Secretariat staff, the "requirements" for reviewing the issue with Nixon "had sort of gone away." (Ibid.)

Soviets and the GRC would, for the reasons outlined above, be disturbed. They on balance would both probably live with the situation, however, though we could anticipate a strong protest from the GRC coupled with the difficulty already noted in obtaining its cooperation in matters such as Chirep. If we did succeed in getting its cooperation, the price would almost surely be considerably higher than would have been the case otherwise.

I might note that the question of the sale of older American civil aircraft to China could become an active issue, since Pakistan International Airlines is attempting to dispose of some Boeing 720s to the Chinese. This issue, if it actually arises (there has been no firm Chinese offer), could be handled as a separate item from the other steps with fewer repercussions and problems.

Group III

A reasonable period after implementation of Group II, the Under Secretaries Committee would report to you the effect of these moves on our relations with Moscow, Taipei, and Peking, and request approval to implement a final group of steps. These would make it very evident that we would be willing to go a considerable distance in improving relations with the Chinese Communists, and to this end would be prepared to accept a large measure of Soviet and GRC displeasure.

—*Trade Delegations.* The Committee recommends authorization of a proposal to the PRC to exchange trade delegations if circumstances warrant. Justice opposes for the same reasons cited under the travel option (Group I). The Chinese delegation would, by the very nature of the regime, be an official one, and ours would probably assume something of an official character in the public eye.

—*Grain Sales.* The Committee notes that a decision in the export field to permit grain sales to the PRC—a major importer of grain—would raise the question of whether to allow more favorable treatment of the PRC than the USSR by not requiring that 50 percent be shipped in American bottoms. If we do extend the 50 percent requirement to apply to the PRC, we might defeat the purpose of permitting sales of grain to the PRC because of high shipping costs. Moreover, regulations would have to be amended to permit U.S. ships to call at Chinese ports.

Waiving the 50 percent shipping requirement would constitute more favorable treatment for China than for the USSR in a historically sensitive area, and might be misunderstood politically abroad. In addition, the longshoremen and other unions have vehemently opposed any relaxation of the shipping requirement for the USSR; they would presumably be at least equally vociferous against Communist China, for both commercial and ideological reasons. The unions would maintain their opposition against the USSR if we were to relax on both to avoid a discrimination in favor of China.

If we were to take this step, you would be taking on a major domestic political battle. Since previous relaxations would have placed our trade with China and the USSR under approximately the same level of restrictions, I see no need to allow the PRC more favorable treatment by exempting grain exports from the 50 percent American bottom shipping requirement. However, Agriculture vigorously favors this move.

If you disapproved waiving the 50 percent shipping requirement, you would wish to consider amending regulations to permit U.S. ships to call at PRC ports, which is necessary in view of the 50 percent shipping requirement to make grain sales a credible possibility and thereby to avoid legitimate PRC claims that our moves are a sham.

A strong adverse reaction could be anticipated from both the USSR and the GRC to the steps in Group III. From the Soviet standpoint, a more favorable treatment for China than the USSR is the question of requirements for using American ships would indicate that the U.S. attached a higher value to good relations with China than with the USSR. Selling grain on the same terms would not cause as much of a reaction, but even in this case the Soviets would be suspicious that our motives were political rather than economic. Even if an attempt to sell grain came to nothing, the Soviets would mark it down as a sign of a change in the U.S. attitude.

The GRC would focus first upon the official quality of the proposed trade delegations, seeing in them a U.S. desire to move toward diplomatic relations with Peking. Grain sales and shipments to China on terms more favorable than those granted the USSR would signify the same thing to the GRC. (Grain sales alone would not be regarded differently from any other non-strategic trade item, however.) Since the GRC would assume as a corollary a U.S. disposition to bargain away its interests, we would need to take into our calculus the possibility of a severe crisis in U.S.–GRC relations. Management of such a crisis could prove very difficult, and we might not be able to count on the GRC's past practice of backing away from extreme positions which it threatens to take.

*Recommendation:*⁸

That you approve the implementation of the steps outlined in Group I.

That you authorize me to inform the Under Secretaries Committee that the further steps proposed by it will be considered only after due consideration of the results gained from the Group I steps, including an assessment of the reactions of the PRC, the GRC, and the USSR.

⁸ Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations.

112. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Possible Significance of PRC Invitation to U.S. Table Tennis Team to Visit China

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from State discussing the possible significance of the recent Chinese invitation to a U.S. Table Tennis Team to visit China.² Its main points are as follows:

—The invitation to the U.S. Table Tennis Team to visit China is the first such extension of hospitality to any U.S. sports group since the Communists came to power in 1949.

—The invitation comes at a time when Peking is allowing increasing numbers of foreign visitors to enter China. It follows closely on our March 15 termination of the restriction on U.S. passports for travel to China. The Chinese invitation may be intended as a gesture in response to this and other U.S. initiatives.

—The primary significance of the invitation is its reflection of Peking's openness and self-confidence in handling its foreign relations. This is part of Peking's effort to present an agreeable face to the world in its drive to gain entry into the UN this autumn.

—The possibility of Peking allowing Senators Javits and Mansfield to visit China may also be seen as part of Peking's "smiles" diplomacy.

Comment. The Chinese may also anticipate that these visits may result in further criticism of Administration policy (Mansfield, for example, would be calling on Sihanouk).

Senator Javits has been keeping State informed of his efforts through the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking to gain entry to China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. The attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that the memorandum was "Noted by HAK."

² Attached but not printed is an April 7 1-page memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Kissinger's April 8 daily briefing memorandum informed the President of the April 7 invitation. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 32, President's Daily Briefs) More information on White House involvement in the ping-pong team's visit to the PRC is *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 3.

The Chinese reacted positively to the Norwegian Ambassador's approach on behalf of Javits but have not yet replied.³

³ In telegram 869 from Oslo, March 24, the Embassy reported on a discussion between the Norwegian Ambassador to the PRC, Aalgaard, and Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. "Aalgaard mentioned Senator Javits' wish to visit China. This aroused great interest. Chiao will himself take up this matter." After receiving further information from the Department of State, Ambassador Crowe passed Javits' itinerary to the Norwegians, who sent it to Aalgaard in Beijing. The plans for Javits' visit went no further than the planning stage. (Telegram 869 and telegram 1385 from Oslo, May 13; are both *ibid.*, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway Vol. I) More information on Javits' attempts to visit the PRC is *ibid.*, Box 819, Name Files, Senator Javits.

113. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1971, 11:31 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President, Ambassador Chow and Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Chow who is leaving his position to return to Taipei as Foreign Minister came in at what was originally a courtesy call but, because of the visit of the Ping Pong Team to China, has taken on added significance.² Ambassador Chow began the meeting by thanking the President for his many courtesies and saying he wanted the President to know that he always understood that the President and I were the best friends of China in this Administration.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, President/HAK Memcons, Memcon—the President, Kissinger, and Amb. Chow Apr. 12, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The President's Daily Diary indicates that Chow met with the President from 11:31 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. and that Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol for the Department of State, was also present. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files) The conversation was recorded by the White House taping system. The statements in quotations marks are actually paraphrases. (*Ibid.*, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, 11:28 a.m.–12:41 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

² Shortly before Chow entered the room, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the visit of the U.S. ping-pong team to the PRC. Noted Nixon, "One interesting thing that we're saying goodbye to him on the day that the ping-pong team, waited, you know, ping-pong team makes the front page of *The New York Times*." Responded Kissinger, "They are very subtle though, these Chinese." Nixon replied, "You think it means something." Kissinger stated, "No question." (*Ibid.*)

The President said, “I want you to convey my warmest greetings to Generalissimo and Madam Chiang. We will stick by our treaty commitments to Taiwan; we will honor them. I said so in my State of the World Report.³ We will do nothing in the trade and travel field which is in derogation of friendship to your President and to Madam Chiang. On the other hand, we will take some steps in the next few days that are primarily to be seen as part of our world perspective, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.” [Note: The President said this because he thought it would be an unbearable loss of face for the Ambassador to begin his career as foreign minister having seen the President and not being warned of impending relaxations.]⁴

The President continued, “On the UN membership issue, some of our friends have deserted us. We are prepared to fight for you but we want to do it in an effective way. I have many proposals on various schemes such as dual representation. I will make this decision, not the State Department. Some people say, let’s find a clever way of doing it, but there is no clever way of being defeated. There is no change in our basic position, but there may have to be some adaptation of our strategy. We, however, before we make a decision want to talk to you. I am sending Ambassador Murphy to Taiwan; he is going there on business anyway, and the Generalissimo should talk to him as he talks to me. Taiwan and the UN is a fact of life for us and we will do nothing to give it up, but we have to be intelligent and we want to hear your views.”

Chow said, “We appreciate your special attention; above all, don’t spread the impression that all is lost.” The President then asked me to explain the choices on China representation, and I summed up the memorandum that I had written to him on the subject (copy attached).⁵ The President asked Chow for his analysis.

Chow said, “We could stick them out for Universality plus the Important Question.” I said, “Will the IQ carry and Universality lose?”

³ Apparent reference to the “Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Relations,” February 25, 1971, in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

⁴ Brackets in the source text. Shortly before Chow arrived, Kissinger reminded Nixon: “Mr. President, one more thing I want to mention, about the Chinese Ambassador. He’s going to be the Chinese foreign minister, and we’re going to announce the relaxation of our trade restrictions [with the PRC]. He’s going straight back to Taipei. I wonder whether you could just mention that to him, so that he doesn’t arrive there with a severe loss of face after seeing you and not having been told about it. Now this first group, there are actually three groups of relaxations. The first one is minor, the entry of Chinese, currency controls, bunkering, some shipping restrictions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

⁵ Probable reference to an April 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 344. See also Document 167 in this volume.

Chow said, “No, this depends on how it is formulated.” He then raised this issue of the Senkaku Islands.⁶ It has to do with the protection of the Chinese Nationalist interests. If Taiwan can do that, then intellectuals and overseas Chinese will feel they must go to the other side. The State Department statement insisting that this is part of Okinawa has had violent repercussions. This will get a movement of overseas Chinese.⁷ The President said, “I want you to know that the relaxation of trade that we are planning is mostly symbolic; the important issue is the UN. We will be very much influenced by what the Generalissimo will think. As long as I am here, you have a friend in the White House and you should do nothing to embarrass him. The Chinese should look at the subtleties. You help us and we will help you. I want Murphy to bring his report personally to me. We will stand firm as long as we can, but we must have an army behind us.”⁸

After an exchange of pleasantries, the meeting ended.⁹

⁶ Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawa sparked renewed Chinese interest in the Senkaku Islands (Taioyutai or Daiyoyutai in Chinese). Chow gave a 4-page aide-mémoire to Green on September 16, 1970, outlining the ROC’s objections to Japanese sovereignty over these islands. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 61, Subject Files, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–September 1970) Shoemith summarized reports of student demonstrations in Taipei against Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands and noted: “The Embassy believes that the initiative for the demonstrations has come from the students rather than the government. But the latter probably has given tacit approval out of reluctance to oppose the fruits of youthful patriotism and its own dissatisfaction over our China policy and oil exploration moratorium.” (Memorandum from Shoemith to Green, April 17; *ibid.*, Lot 75 D 76, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–March 1971) There were also student protests in the United States and Hong Kong. The White House tape of the April 12 meeting indicates that Chow emphasized that the final disposition of the Senkakus should be kept open, and that this issue was a measure of the ROC’s ability to protect itself. He emphasized the symbolic importance of the islands. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

⁷ After Chow left the Oval Office, the President remarked that Chow was correct on the need to consider the political views of overseas Chinese. (*Ibid.*)

⁸ Nixon remarked that he would not raise the issue of the U.S. position in public, but, if asked, would say that it had not changed. He also emphasized that Murphy’s visit would be private, with no press coverage, and that Murphy would report to the White House, not the Department of State. Finally he urged Chow to be “mum” about the United Nations issue until after Murphy visited Taiwan. (*Ibid.*) The White House also wanted to limit speculation by U.S. officials concerning policy toward China. An April 14 memorandum from Kissinger to the Acting Secretary of State reads in its entirety: “In the wake of recent developments, the President has asked that all substantive comments by U.S. officials, including responses to formal press inquiries, background statements on and off-the-record remarks and guidance to Posts abroad, concerning U.S. relations with the Peoples Republic of China be cleared with him through my office.” (*Ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

⁹ At the end of this sentence is a comment in brackets: “End of tape.” In fact the White House taping system continued, as Nixon and Kissinger discussed Chow’s visit, then welcomed Anna Chennault into the Oval Office for a short talk.

114. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1971, 3:31–3:47 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Chow Shu-kai, Departing Ambassador of the Republic of China
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Republic of China

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to see Ambassador Chow briefly to express his personal sentiments on how much he had enjoyed having Ambassador Chow in Washington. He wanted, too, to repeat the sentiments which had been expressed earlier by the President on this same score. Dr. Kissinger then referred to what the President had said concerning moves which the U.S. might possibly make toward Communist China, indicating that some steps might be taken this week. However, this had nothing to do with U.S. relations with the GRC, and quite frankly, were undertaken in order to prevent Russia from being the dominant country in dealing with Communist China. Ambassador Chow noted that he could understand this.²

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that we had picked a few steps which might be taken now, such as travel. While we could let a few Chinese Communists in, it was doubtful they would be breaking down our doors asking for visas. Ambassador Chow again noted that he could see our point—the new steps might make the Russians more amenable. Nevertheless, he didn't know if the Russians would respond to this approach, and Peking would be put in the middle between both

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted on April 14. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. In an April 14 covering memorandum, Holdridge suggested that no further distribution be made. Kissinger initialed his approval. (Ibid.) Kissinger and Chow met from 3:31 to 3:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 480, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² During April 1971 there were signs that the Republic of China had accepted the U.S. position. Kearns reported that he spoke privately with Chiang Ching-kuo after a dinner at McConaughy's home in Taipei. He paraphrased Chiang as follows: "It is necessary for us to publicly oppose actions taken by the United States Government that favor the Chinese Communists. However, we wish the President to know that we understand the necessity of taking such actions at this time." Chiang asked that his message be relayed to the President, and Peterson forwarded it on April 17. (Memorandum from Kearns to Peterson, April 15, and memorandum from Peterson to Nixon, April 17; both in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443 and William P. Rogers' Official and Personal Papers, White House Correspondence)

the U.S. and Moscow. Dr. Kissinger agreed that there were limits to what the Russians could do. This was a very complicated game. Ambassador Chow described the U.S. approach as a highly sophisticated one, which couldn't be explained very easily to the people on Taiwan. He would need to report to his President on this matter in generalized terms. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that no one in Washington outside of a very few knew what was to be undertaken. In fact, a long list had been presented, of which we were taking but a few items.

Ambassador Chow said that in the measures the U.S. was taking which affected his country, the understanding if not the support of the Chinese people was needed. He described the strong sentiments which various Chinese groups had with regard to a number of issues, particularly the question of the status of Senkaku Islets. The demonstration which had taken place in Washington on April 10 was a case in point—those demonstrating had been scientists, engineers, and professional people and not just students. The demonstration had come on all of a sudden because these people had become excited, and was symbolic of what they and the country would stand for. Ambassador Chow declared that he had been asked by President Chiang to take up the Senkaku question with the President and Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he was looking into the Senkaku matter, and asked Mr. Holdridge to forward a report to him on the issues involved by April 13.³

Ambassador Chow, in commenting further on the Senkakus, remarked that even when the Japanese had occupied Taiwan and the Ryukyus, legal matters involving the Senkakus had been handled by courts on Taiwan, and the fishing boats which went to the Senkakus had been from Taiwan. From the Japanese point of view, they didn't care how the Senkakus were administered. For the Chinese though, the issue of nationalism was deeply involved.

Ambassador Chow referred to the fact that there would be some decisions required with respect to the General Assembly next year and he hoped that the "other side" (i.e., the Chinese Communists) could be kept out. Whatever formula was advocated, the Chinese position had to be made tenable in the eyes of the people. Moreover, regardless of what was proposed, it would be hard to sell.

Ambassador Chow went on to discuss the desirability of like-minded nations in East Asia working more closely together. He described ASPAC as something of a social club of the foreign ministers, who put forward differing views on various subjects. The Koreans and the Japanese, for example, were quite far apart on many issues. His

³ See Document 115.

idea was for countries such as the ROC, Korea, Thailand and Vietnam to have more and closer consultations. This would not be like a “minor club,” but would have a real purpose in such things as military matters. Such a grouping, having more or less of a joint stand, would make it easier for the U.S. to make military moves. The group could come to the U.S. and say that it would back the U.S. up. If the four governments could be gotten together, more planning could be undertaken on issues such as the UN, and a parallel approach maintained instead of each government going its separate way. The U.S. would be expected to be a benevolent friend. It wouldn’t necessarily be expected to act, and the other nations would have to do things for themselves, but the tacit backing of the U.S. was needed. Rivalries had to be avoided, since there were already enough adversaries in the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that in these days, anyone who stands up to the Communists comes under attack; this was not from the Communists but from fellow citizens. Ambassador Chow referred to the existence of rumors that the U.S. was giving up, and of the need to arrest the trend of assuming that such was the case. Dr. Kissinger said that he agreed. We did not believe that we had to demonstrate our wisdom and political sagacity by destroying our friends. This was very much in the President’s mind. On the UN issue, we would send someone to the ROC to explain our position, and would need some support from the ROC side. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Chow to explain to his President that our President was a true friend, and that there had to be understanding between the two.

Ambassador Chow stated that he would look upon his role in Taiwan as Foreign Minister as being one of support for the U.S. position. He considered himself very proud to have known Dr. Kissinger, whom he regarded as a friend. He asked that Dr. Kissinger allow him the privilege of communicating directly with him. Dr. Kissinger replied that he definitely wanted Ambassador Chow to do so. If Ambassador Chow should write and let Dr. Kissinger know his private reactions, this would be a tremendous help. He wanted Ambassador Chow to know that in his opinion, he, Ambassador Chow, had always conducted his affairs here with dignity, and when in Taiwan should feel he had two friends in the White House. If we were obliged to do things which caused them pain, this would be to the minimum extent possible. He assured Ambassador Chow that we would do nothing without checking with the ROC. As far as our moves toward the Chinese Communists were concerned, they were mainly of significance with respect to the USSR and in response to our own domestic situation. Ambassador Chow said that he could see the U.S. point of view in both cases, although there were of course questions raised with respect to mainland China.

115. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Chinese Claim to the Senkaku Islets

You asked for information on the Chinese claim to the Senkaku Islets. The most recent summary of this was contained in a Note Verbale sent the State Department by the Chinese Embassy on March 15 (Tab A).² Its main points are as follows:

—As early as the 15th century Chinese historical records considered the Senkakus as the boundary separating Taiwan from the independent kingdom of the Ryukyus.

—The geological structure of the Senkaku Islets is similar to that of other islets associated with Taiwan. The Senkakus are closer to Taiwan than to the Ryukyus and are separated from the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end of the Continental Shelf, which is 2,000 meters in depth.

—Taiwanese fisherman have traditionally fished in the area of the Senkakus and called at these islets.

—The Japanese Government did not include the Senkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until after China's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895.

—For regional security considerations the GRC has hitherto not challenged the U.S. military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to international law temporary military occupation of an area does not affect the ultimate determination of its sovereignty.

—In view of the expected termination of the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, the U.S. is requested to respect the GRC's sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and restore them to the GRC when this termination takes place.

Comment. As you can imagine, the Japanese Government has a comparable list of apparently offsetting arguments and maintains sim-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on April 23.

² Attached but not printed.

ply that the Senkakus remain Japanese. State's position is that in occupying the Ryukyus and the Senkakus in 1945, and in proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes no judgement as to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which should be settled directly by the parties concerned.³

³ Kissinger's handwritten comment in the margin reads: "But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?"

116. National Security Decision Memorandum 105¹

Washington, April 13, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Attorney General

SUBJECT

Steps Towards Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People's Republic of China and the United States

The President has reviewed the recommendations forwarded by the Under Secretaries Committee on steps to increase personal and commercial contacts between the People's Republic of China and the United States,² and has directed that the following moves be undertaken:

—Issuance of a public statement offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the People's Republic of China to the U.S.

—Relaxation of currency control to permit Chinese use of dollars.

—Ending restrictions on American oil companies providing bunkers except on Chinese-owned or chartered carriers bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This relaxation covers ships as well as planes, but would not affect our existing controls on entry to PRC carriers into U.S. ports.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-223, NSDM Files, NSDM 105. Secret. Copies were sent to Connally, Stans, Moorer, and Shakespeare.

² See Document 111.

—Granting permission to U.S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and for U.S.-owned foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports.

—Commencement of a relaxation of controls on direct trade between the U.S. and China by placing individual items under general license for direct export to the PRC after item-by-item interagency review to determine if they are of strategic significance. The Under Secretaries Committee is to be charged with the responsibility of determining which items should be placed on general license, and should forward a report within 30 days requesting approval of these determinations. Upon the commencement of these limited direct exports, direct imports from China of a similar and correlated nature will be allowed.³

The President has also directed that the Under Secretaries Committee review and report to him after a period of four months the results of the steps taken. The report should include an assessment of the reactions to these steps by the PRC and the GRC.⁴ The President will then determine whether implementation of additional steps recommended by the Under Secretaries Committee may be warranted.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ The President announced these changes on April 14. See Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1971, pp. 567–577. The changes were forwarded to all diplomatic posts in circular telegram 63580, April 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHICOM–US) The Departments of State, Commerce, Transportation, and Treasury announced the regulations designed to implement the President’s decision on May 7. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 31, 1971, pp. 702–704) The White House announced the list of products that could be sold under general export licenses (without the need for Department of Commerce permission for each transaction) on June 10. (Ibid., June 28, 1971, pp. 815–817)

⁴ The Department of State kept the White House informed on the largely positive reactions to this decision. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT CHICOM–US) The Department, relying upon a CIA report, also informed Kissinger that the People’s Republic of China was waiting to see whether it would enjoy the same trading privileges as the Soviet Union. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 27, with attached CIA Intelligence Information Cable; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

117. National Security Study Memorandum 124¹

Washington, April 19, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China

The President has directed a study of possible diplomatic initiatives which the United States might take toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the objective of furthering the improvement of relations. These initiatives should explore the degree to which it is possible to build on recent progress. They should be put into the context of our relations towards other countries, especially the USSR and Japan.

The analysis of each possible diplomatic initiative should include:

- the objectives of the initiative;
- anticipated reaction or response by the PRC;
- the advantages and disadvantages of the initiative;
- an assessment of the possible effects on our relations with and the anticipated reactions of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), the USSR, Japan and other nations as appropriate;
- an illustrative scenario by which the initiative could be pursued.

The initiatives should be placed into various groups of increasing scope and also include consideration of appropriate arms control measures included in the ongoing studies provided for by NSSMs 69 and 106 on this subject.²

The study should assume that there will be no change in our policy of recognition of or support for the Government of the Republic of China.

The President has directed that this study be prepared on a priority basis by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 124. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer.

² See Documents 18, 97, 105, and 108.

submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by May 15, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.³

Henry A. Kissinger

³ Joseph Walter Neubert, Acting Deputy Director for Policy, Planning and Coordination Staff, forwarded NSSM 124 to Green on April 23. According to Neubert, Irwin requested that the Green coordinate the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia's work with other areas of the Department, then discuss the draft report with Rogers and himself. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 124) U.S. officials in Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong were asked to provide their views on further initiatives to improve relations with the People's Republic of China in telegram 71891, April 27. (*Ibid.*, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US) Hong Kong Consul General Osborn suggested five initiatives: organize a U.S.–PRC foreign ministers' conference, announce publicly the end of the Taiwan Strait patrol, reduce U.S. military forces on Taiwan, establish de facto trade representation in the PRC, and have private groups invite PRC diplomats to the United States. (Telegram 2763 from Hong Kong, May 3; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) In Taipei McConaughy discussed the reactions by ROC officials to U.S. policy changes, noting that "So far this cost [in relations with the ROC] has been moderate, but to some extent it is cumulative." (Telegram 2156 from Taipei, May 6; *ibid.*) On May 14 R.T. Curran, Deputy Executive Secretary, sent a memorandum to Davis to request that the report be delayed because Irwin, Green, and Trezise were traveling in Asia. (*Ibid.*) The final report was dated May 27; it is printed as Document 129.

118. Message From the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai to President Nixon¹

Beijing, April 21, 1971.

Premier Chou En-lai thanked President Yahya for conveying the message of President Nixon on 5 January 1971.² Premier Chou En-lai is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President Yahya conveys the following verbatim to President Nixon:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. According to a covering memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Hilaly called at 3:45 p.m. on April 27 and requested a 5-minute meeting as soon as possible: "He says he has an urgent message from his President having to do with Communist China." Hilaly and Kissinger met from 6:12 to 6:30 p.m., then Kissinger met with Nixon from 7 to 7:37 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) A handwritten copy of this statement, apparently prepared by Hilaly, is attached to the typed version. The versions are identical. Hilaly also handed over a record of his December 16, 1970, meeting with Kissinger, Document 100.

² See Documents 99 and 100.

“Owing to the situation of the time it has not been possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the U.S.A. to the Premier of People’s Republic of China.

“At present contacts between the peoples of China and the United States are being renewed. However, as the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored fundamentally, a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries. Therefore, the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions. Of course, if the U.S. President considers that the time is not yet right the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that it is entirely possible for public arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan.”

119. Letter From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Defense Attaché in France (Walters)¹

Washington, April 27, 1971.

Dear Vernon:

Mr. David McManis of Dr. Kissinger’s staff will deliver to you, together with this letter, two documents. The first (at Tab A) is a letter from Dr. Kissinger to Mr. Jean Sainteny² and asks him to assist us in a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK’s Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret.

² The undated letter to Sainteny reads in its entirety:

“Dear Jean: Once again, the President and I would like to impose on your invaluable good offices to assist us in a matter of the greatest sensitivity. The bearer of this message, Major General Vernon Walters (our Defense Attaché in Paris), will explain to you our specific need for your intercession. The project is one requiring the kind of skill and delicacy which have characterized your earlier efforts in our behalf and no one, other than the President, myself and General Walters is aware of it. Therefore, it is important that after talking to General Walters you inform no one of the nature of your conversation with him, with the exception of President Pompidou. Both the President and I hope you will find it possible to help. It would increase our already large debt of gratitude to you. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger.”

sensitive matter which you will, in turn, explain to him when you deliver the letter. You should, therefore, contact Sainteny, show Henry's letter to him and ask him to arrange a private meeting between you and the Ambassador to France of the People's Republic of China or with some other appropriate Senior Chinese Communist representative in Paris. In the meantime, Dr. Kissinger will alert Sainteny by telephone. It is important that Mr. Sainteny merely read Henry's letter to him and that you reclaim it after he has read its contents. Hopefully, Sainteny will then arrange a private meeting between you and a designated representative of the Chinese.

The second document (at Tab B) is a note which you should subsequently deliver to the designated representative of the People's Republic.³ The contents of this note should, under no circumstances, be divulged to Mr. Sainteny and you should merely tell Sainteny that you have been instructed to deliver a note, without further explanation of its nature or content.

In sum, we visualize the scenario as follows:

—You are to contact Mr. Sainteny who will have been alerted by Henry.

—Allow him to read Henry's letter to him, being sure to reclaim the letter at the end of the meeting and being sure not to divulge the content of the second note which is destined for the Chinese representative. At this meeting, flesh out Henry's letter by telling Sainteny that we hope he can arrange a private and secure meeting alone between you and an appropriate representative of the People's Republic assigned to France.

—Mr. Sainteny, in turn, will arrange an appropriate secure rendezvous between you and the Chinese representative. At this private meeting, you would then deliver the note at Tab B.

Please keep us posted on the scenario as it unfolds.

Best regards,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

³ The undated message reads in its entirety:

"In light of recent events, it seems important to have a reliable channel for communication between our two Governments. If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks that are strictly confidential, the President is ready to establish such a channel directly to him for matters of the most extreme sensitivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an improvement in US-Chinese relations fully recognizing the differences in ideology. On the United States side, such a channel would be known only to the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and would not be revealed to any other foreign country. If you are interested in pursuing this proposal, initial contact should be made with the bearer of this communication, Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché in Paris. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, would be prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on US-Chinese relations with whomever might be designated by the People's Republic of China to explore the subject further."

120. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 27, 1971, 8:18 p.m.

P: I had a couple of thoughts on this. One with regard to the Bruce² thing which seems to me may pose to them a difficult problem because of him being directly involved in the Vietnam negotiations. Secondly, let me think of whether there is something else—how about Nelson?³

K: No.

P: Can't do it, huh?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. This transcript was prepared by Kissinger's staff. There is also a tape of this conversation. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 27, 8:16–8:36 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 2–52) There are no substantive differences between the two versions.

² Reference is to David K.E. Bruce, former Ambassador to Great Britain and personal representative of the President with rank of Ambassador at the Paris talks with the Vietnamese. The President and Kissinger were discussing who might represent the United States in high-level meetings with officials from the PRC. Discussions between the President and Kissinger concerning contacts with the PRC continued on April 28. The two men, with H. R. Haldeman, re-hashed the previous day's list of potential envoys. John Connally and Kenneth Rush were also considered. The April 28 tape of this conversation, which took place in the President's office in the Executive Office Building, is of poor quality and much of it is unintelligible. Nixon and Kissinger were under the assumption that the first high-level meeting would be in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, although they discussed the possibility of meeting with PRC representatives in Paris. This secret meeting was to prepare for a subsequent trip by Nixon to Peking. While the first meeting would be private, it would be followed by a public envoy if the Chinese requested one. Kissinger suggested that he serve as the secret envoy, stating, "actually I don't want to toot my own horn, but I happen to be the only one who knows all the negotiations." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, April 28, 1971, 4:51–6:08 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 252–20)

³ Reference is to Nelson Rockefeller, businessman, philanthropist, and Governor of New York, 1958–1973. In his April 28 conversation with Kissinger, the President commented:

"Well my point is that he [Rockefeller] does not have the subtlety of moving around. He is the kind of a guy that wants to make a quick shot, dramatic, you know, bold. Now goddamn it, we're going to do things bold, but we don't want to fall down doing it. You can do it. The best thing, the best thing to do is this: Set up a secret negotiation. But the way I would start the telegram, I would say the President has considered, and he would like to arrange a visit to Peking. He believes, he would like to come to Peking. He thinks, however, that the best way to arrange that is for his, must be arranged at the highest level, the agenda, the modalities, et cetera should be arranged by Dr. Kissinger and whatever." (Ibid.)

K: Mr. President, he wouldn't be disciplined enough, although he is a possibility.

P: It would engulf him in a big deal and he is outside of the Government, you see.

K: Let me think about it, I might be able to hold him in check.

P: It is intriguing, don't you think?

K: It is intriguing.

P: How about Bush?

K: Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated enough.

P: I thought of that myself.

K: I thought about Richardson but he wouldn't be the right thing.

P: He is still too close to us and [I don't think it would set well with Rogers].⁴ Nelson—the Chinese would consider him important and he would be—could do a lot for us in terms of the domestic situation. No, Nelson is a wild [*hare?*] running around.

K: I think for one operation I could keep him under control. To them a Rockefeller is a tremendous thing.

P: Sure. Well, keep it in the back of your head.

K: Bush would be too weak.

P: I thought so too but I was trying to think of somebody with a title.

K: Nelson has possibilities.

P: A possibility, yeah. Of course, that would drive State up the wall.

K: He would take someone from State along but he despises them so much he will take our direction and I would send someone from our staff to go along.

P: Send Haig. Really, he's really tough.

K: And he knows Haig.

P: Henry, it wouldn't have happened if you hadn't stuck to your guns. We played a game and we got a little break. It was done skillfully and now we will wait a couple of weeks.

K: We have done it now, we have got it all hooked together; Berlin is hooked to SALT. Nelson might be able to do it, particularly if I sent Haig.

P: Oh, we would have to have Haig; and a State guy but not that Green guy.

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

K: Oh, Green could go. On foreign policy, Nelson would take my advice.

P: He would be a special envoy in a sense.

K: Actually, Mr. President, that's a very original idea and he's tough.

P: Particularly if you get him in right at the mountain top and say look, it will make or break you, boy.

K: Oh, he would do it and I could tell him on this one. On the long operation he would be hard to control but on this one he would be good.

P: If Dewey were alive, he could do it.

K: Nelson would be better.

P: But Dewey isn't alive.

K: If you can hold on a minute, I can get you—I have the oral note that the Pakistans sent me. Here it is—the Pakistan note to Yahya which Yahya passed on to the Chinese that asked him (read portion of note⁵—In reply to questions from me, Mr. Kissinger said . . .)

P: They opened that up on Taiwan.

K: On this ambiguous formulations could make that clear in the exchange and announcements.

P: Their reply is can not come over and talk about Taiwan. There is no limit to that because there is no meeting.

K: The difference between them and the Russians is that if you drop some loose change, when you go to pick it up the Russians will step on your fingers and the Chinese won't. I have reviewed all the communications with them and it has been on a high level.

P: Yeah, they have.

K: The Russians squeeze us on every bloody move and it has just been stupid. They cannot trick us out of Taiwan, they have to have a fundamental understanding.

P: Put Nelson in the back of your head. What did Haig think about this?

K: He thinks it is a great diplomatic move and if we play it coolly and toughly as we have until now, we can settle everything.

P: He said that.

⁵ All ellipses are in the source text. See Document 118.

K: Mr. President, I have not said this before but I think if we get this thing working, we will end Vietnam this year.⁶ The mere fact of these contacts makes that.

P: Another thing, of course, our little problem of time. In terms of wanting to announce—

K: We ought to be able to announce it by the first week in June anyway.

P: We would have to if we are going to be there in June. Is SALT going to turn them off?⁷

K: No, no.

P: Particularly, if we are going to drag our feet with the Russians on the Summit. They are fiddling around with it; well, let them fiddle.

K: They won't move fast because of the protests in this country. A more sophisticated analysis of the report was made by Chou En-lai.

P: His analysis in effect realized what we were doing.

K: A very subtle analysis of the international situation.

P: Well, anyway, there is another player we can keep. Bruce is another possibility too. It would be quite dramatic to pull Bruce out of Paris and send him to Peking.

K: For that reason, they might not take him.

P: In terms of Bruce, he is our senior Ambassador and we feel he is the best qualified man.

K: They would jump at Rockefeller, a high visibility one.

P: Visibility and it would be enormous. Can't you just see what that would do to the Libs in this country, oh, God. Rockefeller over there, Jesus Christ.

⁶ Vietnam figured prominently in their discussions. On April 28 the President told Kissinger: "What we are playing for basically is the Chinese summit, that's my plan. That is the big play. Now, that's only half of it, the other part of the play is to do something about this war. That's the other half of it." Kissinger responded: "With that, I think, those guys in '54 they needed peace, and they settled Vietnam then. They need peace now, it's got to have effect on Hanoi. That's one advantage of a public emissary." After a brief discussion Nixon allowed that they could send a public emissary later "for cosmetics." Nixon later added: "Well, let me say, before I get there, the war has to be pretty well settled. I'd just simply say, we can't come there until we have some idea. The fact must be known in the United States that the war is settled. I can't come to China before that." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, April 28, 1971, 4:51–6:08 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 252–20)

⁷ During the April 28 discussion, Kissinger observed: "They're [the Chinese] so scared of the Russians that they're better off having your visit next May or April and keeping it hanging and keep daring the Russians to attack them with the Presidential visit. That's what I think they want. I do not believe they want you now. That would be too quick a turn-around time for them." (Ibid.)

K: That has great possibilities.

P: Here is Rockefeller—he is lined up with us all the way; he has lined up with us on foreign policy all the way. Anyway, that is something to think about.

K: That's a good problem to have.

P: It is a good luxury to have.

K: Once this gets going—everything is beginning to fit together.

P: I hope so.

K: You will have to hold hard on Vietnam on Thursday.

P: I intend to hold it hard. What's happening on the prisoners?

K: I have three proposals which I am putting in writing—they will release 1,000, they are opening their camps and calling on the North Vietnamese to do the same, and proposing that all prisoners be held in a neutral country. This should be announced by Bruce in the morning—

P: Good.

K: And you can hit it in the evening.

P: They might hit that play if we build it up a bit. They will all think it is about bugging out but it will be on prisoners.

K: We are beginning to hold the cards.

P: That's true but we are going to hold it. The demonstrators may overplay their hand.

K: John Chancellor, whom I had lunch with today, thinks the tide has turned.

P: What turned it?

K: He thinks what happened this week has ruined them.

P: John Chancellor . . .

K: Absolutely. He doesn't exactly know what you have up your sleeve but—

P: I am not saying anything about China except that the proposals are at a very sensitive stage and I don't intend to comment on the future and next question, gentlemen.

K: Right.

P: I don't want to get into the proposal of a two-China policy, UN membership, Taiwan and so forth. I am going to finesse all questions by saying that developments here are significant and I don't think the interests of the nation will be served by commenting on it further.

K: I think that would be the best position to take, Mr. President.

P: Haig was pretty pleased.

K: If anyone had predicted that two months ago, we would have thought it was inconceivable.

P: Yeah, yeah. After Laos—

K: After Cambodia, the same thing—

P: Yeah. But look at after Laos, the people over two to one thought it had failed and yet here comes the Chinese move, the Ping Pong team and something more significant that pales that into nothing. It can have an enormous significance. Well, look, Nelson's tongue made that statement to Snow. How can we get the Mansfield thing turned off. I don't know how we can do it but one way we could do it is to invite him to go along.

K: No. Why give this to him?

P: He could go along with me.

K: He can go along with you when you go.

P: We could invite Mansfield and Scott.

K: If you want to share it with the Democrats.

P: Share it; the Chinese will treat them very well but they will know where the power is.

K: But they actually haven't invited anyone yet.

P: Could you get a message to him?

K: Think I can get some oral message to him.

P: Two weeks away and I wonder if they will move on Mansfield before then.

K: No, but they may.

P: As a temporary action, can you say that the President will be in California and—

K: I have already told them and that a constructive reply will be coming.

P: If you could add to that, that any other visits should be held in abeyance until we give our reply.

K: I will get that across.

P: There will be many requests and we feel that political requests . . .

K: Right.

P: Good idea. Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Taipei, May 3, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Ambassador David Kennedy

Mr. Anthony Jurich

Republic of China

President Chiang Kai-shek

Mr. Fredrick Chien, Interpreter

Both Kennedy and President Chiang expressed warm and cordial greetings. The President indicated that he had not been fortunate to have met Ambassador Kennedy previously but was fully aware of his fine reputation and friendship for the Chinese people.

Ambassador Kennedy expressed to the President the warm regards from President Nixon and his hopes for continued strong and friendly relations between our two countries.

Ambassador Kennedy then explained to the President that the principal purpose of this mission was to arrange for a solution to the textile problem. He developed for the President both the political and economic problems that are resulting from the upsurge of the textile imports into the United States. Ambassador Kennedy strongly stressed the need for a prompt and favorable solution to this problem.

He advised the President that he would be present during the course of these negotiations but not participate directly at the negotiating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Secret. Prepared by Jurich, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of the Treasury. Telegrams relaying the contents of Kennedy's discussions with Vice President C.K. Yen on May 1 and Finance Minister K. T. Li on April 30 are *ibid.* The memorandum of Kennedy's conversation with Chiang and his May 12 memorandum to the President are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 820, Name Files, Ambassador David M. Kennedy. Kennedy's May 13 summary report of his meetings, forwarded to Rogers, then the President, stated that the Chinese assured him negotiations would take 3 to 5 days. He also mentioned that the Chinese hoped to obtain a steel mill and greater investment in "oil resource development" to offset voluntary limitations on the growth of their textile industry. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY) Ambassador Kennedy also visited Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, where he sought to obtain commitments to negotiate limits on textile imports into the United States. Memoranda of conversations he held were forwarded to Rogers on May 13. (*Ibid.*)

level.² He would be readily available to reconcile any disputes and make final decisions. President Chiang was then asked to designate one individual who would have the authority and responsibility to perform a similar function. We cannot afford to get bogged down in petty details and bureaucratic machinations on these crucial issues Kennedy explained.

President Chiang promptly agreed to start negotiations as rapidly as possible with the assurances that we would reach reasonable agreement. He particularly appreciated the approach which Ambassador Kennedy has used and proposes to use during the next stage of negotiations.

Note: Subsequent to this meeting, word was received from both the President and Vice Premier's offices that they would be ready to start negotiations by the first of June.

Up to this point, the Generalissimo had complete composure. He looks particularly well and acts like he is in control of himself and the situation. Mentally he seems particularly alert. He then started to discuss the recent State Department statements of Mr. Bray.³ The President went on at great length without interruption becoming increasingly agitated. Toward the end of this colloquy, he was visibly shaking.

The President explained that he considered questioning the sovereignty of Taiwan and the Pescadores as the most serious affront to the ROC. He called it a "slap in the face" to both himself and to his nation.

It was particularly emphasized that Bray in response to a question reflected the impression that there had been a change in the U.S. position, and compounded the situation by subsequently reading a prepared statement, which seemed to further endorse the impression of change relative to the question of sovereignty.

President Chiang then cited the wartime meetings at Cairo and Yalta plus various wartime documents which clearly established the sovereignty of Taiwan and the Pescadores as belonging to the ROC. In

² Nixon's May 13 memorandum to Cabinet officers involved with economic policy noted that talks would begin on June 1 and that Jurich would chair the negotiating team, which would include representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor. (*Ibid.*)

³ Reference is to Charles W. Bray, III, Department of State press spokesman. Apparent reference to an April 28 statement issued by the Department of State suggesting Taiwan's ultimate status awaited final determination. The ROC Chargé, Martin Wang, brought this matter to Green's attention on April 30. (Telegram 75570 to Taipei, May 2; *ibid.*, POL CHINAT-US) The PRC also complained publicly about this statement. Nixon commented on a brief report about this issue in his May 5 daily briefing memorandum: "K-Why doesn't State just follow my line?" (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, May 5; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 33, President's Daily Briefs) The statement was not printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*.

addition, he cited the mutual defense treaty between the ROC and the U.S. Are all these treaties and understandings being questioned, he asked.

Ambassador Kennedy, at this point, injected the comment that President Nixon subsequently at his press conference⁴ clarified the U.S. position by stating that it had not changed. President Chiang acknowledged that he knew of and understood President Nixon's statement. Subsequently, however, he asked categorically that Ambassador Kennedy express personally to President Nixon the extreme concern which he has expressed and asked that at some appropriate time, President Nixon reaffirm the U.S. position so that there may be no doubts in anyone's mind as to the status of Taiwan and the Pescadores and the relationship between the ROC and the U.S.

Ambassador Kennedy expressed his apologies over this most unfortunate statement and reaffirmed President Nixon's and the United States Government's position that the U.S. policy has not changed. He also assured President Chiang that his views would be personally, fully and completely conveyed to President Nixon upon his return. Ambassador Kennedy then expressed his appreciation for the frank and candid statement by the President.

President Chiang at this point apologized for taking so much time in his frank and emotional statement but he felt so strongly that he was not able to help himself. He believes he is expressing not only his personal view but the view of the government of the ROC and the people.

At this point Ambassador Kennedy expressed his sincere appreciation for President Nixon, for his country and for himself personally for this opportunity to discuss these important matters as candidly with the President.

The President did not acknowledge this offer to culminate the meeting but immediately started discussing the U.S. policy concerning mainland China.

The Generalissimo reflected upon the mission of General Marshall in 1947–48. He then compared the motive and the goodwill of the United States as reflected by the Marshall mission with what is happening today. Again, he stated, the U.S. is trying to reconcile the differences between the Chinese Communists, the ROC, and the world. He recognizes that our motive is to reduce tension and seek peace. Again, however, he believes we do not fully understand the Chinese Communists, their views, and their methods. As we were deceived in 1947–48, which resulted in the fall of the ROC, he is concerned that the U.S. will again make the same mistake.

⁴ Apparent reference to a news conference held on April 29. See *Public Papers: Nixon*, 1971, p. 593.

He then spent some time further explaining what the Chinese Communists are trying to do and the tactics they are using. Particularly, he cautioned the U.S. about both subversion and ideological warfare. In brief, he is seriously concerned that the United States and the West are exposing themselves to a Chinese Communists' offensive which will weaken us and the free world.

Ambassador Kennedy assured the President that the U.S. is seeking these small steps relative to the mainland in order to reduce tensions in the interest of peace. The United States will do its utmost to insure that in the process there will be no harm done to the ROC. We will keep alert and appreciate the notes of caution by the President which have been expressed so honestly and so candidly. We also recognize that they are based upon personal experiences which are invaluable in assessing such a complex situation.

Ambassador Kennedy then again thanked President Chiang for the opportunity to frankly and honestly exchange views which he believes will be helpful to both governments.

The meeting lasted approximately an hour and twenty minutes.

President Chiang thanked Ambassador Kennedy and expressed his hopes that he would be returning soon. He specifically requested Ambassador Kennedy to convey his personal and his country's thanks to President Nixon and to assure Nixon of his continuing friendship.

122. Extract of Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 5, 1971.

Ambassador Hilaly called today asking that the following information be passed to the President:

The message which Dr. Kissinger gave him on April 28 was transmitted directly to President Yahya that same evening.² President Yahya

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. A full memorandum of conversation has not been found. This extract was apparently prepared by the NSC staff.

² Kissinger met with Hilaly in the early evening of April 27. See footnote 1, Document 118. Neither a copy of the message from Kissinger to the PRC nor a record of the April 28 meeting with Hilaly has been found. Kissinger's record of schedule does not contain entries for April 28–May 9, 1971.

has cabled Hilaly confirming that Yahya personally conveyed the message to the Ambassador of Communist China on Saturday morning, May 1. It most probably reached Chou En-lai the same day or the following day.

Ambassador Hilaly said that what he had told President Yahya on behalf of President Nixon on the basis of Dr. Kissinger's talk with him was as follows:

The President asked that the following message be passed to President Yahya:

My warm thanks for the helpful role you have played. I particularly appreciate the delicacy and tact with which you have handled these important exchanges. Please thank Chou En-lai for his message which I think is positive, constructive and forthcoming. I will soon be replying to it in the same spirit.

Ambassador Hilaly noted further that Dr. Kissinger asked him to convey the following to Chou En-lai stated as President Yahya's personal views:

I feel that President Nixon is very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and not to let any politician come into the picture until a government-to-government channel is established. My Ambassador in Washington thinks this is because President Nixon will find it more difficult to move quickly in the matter if American politicians come into it. Therefore, it would be best until President Nixon's reply is received and an American envoy is designated for these discussions if the Chinese government would not discuss the matter with any American politician. This does not mean that there is any objection to continuation of the People-to-People program. In fact, Ambassador Hilaly thinks that President Nixon would be very happy if every other kind of American visitor is encouraged to visit China—students, reporters, scholars, etc.—so this is a temporary thing until the official link is established.

Ambassador Hilaly said that he received a telegram from President Yahya saying that the above was conveyed as suggested.³

³ Haig used this document as a basis for a May 5 memorandum to Nixon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 5.

123. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Message from Norwegian Ambassador in Peking²

Ambassador Crowe in Oslo has forwarded the text of two telegrams to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (received on April 19 and 23) from Norwegian Ambassador Aalgaard in Peking covering his conversation with the Acting Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei.³ I thought that you would be interested in the main points, which should be viewed in the context of events known only to you.

—Chi Peng-fei stressed the political importance of the American Table Tennis Team's visit to China and maintained that this was only the beginning of extensive contacts with the American people. It was clear to Aalgaard from Chi's remarks that the invitation to the American team was a response to the U.S. lifting of travel restrictions.

—Mao told Edgar Snow that contact with the Russians was now impossible. The Russian people had allowed themselves to be led by the current leadership. The situation is completely different in the U.S. where the American people have demonstrated a great capacity to behave independently. China must therefore seek to establish better contacts with the Americans.

—Chinese sports teams will travel to the U.S. in the near future and the Chinese have a long list of American politicians, journalists and others who have expressed a desire to visit China. James Reston will come at the end of April.⁴

—China is now prepared to start a wide range of contact activity with the U.S. The U.S. rejected the Chinese proposal for such contacts

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to an attached covering memorandum, Holdridge drafted the memorandum for Haig on April 29.

² See also Document 104 and footnote 3, Document 112.

³ Crowe combined the two Norwegian telegrams detailing Aalgaard's conversations in Beijing in telegram 1185 from Oslo, April 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I. The actual conversation between Aalgaard and Chi took place on April 14.

⁴ The President underlined this sentence and added "?! " at the end of it.

made at the beginning of the Warsaw Talks.⁵ Now the conditions exist in both countries for the realization of the original Chinese idea.

—Aalgaard felt that while the new Chinese line may be seen primarily as a face-saving device, for example with Hanoi, it is first and foremost a response to the American softer line.

—Aalgaard also felt that in addition to the immediate utility in advancing Chinese political goals, the most recent Chinese moves should also be seen as part of a longer range policy of greater flexibility in relation to the U.S. to counter China's greater danger, namely, increased Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and the possibility that the Soviets will fill the military vacuum which the American disengagement policy in Asia can create. Another factor is fear of an eventual Japanese nuclear capability.⁶

—The Norwegian Embassy in Peking believes that the Chinese will not immediately propose resumption of the Warsaw Talks though it is not impossible that this will occur in the last half of 1971. It is therefore assumed that the people-to-people formula will be maintained between China and the U.S. in the foreseeable future.⁷

⁵ The President underlined this sentence.

⁶ The President began underlining at the word "counter."

⁷ In a March 16 memorandum to Kissinger, which reported on Norwegian views of the PRC's policy toward peace in Vietnam, Holdridge wrote: "Past experience makes us leery of Aalgaard's reporting, which, we fear, is probably colored by his desire to play an intermediary role in the negotiations." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I) Crowe had also suggested to the Department of State that Oslo might be "a suitable locale for Chicom-US contact," but apparently no action was taken toward this end. (Telgram 205 from Oslo, January 21; *ibid.*)

124. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassador Farland, May 7, 1971

On Friday, May 7, I met for three hours with Ambassador Farland in Palm Springs.² At that time, I outlined the exchange of messages between the U.S. and China that has taken place through the Pakistanis; I read portions of the most recent message delivered by Ambassador Hilaly on April 21³ and told Ambassador Farland that you intended to respond by proposing that I meet with Chou En-lai, or a suitable Chinese representative, either in Pakistan or at a location in southern China easily accessible from Pakistan. We considered a number of details associated with the trip and reached some tentative decisions.

—After reviewing several alternative communication channels, we agreed to place a special Navy communicator in Karachi to provide a communications channel similar to the one I have set up with Bahr and Rush. This should be operational this week.

—I discussed with Ambassador Farland my proposed trip itinerary which would provide for an arrival in Islamabad on a Friday, at which point he or Yahya could arrange to host me for the weekend. This would provide the cover for my meeting with the Chinese, and on Monday I would continue on to Tehran. I indicated that I would probably require about 24 hours with the Chinese and would plan on meeting in three separate sessions.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret, Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² According to the attached memorandum of conversation prepared by David Halperin of the NSC staff, this meeting took place at the home of Theodore Cummings in Palm Springs, California, on May 7 between 2:50 and 5:45 p.m. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 6. In a backchannel message to Farland, May 3, Kissinger wrote: "For the most sensitive reasons known only to the President and myself, the President wishes you to find some personal repeat personal pretext for undertaking an immediate trip to the United States in order that you may be able to confer with me." (Ibid.) Farland responded on May 4 that he had informed the Department of State that he was returning to the United States to conduct an urgent business transaction. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 118.

—Ambassador Farland felt that it would be better to be taped by the Chinese than the Pakistanis, and for this reason the meeting should be conducted in southern China rather than Pakistan.

—We discussed the relative merits of my traveling to China by Pakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft and tentatively decided that the optimum arrangement would be to pre-position a smaller White House aircraft in Pakistan equipped with a Pakistani navigator. This would permit the larger aircraft in which I arrive to remain parked at Rawalpindi over the weekend in public view.

—I instructed Ambassador Farland to discuss our meeting and my proposed trip with Yahya and made him responsible for all the technical details of the trip. He will submit for my review several possible scenarios for the China meeting as soon as the special communications channel is activated.

Ambassador Farland made several more general points:

—He was sharply critical of Ambassador Keating who, in his view, is attempting to make a partisan issue of the Pakistani situation and discredit the Administration in the process. Ambassador Keating apparently called in a *New York Times* correspondent and divulged the contents of the Blood cables,⁴ and Ambassador Farland feels that Ambassador Keating will use his trip back to Washington to lobby against your Pakistan policies.

—Ambassador Farland stressed his conviction that it will take a substantial (i.e., \$250 million) loan to sustain Pakistan for another six months and he requested support in obtaining a commitment from the World Bank or IMF. As a related matter, Ambassador Farland asked that Hannah be told in a forceful way that you want him to adopt a positive attitude toward Pakistan for at least the next six months.

—Ambassador Farland also felt that Germany, Great Britain and possibly also Japan should be apprised of our determination to save Pakistan and asked to adjust their policies to support our position.

A full record of the meeting is attached at Tab A.⁵

⁴ Archer K. Blood was the U.S. Consul General in Dacca, East Pakistan (Bangladesh). The "Blood cables," written by Blood and the staff at the Consulate in Dacca, criticized U.S. policy toward South Asia and called for strong condemnation of Pakistani military repression in East Pakistan. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, Document 19.

⁵ Attached but not printed. See footnote 2 above.

125. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, May 10, 1971.

President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21, 1971, from Premier Chou En-lai conveyed through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries, President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.

In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President Nixon proposes a preliminary *secret* meeting between his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, and Premier Chou En-lai or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest. If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking publicly between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "Handed by Mr. Kissinger to Amb. Hilaly, 12:00, 5/10/71." Kissinger met with Hilaly on May 10 from 12:10 to 12:55 p.m. and from 3:05 to 3:29 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Kissinger informed Farland via a May 14 backchannel message that "Message passed to Yahya through Hilaly along lines of our conversation. You were designated as point of contact for travel arrangements." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages—1971—Amb Farland—Pakistan) Farland informed Kissinger on May 22 that this message was received by Yahya in Lahore on May 17 and was given to the PRC Ambassador on May 19. (Ibid.)

It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. *For secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.*²

² Nixon did, however, hint to Rogers that a meeting was possible. At a May 21 meeting with Rogers, Nixon remarked: "Now, it's something that we should keep very much, now one thing I've done that you should know, Maurice Stans wants to take a commercial mission, Ted Kennedy suggested he could drop over from there [the PRC] on his trips and so forth. And I said none of you even approach it, don't even suggest it, we're not going to get into [unintelligible]. Any visits must be at the highest level. It would have to be you or me or both. And it might come, it might come. I just have a hunch here, a feeling that there's something going on there. I think that this Russian thing has a helluva lot more to do with China than anything else. They're scared of them." Rogers replied: "Yeah, no doubt about it. I think we want to be careful, that's why I want to mention today in my speech, on not appearing that we've turned them off. I think we've got to soften, to downplay a little bit so we don't get too eager." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, May 21, 1971, 11:29–11:41 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 503–9) Rogers' May 21 speech before the 1970 Medal of Honor recipients is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 14, 1971, pp. 766–768.

126. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, May 20, 1971.

In case the People's Republic of China has not been apprised, the United States Government wishes to inform it of the following statement made by the President of the United States on May 20, 1971:

"The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. This message was sent via special channels from Kissinger to Farland on May 20. Kissinger's instructions read: "Please deliver the attached message to Yahya personally for immediate transmittal by him to PRC Ambassador. Best regards." (Ibid.) A copy of the message contains the handwritten notation: "Handed to Hilaly 12:00 May 20, 1971 (without classification)." Kissinger and Hilaly met from 12:10 to 12:15 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

"The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

President Nixon wishes to emphasize that it is his policy to conclude no agreement which would be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to include this issue and related questions on the agenda of the proposed meeting with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China.²

² The first draft of this May 19 message reads in its entirety: "The United States Government wishes to inform the Government of the People's Republic of China of the President's May 20, 1971 statement on the strategic arms limitation talks. The United States Government wishes to reaffirm that any agreement that it might conclude will not be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to discuss this issue and related questions with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China." A longer second draft, May 19, contains Kissinger's revisions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)

**127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for
International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, May 24, 1971.

SUBJECT

China Trade

As you know, I am fully behind the President's policy to open up our trade and travel restrictions with the People's Republic of China. Not only are there economic advantages for us but I am convinced that the President has already and will continue to make domestic political gains from the process. This is particularly true, if the domestic political aspects are handled with care. My views on how to win extra domestic political points in the key border and agricultural states are set

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret.

forth in the attached copy of a memorandum I sent the President on May 17.²

On substance, I'm with you and will support proposals as far-reaching as you think advisable.

Clearly, the key disagreed substantive issue for Presidential decision is the proposal to add grains on general license for export both to China and the Soviet Union. There is a real trade potential here; there is an opportunity with Bob Dole³ and the farmers to win domestic political kudos; and the situation is set up to eliminate some very short-sighted shipping restrictions. While labor and George Meany⁴ may oppose this latter aspect, I have reason to believe that the west coast unions are prepared to load grains both for China and the Soviet Union.

On balance, it is better from the President's standpoint, for Joe Curran⁵ to be unhappy than for the American farmers to be unhappy. Particularly since grain exports do have the promise of improving the balance of payments, which is so important.

² The attached May 17 memorandum to the President essentially restated the points raised by Peterson in this memorandum.

³ Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) was Chairman of the Republic National Committee.

⁴ George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO.

⁵ Joseph Edwin Curran, President of the National Maritime Union (AFL-CIO).

128. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 25, 1971, 1:10–2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
M. and Mme. John Paul Sainteny
Brig. General Alexander M. Haig
W. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. Sainteny, Kissinger, Lord, and Smyser also met from 2:40 to 3:15 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

Substantive portions of the luncheon conversation centered on Vietnam and China. Following are the highlights of M. Sainteny's observations.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

China

Mr. Sainteny said the following:

—The US moves concerning China were good, and we were now on a good path.

—With the Chinese, if you knock on one door they will open another one. Thus, while the Chinese Ambassador in Paris had merely transmitted Dr. Kissinger's note without comment, M. Sainteny believed the approach through him had been very efficacious with respect to recent events.²

—Chou En-lai has been clearly in charge since the Cultural Revolution, with Mao now being old.

—The Chinese will blow hot and cold in their dealings with us. We should multiply our gestures toward them to show our good will; he cited as an example that his company wished to sell helicopters to the Chinese, but were prevented by CÔCOM restrictions because an American license was needed for certain parts.

Dr. Kissinger said that M. Sainteny could tell the Chinese that the US will look positively at these trade questions. We will be freeing some trade items, although we cannot guarantee to free them all and will not release any with military significance.

After Lunch

After lunch, M. Sainteny remained for further private conversation with Dr. Kissinger. During that conversation he asked Dr. Kissinger whether he could tell Ambassador Bruce and Xuan Thuy that he had occasional contact with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger said that he could tell those people.

² Sainteny wrote a letter to Kissinger on January 12, which was translated by Smyser for Kissinger on January 18: "Acting on your letter of November 9, I had a conversation with my friend on December 23 during which I was able to set forth our project. Although he received the idea with a certain reserve, my interlocutor transmitted it to his board of directors. This board has so far apparently not made its response known. I shall not fail of course to keep you informed." Kissinger's response, drafted by Smyser, reads: "It was a great pleasure to hear that you are making progress. We wish you and your family a very Happy New Year, and we look forward to hearing from you again." Sainteny's letter, Smyser's translation, and the response to Sainteny are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, Files for the President, Miscellaneous memoranda relating to HAK's trip to PRC, July 1971.

Dr. Kissinger asked M. Sainteny whether we could use him to get a message to the Chinese very fast if we needed to. M. Sainteny said he thought he could get to the Chinese quickly enough to deliver any urgent message, and that he would be pleased to do it.

129. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 124¹

Washington, May 27, 1971.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

NEXT STEPS TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA— NSSM 124

Preface

On April 19, 1971, the President directed:

“a study of possible diplomatic initiatives which the United States might take toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the objective of furthering the improvement of relations.” NSSM 124 further directed that “The study should assume that there will be no change in our policy of recognition of or support for the Government of the Republic of China.”

The introduction of this response to the President is an analysis of the principal factors in US–PRC relations which have bearing on the selection and timing of the next initiatives.

This is followed by three groups of initiatives which the President might wish to approve ranging from some which could be unilaterally

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 124. Top Secret. Brown, Acting Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific, submitted this report to the SRG on May 28. (Memorandum from Brown to Kissinger; *ibid.*) According to an August 24 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, the CIA prepared an Intelligence Annex to NSSM 124 that assessed reconnaissance operations involving China with an eye toward their reduction or elimination. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84–B00513R, DCI/Executive Registry Files, NSSMs) According to a “NSSM Status Reports Prepared by S/PC,” from December 1971, NSSM 124 was “completed” after it was submitted to the Senior Review Group, and no NSC meeting was planned. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 73 D 288, General Files on NSC Matters, NSC Under Secretaries Memoranda, 1971) NSSM 124 is printed as Document 117.

undertaken at any time with minimal preparation to those which require the concurrence of the PRC for implementation.²

NEXT STEPS TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA—
NSSM 124

Introduction

I. The Present Situation

For over a decade we have tried to get the People's Republic of China to defer the central problem between us—Taiwan—and to discuss at Warsaw what Peking called “minor questions,” various means of contact between our two peoples. We have sought these contacts in the hope that better understanding might gradually move us toward resolution of more fundamental problems between us. Only in the past two years, however, have we made significant unilateral moves in an effort to bring this about. Peking has now acted too—and, perhaps significantly, in the one area wherein we so far have permitted an “equal and comparable” arrangement, that of travel.

Both sides have doubtless recognized the danger inherent in nearly two decades of deeply inimical confrontation. In the present changed context, both sides seem at last to view the rigidities long associated with that confrontation as being unnecessarily self-limiting.

The events of April in Sino-US relations are significant. But they do not yet touch on fundamentals. This paper presents steps to stimulate further normal contacts between China and the United States in order to test whether we can now move on toward a more fundamental regularization of our relations.

II. PRC Motives and Tactics

Peking's “people's diplomacy” towards the US is a dramatic departure. But it does not necessarily mean that the Chinese leaders have changed their hostile view of the US or revised their major foreign policy goals—recognition as the dominant power in Asia, accommodation of other Asian states to PRC policies, elimination of the Nationalist Government, and the withdrawal of US military presence from Taiwan and the Asian mainland.

² Options in Group I included the following: Cultural, Scientific, and Industrial Exchange; Transportation: Sea and Air; Trade Initiatives; Trade Promotion; Arms Control; and U.S. Military Presence on Taiwan. Group II included Cultural and Scientific Exchange; Trade Promotion, U.S. Presence in the PRC; Status of the GRC; Arms Control; and U.S. Military Presence on Taiwan. Group III included Official Trade Missions; Status of the GRC; Status of Taiwan; Blocked Chinese Assets and U.S. Claims; U.S. Presence in the PRC, Arms Control; and U.S. Military Presence in the Taiwan Area. Each option included a brief discussion of principal advantages, principal disadvantages, and implementation.

The new approach to the US forcefully underlines another policy goal—recognition of China as a world power.

Probable Motives

Peking wishes both to raise the prospect of a dialogue with the United States as a warning and lever against the Soviet Union and to erode the GRC's international and domestic position. Peking's "reasonableness" toward the United States is certainly designed to induce other countries to recognize the PRC and to garner support for entry into the UN on its own terms—GRC expulsion. Additional considerations are to move the Japanese Government towards accommodation, and to increase domestic US pressure for changes in US China policy.

International Chinese Developments. Most of the Chinese leadership appears to have backed the post-Cultural Revolution drive for a more normal international status. But there have been enough disruptions in the pattern of Chinese behavior, particularly in the domestic area, to suggest serious policy debates. The moderate line appears firmly in control, but the radicals undoubtedly continue to exercise a restraining influence on friendly approaches to the United States, especially in areas where this might involve substantive Chinese concessions. Conceivably, visible failures in the current international initiatives could contribute to a reversal of line.

The American Factor. If satisfied by the degree of success they see from their initial step, the Chinese may take bolder actions, including a resumption of the Warsaw Talks or some other form of official contact with the United States, though this is by no means certain. We should not expect Peking's interest in building the momentum of its American policy to lead it to accept any major undercutting of its bargaining position on the Taiwan issue.

Some US actions could cause Peking to hesitate in its new approach or even turn "people's diplomacy" into an activity intended mainly to embarrass the United States Government. Examples include:

- A major US escalation in Southeast Asia.
- The transfer of US military facilities and functions from Okinawa to Taiwan.
- Formal US adoption of a "two Chinas" position.
- Vigorous US leadership of a campaign clearly intended to block PRC admission to the United Nations.

The Chinese will be acutely sensitive to questions of equality of treatment, especially as compared with the USSR. To avoid appearing in the supplicant's role by rapid response to US initiatives, they may not publicize trade activities and may be embarrassed by public or semi-public discussions of scenarios for improving relations that

appeared to emanate from official US sources. To gain maximum impact on US public opinion, Chinese moves may be correlated with US Congressional hearings and the 1972 election campaign, and be directed toward individuals seeking more rapid changes in US policy.

The International Context. Peking will attempt to secure maximum international support on Chirep and minimize US opposition. If they fail to obtain their seat, the Chinese would be likely to increase their pressures again the following spring. If they win, they would be better positioned to make additional moves to capitalize on their new prestige and on Taipei's discomfiture.

Other developments which could quicken their pace would include a dramatic increase in Sino-Soviet tensions, a buildup of pressure in Japan to change its China policy, and a breakdown of morale on Taiwan. The new Chinese course risks displeasure in Hanoi and Pyongyang. Over time, unhappiness in these quarters could cause Peking to hesitate, especially if its initiative does not appear to be bearing fruit.

III. US Objectives and Strategy

A. *Objectives.* Some US and PRC objectives overlap—examples are allowing US–Chinese relations to develop as a way of offsetting Soviet pressures on each of us and avoiding armed conflict between the United States and China. That renewal of contact between us may permit us to work from these common interests toward mutual accommodation in areas of disagreement is the premise underlying our basic policy of encouraging PRC entry into the world community and improving our bilateral relations.

On the other hand, we intend to continue our policy of recognition of, and support for, the GRC, and we will have to assure ourselves at each turn that US–GRC relations do not suffer to the point of jeopardizing our most fundamental objectives toward Taiwan—insuring its security from external attack and maintaining necessary military access for ourselves. Much will have to happen between the PRC and us before this minimum is in danger, but it is within those limitations that our next steps toward the PRC must take place.

Not all of the US objectives that might be sought via better US–PRC relations (or even unrequited US initiatives toward Peking) relate strictly to the GRC and PRC. And some may be even more important than those already mentioned:

—Preserving the present US–Japanese relationship. Judging from reactions so far (see below), reducing US–PRC tensions can serve this objective, though that depends greatly on how well we handle the process.

—Maintaining public support for our foreign policy. Even the first, uncertain indication of a thaw between Washington and Peking has

produced strongly favorable public reactions, both internationally and at home. This strengthens the credibility of our expressed desire to deal peacefully with all nations, offsetting antipathies toward the Indochina war. Thereby, it increases our ability to deal with the whole spectrum of other international issues.

B. *Strategy.* Our handling of the Table Tennis episode has shown that the United States Government welcomes—and does not fear—Peking's new flexibility. Additional relatively innocuous steps by us and an amiable attitude toward further moves by Peking can serve the same purpose.

The Mix of "People's" and Governmental Diplomacy. Peking is faced with certain conflicts in its objectives:

- It wants to recover Taiwan, which pits it against US policy.
- It wants improved relations with the USG, if for no other reason than for leverage to use on the Soviets (and perhaps the Japanese).

The conflict is reflected in Peking's current resort to popular, as opposed to governmental, diplomacy vis-à-vis the US.

Popular diplomacy serves both objectives—to some extent. By appealing to US and world opinion on a people-to-people basis, Peking improves its prospects for getting the GRC expelled from the UN. Whether this succeeds or not, however, Peking will still confront the US defense commitment to Taiwan. Peking expects its popular diplomacy to help here too, because public pressure will force the US Government to make further concessions. This in turn could ultimately lead to better US-PRC governmental relations—which Peking surely requires if China's position with respect to the Soviets is to be enhanced in any substantial and enduring way.

Peking may hope for this strategy to work. But in the short-run it cannot expect much on the government-to-government front if it requires first that the United States sever its ties with Taiwan. And it has problems with the Soviet Union now. To pursue both its current objectives, therefore, it cannot give absolute priority to the Taiwan issue. While it may show relative toughness toward us on Taiwan between now and the UN vote next fall, it will hardly wish to foreclose all its options on the governmental side.

Our tactical dilemma is similar to Peking's. We would like to improve relations—without making crucial concessions on the Taiwan issue. Peking's popular diplomacy offers an opening for us, but it is more advantageous for us to be able to deal also on a government-to-government basis.

- The latter would show Peking that any improvement in relations was a deliberate act of USG policy, not something caused by popular pressure on the Administration.

—It would erode Peking's policy of focusing on a "solution of the Taiwan issue" to the preemption of all other business in its governmental dealings with us.

—It would move us more quickly toward a relationship in which our most serious objectives can be pursued, since these are matters that must be dealt with between governments.

It should, therefore, be US policy to try to move our contacts more into a governmental plane or to involve the government in some appropriate way in people-to-people contacts. This has been done, for example, in the handling so far of the Table Tennis visits (through the President's reception of Steenhoven, official facilitation of visas and invitations, etc.).

Conciliatory governmental gestures by us, even if not taken up by Peking, would offset attempted PRC pressures on the US Government through purely people-to-people contacts. More importantly, approaching Peking on a governmental basis will probe the relative priority it actually accords the Taiwan issue as an obstacle to better US-PRC relations.

This does not mean that we should take no steps on the Taiwan issue until the returns from other moves are in. If only for reasons of consistency Peking must press seriously for something on the Taiwan issue. But we can start modestly with additional steps in store should developments merit our taking them.

We should thus be careful not to convey to Peking by words, acts or even nuance, that our objective is to obtain PRC agreement to "put the Taiwan issue aside." On the contrary we are neither unwilling nor afraid to discuss it. (This position would be conveyed, when and if appropriate, privately and to the PRC only.)

The Options Available—Moving by Graded Steps. The options presented in this paper are divided into three groups. Each group represents an increase in seriousness of impact along several fronts:

—The groups would be progressively more difficult to accept for the GRC and the Soviet Union, each of whom opposes reduced US-PRC tensions.

—Congress and public opinion in the United States and elsewhere will probably also react differently to the moves in the successive groups. Some of the later moves, for example, would be substantial departures from long existing patterns. Reactions will be easier to judge as the earlier, more innocuous moves are made.

—The effect of these moves will be to press the PRC increasingly to deal with us on a government-to-government basis. The range of moves included in each group is intended to permit selection of a mix with enough interest to Peking to bring it along. Actual choice of what, if any, mix to implement will, of course, depend on the overall circumstances of the time.

—The moves in the first group are innocuous in their effect on US security interests, the likelihood of adverse domestic or international

reactions and the like. Some moves in the second and especially the third group, however, become increasingly steps we should take only as merited by other developments, especially (but not exclusively) PRC reactions to our earlier moves. This is particularly important in the military field, and steps challenging the GRC's legitimacy.

The impact of these moves will vary with their quantity and timing. Many steps taken simultaneously will have more impact—for a while at least—than would the same steps spaced out. Bunching them may also leave the problem of what to do for an encore. If many innocuous steps are taken together, the first impact may be great, but the later impact of more consequential steps may be reduced. The public and other governments will have grown more accustomed to movement between the United States and the PRC. Accordingly, this might increase our room for maneuver later on.

Chinese Responses. Peking is more apt to take small steps to improve atmospherics and maintain a sense of momentum than to propose or undertake major new departures affecting Sino-US relations.

It will probably want to move cautiously, assessing the effect of each step it takes before moving to the next. Among the steps open to the Chinese are the following:

- Favorable comments on US attitudes and initiatives by such leaders as Chou En-lai.

- Private remarks by Chinese officials designed to reach US officials which assess the possibility of further improvement in bilateral relations in a realistic and generally favorable light.

- Increased contact by Chinese diplomatic officials stationed abroad with Americans in official and unofficial positions.

- An alteration in the tone and content of Chinese domestic and foreign propaganda resulting in a marked diminution of anti-American themes. Personal attacks on President Nixon have already largely ceased in Peking's external media; further steps in this direction are possible.

- Admission to China of US public figures, for example, US Congressmen, with whom Chinese officials could hold responsible if unofficial discussions.

- Admission of relatives of the US citizens still held in Chinese jails for visits.

- Relaxation of PRC restrictions on trade and resumption of Sino-US talks in Warsaw or elsewhere. Trade moves are likely to be initially rather small and may depend in large part on Peking's reading as to whether or not the US continues to discriminate against China in relation to the USSR. Chinese interest in resuming the Warsaw dialogue would probably depend on Peking's reading of the desirable mix between "people's diplomacy" and government-to-government contacts, as discussed above.

One obviously desirable Chinese response would be the release of some or all of the four US prisoners still held in Chinese jails. Peking would probably react negatively if it came to feel that the United States

was making further improvement in relations dependent on the release of the prisoners. On the other hand, they have in the past released foreign nationals held in Chinese jails as an indication that relations with the country in question were already improving and could improve further. This approach was employed most recently in the case of Great Britain. But even if Peking were to decide to release some or all of the prisoners, they are likely to do so later rather than sooner, as progress is made in bilateral relations.

Chinese responses, however, are only one element in assessing the usefulness of US initiatives. The options set forth in the first group and most of those listed in the second group are really not dependent on specific moves by Peking. Favorable domestic and world impact or problems relating to Soviet-US relations might make some or all of these options desirable, even in the absence of a clear and favorable Chinese move. The options in the third group, however, generally require some specific and favorable movement on the part of Peking. These responses are listed under the individual options themselves.

Constraints. In taking additional steps toward improved relations with the PRC we must avoid their being misinterpreted by Peking and our allies as indicating US weakness. If so construed, they might stimulate the PRC to step up pressures rather than improve relations. This is especially so in the military sphere. An excessive unilateral reduction of our close-in military presence, for example, could be misunderstood by Peking as meaning we would not resist Communist aggression. It could leave us less prepared to counter such aggression should it occur. And it could undermine the confidence of our allies. Given these uncertainties about Chinese motivation, initiatives which might be considered in the military area should be confined to those which do not detract from essential US and allied military capabilities. Significant changes in the size and nature of our military presence in Asia have already been taken over the past several years. Reductions in the US troop strength in Korea and Southeast Asia, the reduction of base facilities in Japan, the reversion of Okinawa, discontinuance of the Taiwan Strait Patrol, reduction in MAAG China strength, withdrawal of KC-135 tankers from Taiwan, and contemplated reductions in the Philippines present a pattern which, together with the lowered profile called for by the Nixon Doctrine, constitute a major shift in the thrust of our military policy in Asia. Given US specific bilateral commitments to various nations on the periphery of the PRC, as well as the more general commitments expressed in the Nixon Doctrine, further dramatic initiatives in the field of military reductions should not be considered except with all due caution. For example, a sudden drop in the US military presence on Taiwan that exceeded reductions consonant with our withdrawals

from Viet-Nam should probably not be taken in the absence of other justifying circumstances.

An additional constraint exists by virtue of the lack of governmental contact between the US and the PRC. In the case of the USSR, because of the existence of diplomatic relations and the various post-World War II multinational military groups and committees on which both the US and the USSR have been represented, it has been possible to negotiate reciprocal arrangements to dampen risks to vital interests. In the absence of formal US–PRC contacts, initiatives must be unilateral and intentions made apparent by gestures and pronouncements. Such a situation is extremely fragile and is easily subject to misinterpretation. This danger may be reduced to the extent that we are successful in drawing the PRC into government-to-government contacts. US initiatives on the military side which facilitate such contacts, without endangering our essential military capabilities, would therefore be helpful.

The military options in the first and second groups, if taken under the circumstances specified for each, are not expected to produce the various undesirable consequences discussed in this Introduction. Those in the third group should probably not be taken without further review, as is more fully explained below.

[Omitted here are the last two sections of the Introduction (Chirep Implications, and Third Country Reactions), Group I Options, Group II Options, Group III Options, and Annex to Option on Blocked Chinese Assets and U.S. Claims.]

**130. Message From the Premier of the People's Republic of China
Chou En-lai to President Nixon¹**

Beijing, May 29, 1971.

"Premier Chou En-lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President Nixon.

"Premier Chou En-lai has seriously studied President Nixon's messages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd, 1971,² and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U.S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area.

"Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U.S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking.

"Premier Chou En-lai suggests that it would be preferable for Dr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in China, that Peking may be the location and that he may fly direct from Islamabad to a Peking airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from China, if needed. The talks plus the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. An identical handwritten copy of this message is attached. It was probably prepared by Hilaly. Kissinger met with Hilaly from 9:06 to 9:24 a.m. on May 31. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) At that time, he apparently made Kissinger aware of the incoming message but did not yet have the actual text. The two men met again on June 2 from 8:10 to 8:30 p.m. (Ibid.) According to a notation on another copy of the message, it was "transcribed from handwritten document handed to HAK by Hilaly, 6–2–71, 8:10 p.m. Taken to Pres." This version did not include the comments from Yahya at the end of the message. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material Concerning Preparations for First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

² See Documents 122, 125, and 126.

flights on both ways will probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in Peking he may do so.

“As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger’s trip strictly secret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy is still desired the Government of the People’s Republic of China will on its part guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have yielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be made after the meeting, if it is so desired.

“As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.

“Premier Chou En-lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with Dr. Kissinger in Peking in the near future.”

I³ notice from the above message that the Premier has given an alternative for an open meeting between himself and Dr. Kissinger. Knowing Dr. Kissinger’s desire to maintain strict secrecy which fact I have been impressing upon Premier Chou En-lai, the above message is indicative of the Premier’s acceptance of the secret meeting for which he has given guarantee. The rest will depend upon U.S. and Pakistan maintaining secrecy.

As regards arrangements on our part, I have discussed with the Chinese Ambassador and propose as follows:

- (a) Dr. Kissinger arrives on a D Day
- (b) After a 24 hour stop in Islamabad and a meal with me, he will ostensibly make a trip to a place not open to public in the Northern region. In actual fact, a Pakistan Boeing will carry him along the Northern route direct to Peking up from Islamabad. The time of flight will be approximately seven hours. On completion of the mission, Dr. Kissinger will return to Islamabad to resume his onward journey.

If Dr. Kissinger would find it helpful, I am considering sending a high level Pakistani with him to Peking.

³ “I” refers to Yahya.

131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

China Trade

The Under Secretaries' Committee (USC) has forwarded at Tab A² its recommendations on direct trade between the United States and the PRC, as you directed in your April 14 decision.³ The agencies have already put into effect the other elements of your decision: visas, shipping, cargoes, bunkering, and foreign assets controls.

U.S. Exports

You will recall that your decision in opening trade with the PRC was to proceed in three stages: Stage I, to establish a trade level below that of U.S. trade with the USSR; Stage II, to place trade with the PRC on a par with the USSR; and Stage III, to go beyond the level of trade with the USSR. (This last would have been via authorizing direct grain shipments to the PRC without requiring that they be shipped on U.S. vessels, as is now necessary for shipments to the USSR and Eastern Europe.) Your purpose was to provide us with an opportunity to assess the reactions of the PRC, the Republic of China, and the Soviets before proceeding to the next stage. The USC list (Tab A1)⁴ is intended to implement Stage I of your decision.

I believe that the list of items USC has recommended for direct U.S.–PRC trade meets your conditions. Its level of trade would be at a level lower than that with the Soviet Union, and there would be a number of significant items which could be added to the China list later. (The excluded items are at Tab A2.) The main differentiation is that the proposed China list leaves out several items which Defense, Commerce

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for action. According to a covering memorandum to Kissinger from Holdridge and Ernest Johnson, with the concurrence of Kennedy, Holdridge and Johnson wrote and then revised this memorandum for the President. (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed is a 4-page May 13 memorandum signed by Irwin. The full report detailing trade options and a list of non-strategic items are *ibid.*, RG 59, Office of International Policy and Planning, 1969–1971: Lot 72 D 504, NSSM 124.

³ See footnote 3, Document 116.

⁴ The tabs are attached but not printed.

and AEC believed needed further review because of possible military use or of their greater strategic benefit to China's low technological and industrial level. Examples are automatic welding machines for pipe over 19 inches, propellers, agricultural machinery with automatic transmission, cars with four-wheel drive, steam boilers, engines, gas containers, some chemicals, radar, cameras and lenses.

In addition, the USC list would appear to meet another issue which has arisen in connection with direct U.S.–PRC trade: the strong indications we have received that the Chinese will not be interested in such trade if we restrict our exports to them significantly more than exports to the USSR. The USC list contains 95 percent of the items allowed to go freely to the Soviet Union, and this is probably sufficient to make the Chinese feel that they are not being given second class status. If they should get a contrary impression, they would probably state publicly that this was the reason for their not sanctioning trade with the U.S., thereby causing American business interests to criticize you and not the Chinese for the failure of trade to develop.

On the other hand, by accepting the USC list, we should be able to avoid Chinese resentment by making it clear in the first announcements that we are still continuing to consider further additions to the China list, and that we will consider applications for special licenses for items not included on the general license list. Continuation of some differential in favor of the USSR will also help avoid problems with the USSR and Taiwan.

You should know, however, that Secretary Laird does not wish to release the USC list all at once but proposes instead to release it in segments over a period of months contingent on PRC reactions.⁵ In addition, Defense objects to the inclusion of two items, earth moving equipment and railway equipment, on the USC list. I have no particular brief on these items other than to keep the China list close enough to the Soviet list to obviate the difficulties I outlined above. A piecemeal release of the items on the USC list, though, would almost certainly result in a cold reaction from the Chinese. It would also cause delays and throw the question of what to release at any given time back to the inter-agency process.

If you should wish to make even more dramatic your implementation decisions, you could of course decide to go immediately to Stage II of our decontrol program and make the original Chinese general

⁵ Laird's comments on the May 13 draft Under Secretaries memorandum stemmed in large part from recommendations made to him on May 12 by Nutter, Moorer, and John W. Vogt, Director of the Joint Staff. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0197, China (Reds) 092, May)

license list equal to the Soviet general license list without serious security problems, i.e., by adding the items at Tab A2. The Chinese could probably get these goods from other sources in any case. I do not believe it necessary, however, to move at once to the Russian list in view of the ample nature of the Under Secretaries' recommendations with the State additions, provided we release all the items on our list simultaneously.

Grains

The Under Secretaries' Committee, except Defense and Labor, strongly urges that you approve a proposal to add wheat and feed grains to the open general list not only for China, but for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well. Maintenance of this restriction enables Commerce to demand that 50 percent of all shipments be in American bottoms. This eliminates the grain trade with Eastern Europe and will appear absurd with China until we allow U.S. ships to call at Chinese ports. (NSSM 124, *Next China Steps*,⁶ as it now stands in draft does, however, offer the option of U.S. carriers calling at Mainland China ports, and it is due shortly.) The China trade changes offer a good occasion to eliminate the 50 percent shipping requirement across the board, and it would be a gesture to the USSR.⁷

Grain is one of the principal potential exports from the Free World to China, and it is difficult to explain to U.S. farming interests why we refuse to allow that trade. Liberalization on this point may result in further pressure to relax Eastern European restrictions, and it will certainly increase pressure to allow U.S. ships to call at Chinese ports. The

⁶ See Documents 117 and 129.

⁷ The AFL-CIO and the International Longshoremen's Association opposed any modification of the requirement that at least 50 percent of all grain shipments to Communist countries be carried in U.S.-registered vessels. The President and Kissinger discussed this requirement on June 4. Nixon complained, "It's an archaic provision of law, the 50 percent of American bottoms. The American merchant marine, however, is a relatively, is a very patriotic union in support of other activities and it would be rough as hell." Kissinger replied, "That's true. I think then perhaps individual licenses would be better. Except that then every time we do it, we have hell to pay." Nixon said, "Well, the point is, we just tell them we got it because of the enormous surplus of grain and so forth, we've got to do it for grain, we're going to fight like hell to keep the 50 percent American bottoms for everything else." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–10:22 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4) Kissinger, Lord, Jay Lovestone, Director of the Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, and Thomas Gleason, President of the International Longshoremen's Association met on June 9. Gleason informed Kissinger that he would instruct the longshoremen not to load any ships involved in grain trade with Communist countries. He added, however, that he did not want to embarrass the President. (Memorandum of conversation, June 9; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 269, Memoranda of Conversation, June 1971)

Labor Department is opposed to relaxation of these controls without first getting union agreement, since the move would antagonize the unions, particularly George Meany, and may result in a refusal by the longshoremen to load grain destined for the Communist countries. Pete Peterson strongly urges a positive grains decision, since it would have very favorable political results in border and agricultural states, and specifically with Senator Dole. Peterson believes the agricultural political aspects outweigh the costs with the unions and that the west coast unions are prepared to load grain.

The Under Secretaries' Committee considered a fallback recommendation—that you include grain on the open list for China even if you do not do so for Eastern Europe, or that you authorize individual licenses for China without the 50–50 requirement. I cannot, however, recommend these fallback positions for they would reinforce suspicions that improvement in China relations is principally aimed against the USSR and would take us right to Stage III in our China control program—better treatment for China than for Russia.

U.S. Imports

The Under Secretaries' Committee has considered three means of controlling U.S. imports from China. The Trading with the Enemy Act, by which we will control these imports, does not allow product differentiation.

Imports from China will face high Smoot–Hawley tariff rates. Cotton textiles will be held down by the long-term textile agreement. Before the U.S. embargo on trade with China, 80 percent of our imports consisted of items such as hog bristles, tung oil, wool, tungsten, feathers, eggs, and menthol. The USC believes that even without controls, our imports from China would take a few years to reach \$100 million though they might eventually reach \$200 million. In view of the nature of China's exports to the Free World—mainly foodstuffs, crude materials, and semi-finished manufactures—the pattern of her shipments to the United States and the potential volume of imports, the Under Secretaries' Committee recommends that you approve the issuance of a general license authorizing all imports from the PRC with an announcement that we may impose a global import restriction in the future should it become necessary.

Other options considered and rejected were that (a) all potential imports be licensed individually by the Treasury Department; and (b) a \$50 million quota be now announced limiting such imports. The Committee rejected these recommendations as unnecessary until we have a better view of developing trade relations and because of the bad precedent that would be established by initiating such a cumbersome bureaucratic procedure.

Further Review and Coordination

The Committee will review the results of your decisions in August and report to you on possible future steps. Meanwhile, the agencies will continue to make additions to the China list in the context of reviews for the Eastern European list and send to you only those items on which there is interagency disagreement. (I believe we can trust Defense to be sufficiently vigilant in this respect.) The agencies will also consider on their merits individual applications for export of items not yet included on the general open license list.

Announcing Your Decision

To obtain maximum domestic and international impact from your decision, we should issue a White House press release along the lines of the one at Tab B. Pete Peterson, however, has written to suggest that we would gain more domestic plaudits by first conferring with interest groups (Tab C). This, however, would open the strong possibility of press leaks.⁸

Recommendations

1. That you accept the Under Secretaries' recommendation on items for the U.S. export list including earth moving and railroad equipment. Pete Peterson concurs.⁹

Approve

Disapprove, prefer the USG list without earth moving and railroad equipment

⁸ Peterson's memorandum is Document 127. Nixon wrote a handwritten comment beside this sentence: "OK—Don't worry about the leaks, they will only help build the story." On June 4 Nixon told Kissinger that he wanted Peterson to confer with interest groups and that a leak would be "useful" in this case in order to build the story over time. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–10:22 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4)

⁹ The President initialed his approval. However, in a conversation with Nixon on June 4, Kissinger suggested delaying the approval on earth moving equipment and some other items: "You see, the advantage of not going immediately to the Soviet level is it gives you another story whenever you need it." (Ibid.) Nixon apparently accepted this suggestion, as Holdridge wrote to Kissinger on June 4: "In accordance with your instructions, Ernest Johnson and I went to State this afternoon for a meeting of the Working Group on China Trade List in order to reduce the number of items on the China list significantly below the number on the Soviet list." He added that items cut from the list included earth moving equipment, locomotives, petroleum products, copper products, and railroad signal equipment. He concluded: "We have stressed the need for keeping the reductions in the China list extremely closely held." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII)

Disapprove, prefer to accept USG recommendations but phase the announcements over several months as suggested by Defense

Disapprove, prefer to go immediately to the Soviet level in our Chinese export controls

2. That you approve the addition of grains for open general license export to China and the Soviet Union. Pete Peterson strongly concurs.¹⁰

Approve

Disapprove

Disapprove, open general license to China only _____, or, individual licensing for China without the 50% shipping requirement_____. (I strongly recommend against these last alternatives.)

3. That we announce the licensing of all imports from the PRC under a general license subject to possible future import restrictions should these prove necessary. Pete Peterson concurs.¹¹

Approve

Disapprove, prefer individual licenses, without dollar quota

Disapprove, prefer a global \$50 million limit

4. That we announce the decision via a public release from the White House.¹²

Approve

Disapprove

¹⁰ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of any of the options, but the President wrote: "Pete [Peterson], [George] Shultz—earliest." When discussing this issue on June 4, Nixon and Kissinger felt it unlikely that the Russians or the Chinese would buy significant amounts of grain from the United States. Nixon, however, emphasized that even a small shipment of grain to the PRC would have a major impact among farmers. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–10:22 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4)

¹¹ The President initialed his approval.

¹² The President initialed his approval. Kissinger relayed these decisions to Irwin in a June 9 memorandum. (Ibid., RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/U-Sec Memoranda, January 1971) The White House announced the trade policy on June 10. (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1971, pp. 815–817) Details on the new trade rules are in 36 *Federal Register* 11808. All diplomatic posts were informed in telegram 103604, June 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US) The Republic of China expressed its dissatisfaction with these measures on June 11, when Ambassador Shen met with Green. (Telegram 104798 to Taipei; *ibid.*)

132. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, June 4, 1971.

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou En-lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward to the opportunity of a personal exchange with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou En-lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly to and from an airport to be designated by the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China is prepared to maintain strict secrecy with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential. Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss a possible communiqué to be issued sometime after his return to the United States.²

President Nixon reciprocates Premier Chou En-lai's anticipation of the meeting between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger. He considers it a hopeful first step in improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. Nixon initialed the message, which bears the notation: "5th Draft—handed to Hilaly 5:30, 6/4/71." Kissinger and Hilaly met from 5:50 to 6:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² Kissinger wrote the word "joint" in front of the word "communiqué" in this sentence.

**133. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for
International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, June 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Textile Negotiations in Taiwan

1. Ambassador Kennedy has reported that U.S. and Taiwan have reached some preliminary understanding on several major portions of a five-year voluntary restraint program for textiles, including a nine percent average growth rate for man-mades and one percent for wool.² However, several very serious points of contention remain (base year figure and trigger mechanism for imports in categories not specifically covered in the agreement). Until they are resolved, the negotiations are at an impasse.

2. Ambassador Kennedy believes there is no give whatsoever in the U.S. industry's position on these issues and there is some strong pressure for the industry representatives to come home. The Chinese also have compelling reasons to be adamant. They see no reason why they should not hold out for something at least as good as Japan is now giving us unilaterally. They are also concerned about being the first of the three Asian countries to voluntarily settle with us unless the terms are advantageous. The Taiwan Government feels it has taken a heavy beating from the U.S. in recent months (oil moratorium, Two-China developments) and that it would lose a great deal more international face if they were to settle for a disadvantageous bargain.

3. Ambassador Kennedy believes we have three alternatives:

(a) Go to Hong Kong and Korea with the agreement as it now stands and with an understanding with Taiwan (which they have agreed to) that they will accept a base year figure and consultation mechanism that those two countries are willing to accept. Ambassador Kennedy rejects this approach since Hong Kong and Korea will know

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 12, President's Handwriting Files. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. This trip was arranged in early May. See Document 121. Overall trade policy toward the nations of East Asia is documented in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV.

² Attached but not printed is a message sent via backchannel by Kennedy to Peterson on June 7. A relatively complete record of the Sino-American textile negotiations is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables).

the problem we face with Taiwan and be in a good position to exert leverage on us to give in other areas to get what we need on the base year and the consultation mechanism.

(b) Return home now and admit failure. Ambassador Kennedy believes your prestige is on the line in the textile and footwear issues and that to fail could have very serious domestic and foreign ramifications (he believes the footwear negotiations would collapse if the textile negotiations were called off). While the industry indicates it would rather go home than give any further, he doubts that would be their feeling a few months down the road in the face of totally unrestrained textile imports.

(c) Offer certain concessions to Taiwan. Ambassador Kennedy feels the impasse can be broken without causing disastrous side effects for either our industry or the Taiwan Government. While the Chinese have stressed the importance of certain military items (F-4's for example) Ambassador Kennedy is convinced that the "only" way to resolve the issues is to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese administrative control under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.³

4. Ambassador Kennedy's argument on the Senkaku follows:

"This is a major issue in Taiwan with both domestic and international implications. If the U.S. were to maintain administrative control, it would give the GRC a tremendous public boost since they have expressed themselves so forcefully on the issues. Further, it would be a very direct indication of our continued interest in and support for the GRC—and it would be done at Japan's expense, a point that is vital to our ability to proceed effectively with textile negotiations in Hong Kong and Korea and subsequently in Japan. Announcement of such a decision allows the GRC to save face both at home (it takes the Vice Premier off the hook) and abroad. Taiwan could accept the current textile package in face of Hong Kong and Korean pressure.

"In addition, such an act would, in my opinion, provide a very badly needed shock effect on the Japanese. It would indicate that U.S. acquiescence in all matters requested by the Japanese could no longer be taken for granted.

"I can fully appreciate the opposition which such a proposal will generate in certain quarters of our government. But I feel that this can and must be done. We accepted stewardship of these Islands after World War II. Neither historically nor geographically are they a part of the Ryukyus Chain containing Okinawa. Consequently, the GRC suffers a great loss of face if we allow Japan to gain administrative control of them. Since possession of the Islands is still in dispute, there is every reason for the United States to maintain administrative control until such time as the dispute is settled. Taiwan feels very strongly that

³ See Documents 113, 114, and 115.

once Japan had administrative control there is absolutely no possibility of their ever relinquishing that control. By no means am I suggesting that we hand the islands over to Taiwan. Rather, I am strongly recommending the wisdom of preserving the status quo rather than allowing Japan to assume administrative control with the great loss of face this entails for Taiwan.

"I know of no other action sufficiently important or sufficiently dramatic to resolve our textile problems specifically as well as to pave the way for resolution of several general international trade difficulties. The stakes involved are very high which I fully realize. I realize, too, that only the President can make such a decision. Therefore, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to present to him all the potential benefits and ramifications of my recommendations."

5. Henry Kissinger is looking into the background of the Senkaku Islands dispute and will be able to report to you at our meeting this afternoon on what would be involved in not turning over the Senkaku Islands to Japan at this point.

6. I've just heard from Harry Dent that Roger Milliken called to say the industry is getting very discouraged, and I am trying to get that input prior to our three o'clock meeting.⁴

⁴ Harry Dent was Special Counsel to the President, 1969–1972. Roger Milliken was a textile executive at Deering Milliken, Inc. and a member of the Republican National Finance Committee.

134. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to Ambassador Kennedy, in Taipei¹

Washington, June 8, 1971, 1229Z.

Eyes Only for Amb Kennedy, Taipei from Peter Peterson. After lengthy discussion, the President's decision on the Islands is that the deal has gone too far and too many commitments made to back off

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Secret; Eyes Only.

now.² I showed your wire on this and even reread portion dealing with its importance.³ The President was deeply regretful that he could not help on this, but he felt that the decision was simply not possible. The President has instructed me to tell you that he will send a senior military representative in August to review with GRC in “a favorable and forthcoming way” important defense possibilities.⁴ I’ve explained that this makes final negotiations now very difficult but decision is August visit because of need to do this while Congress is out in August. Not to complicate your life further but I just talked with Roger Milliken who says that industry here was about to decide to ask everyone to come back because deal now being talked about comes up to 2.7 billion over the term, which is half billion up from 2.2 billion or 7-1/2 percent increase worked out here on the 1970 base that Milliken says was the ceiling. Also, Milliken reports Mills will say that he can get deal from other countries similar to Japanese which will work out considerably better than deal you have offered.⁵ Harry Dent and I suspect that Mills may have suggested he will support quota bill as part of his own political objectives. Bryce Harlow confirms from high sources that Mills has made some kind of commitment to support quota bill next spring.

Apparently, the 2.7 billion that industry representatives there agreed to strikes them as too much here in this country and that 2.2 billion was the ceiling.

I have just called Milliken to say that the President would certainly appreciate their staying with us in this effort and if it breaks up now

² Nixon, Kissinger, and Peterson met at Camp David from 3:25 to 4:10 p.m. on June 7. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to a draft telegram to Rogers by U. Alexis Johnson: “Henry Kissinger stepped into the breach with material that I supplied him, and last night [June 7] obtained the President’s decision that we would not change our position on the Senkakus. However, this points up the heat that GRC is bringing to bear on us and in turn in some degree probably reflects the heat that GRC is feeling on a subject which it neglected for so long.” (Ibid., RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Nodis Chrono 1971) Kissinger and Johnson discussed the Senkaku Island issue by telephone on the morning of June 7. Johnson stated: “The principle that we are applying is that we receive the islands from Japan for administration and are returning them to Japan without prejudice to the rights—no position between the two governments on it.” (Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Johnson, June 7, 10:35 a.m.; *ibid.*, Telcons, May–June 1971)

³ See Document 133 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁴ In an October 5 memorandum to Haig, Holdridge wrote that Peterson’s office had contacted him to note that no military assistance mission had been dispatched to Taiwan. He noted, “Given Ambassador Kennedy’s promise to the GRC, and given the doubts likely to be raised in their mind by any considerable postponement of the survey mission, we should move ahead reasonably soon to send a suitable officer to Taiwan.” Haig’s handwritten comment on the bottom of the memorandum reads: “Cripes John—this is dynamite. In any event we should wait till we see how textiles come out.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)

⁵ Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D–Arkansas) was the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee.

it would be hard to reconstitute the effort. He said they felt that likelihood is good enough for quota legislation that they would probably take their chances and come home now.

My recommendation is that you tell GRC that deal must be at a volume level that you can get industry to really accept and that this is important enough to us that we will have to review defense and other carrots and sticks in order to achieve it.

Then I would go on and start in other two countries and let GRC stew about potential U.S. actions. If industry says they want to come back to U.S., I'd be inclined to go on anyway and see what it takes in other two countries to get deal industry would accept. I think it would be better if industry would stay but it's not essential. My reasoning is that if you can get deal that sounds reasonable not only to some of the industry but also the public, then I think we are far better off than having appeared to have failed and only Presidential alternative would be to support what could be a disastrous, wide-ranging quota bill on many categories or veto and still lose textile support. If we don't make any deal, it certainly would seem to hurt the President a lot and help political opponents equally. I've explored this with top advisers and all agree that the best deal we can make is a lot better than none at all. Do your best on this basis.⁶ The President deeply appreciates what you are doing.⁷

⁶ On June 7 Kennedy told Chiang Ching-kuo of the decision on the Senkaku Islands. Chiang asked that the U.S. Government categorically state at the time of the signing of the Okinawa reversion agreement that the final status of the islands had not been determined and should be settled by all parties involved. (Backchannel message from Kennedy to Peterson, June 9; *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) In a June 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson noted that Rogers had raised this issue with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi at their meeting in Paris on June 9. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Kissinger, Henry, 1971) On June 12 Peterson informed Kennedy, who was in Seoul, that Rogers had approached Aichi, "strongly urging GOJ to discuss issue with GRC prior to signature of Okinawa Agreement on June 17." He also noted that a Department of State spokesman would announce on June 17 that a return of "administrative rights" to Japan of the Senkaku Islands "can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) On June 15 Peterson cabled Kennedy, in Seoul, stating that Aichi had met with the ROC Ambassador in Tokyo to discuss the Senkaku issue. (*Ibid.*) On July 12 Chiang Ching-kuo complained to McConaughy that "the Japanese so far have refused to talk in any meaningful way on the subject." (Telegram 3388 from Taipei, July 12; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT)

⁷ An exchange of notes between Rogers and Ambassador Shen on June 29 extended and amended the October 12, 1967, agreement on trade in cotton textiles. See TIAS 6361 (the 1967 agreement), TIAS 7011 (an exchange of notes for an interim agreement signed in late December 1970), and TIAS 7135 (the June 1971 notes). The agreement was further extended and amended in August 1971 (TIAS 7177). A new agreement was reached in December 1971 (TIAS 7249, corrected in TIAS 7469). The United States and the Republic of China were also parties to a multilateral accord on trade in wool and man-made fiber textile products in December 1971 (TIAS 7493 and 7498).

135. Editorial Note

The United States and the People's Republic of China finalized arrangements for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger's trip with a series of message relayed through the Pakistani Government. Kissinger, Winston Lord, and Ambassador Agha Hilaly met at the White House on June 21 from 6:07 to 6:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) At this meeting, Hilaly handed over two notes. First was a June 19 note from Islamabad, written on stationery from the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington:

"My dear Henry: Enclosed is the slip of paper sent to me by President Yahya Khan. The rest of the slip had the following message from him *to me*. 'The above message from Peking seems to clinch the issue finally. Please assure our friend that absolute fool proof arrangements will be made by us and he need have no anxiety on this count. I will be expecting him in Islamabad on July 8—mid-day. Please deliver the above message to him & send me his confirmation & reaction if any.' With my best regards, Yours sincerely, Agha [Khan, President of Pakistan]."

Attached to this note was Premier Chou En-lai's June 11 message to President Nixon:

"President Nixon's message transmitted by President Yahya Khan on June 9, 1971 has been received. Premier Chou En-lai agrees to change the time of Dr. Kissinger's visit to Peking to July 9th to 11th, 1971. The govt of People's Republic of China will make all the necessary arrangements accordingly."

Chou's message was written on plain paper. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) Kissinger relayed his travel plans to the Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph S. Farland, on June 22. The draft telegram signed by Kissinger reads as follows:

"1. This will bring you up to date on my plans for Pakistan visit which have now firmed up. 2. We plan to surface Asian trip in bureaucracy late this week, and publicly first of next week, building it around three-day stop to Saigon, followed by low-key orientation visit to Bangkok, New Delhi, and Islamabad, plus stopover in Paris to see Bruce on way home. 3. My side trip is now confirmed for July 9–11. 4. My official itinerary as sent to posts will show me arriving in Islamabad mid-day July 8 and departing July 10 afternoon. In response to State cable, you should work with Pakistani Government to arrange official schedule in Islamabad during this period. We will adjust schedule while I am traveling. 5. Other members of my staff with me for

Pakistani stop will be Hal Saunders, John Holdridge, Winston Lord, Dick Smyser, David Halperin and a Secret Service agent. 6. The only other people aware of the side trip are Helms' deputy Karamessines [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. 7. I have told Ambassador Hilaly that because of need for fast communications, further planning for side trip will be through you. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] I will keep Hilaly informed. You should deal only with President Yahya or whomever he personally designates as liaison. 8. You should, of course, remain in Islamabad from now through my visit. I look forward to seeing you. Warm regards." (Ibid.)

An undated telegram in this special series provided more detail on arrangements for Kissinger's trip. The telegram reads in part:

"He [Kissinger] will be accompanied on side trip only by Lord, Holdridge, Smyser and two Secret Service reps. Saunders will stay in Pindi for business there. Halperin will go to Hill Station with Farland and third Secret Service rep, while Saunders stays at Guest House. Two girls in the party, Diane Matthews and Florence Gwyer will be billeted separately. By the time of arrival in Islamabad, all members of the party, with the possible exception of three additional Secret Service men who will presumably be at Embassy, will be witting. Another exception as matters now stand will be Yeoman First Class Charles Radford who will also not be witting."

The telegram also detailed how Kissinger's staff would prevent a doctor from the U.S. Embassy from traveling to the Hill Station during Kissinger's "illness." (Ibid.)

According to a draft telegram prepared by Kissinger's deputy Alexander Haig, on June 28 Kissinger sent another special channel message to Farland:

"When you see Yahya tomorrow to discuss draft itinerary for visit to Pakistan, please ask him to transmit the substance of the following message to the Chinese as soon as possible: 1. U.S. Government wishes the Government of the People's Republic of China to know that it will not answer the Soviet Government with respect to the question of the five power nuclear disarmament conference until Dr. Kissinger has discussed the matter during his forthcoming visit. 2. The U.S. Government will maintain the strictest secrecy with respect to Dr. Kissinger's forthcoming trip regardless of whatever speculation may occur in the U.S. press or elsewhere. 3. During his visit, Dr. Kissinger will be empowered to work out with the Government of the People's Republic of China the substance and form of a possible subsequent announcement of his trip. Warm regards." (Ibid.)

136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the Ambassador to the Republic of China (McConaughy)¹

Washington, June 30, 1971, 12:18–12:35 p.m.

[Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries and a brief discussion of American relations with Africa, Chile, Turkey, and Iran.]

McConaughy: Am I authorized, Mr. President, to continue telling them that we do not intend our efforts to lower tensions with the Chinese Communists—

Nixon: Our intentions—

McConaughy: And to get some contacts. I mean, we do not intend for those efforts to prejudice the vital interests of the Republic of China. You authorized me to say that about 12 months ago.²

Nixon: I think that's fair enough. Just say that we, that our—as far as the Republic of China is concerned that we have—we know who our friends are. And we are continuing to continue our close, friendly relations with them. As for their vital interests, what you really mean by vital interests, what you mean is, are we going to turn them over to the ChiComs, is that it?

McConaughy: Well—

Nixon: Is that what they're afraid of?

McConaughy: I think they, they'd find—of course that they know we wouldn't do that. I believe they think of that as just general support for their membership in the UN—general international backing of them.

Nixon: We will—we will certainly in the UN. We're not going to support any proposition that would throw them out.

McConaughy: Yeah. Exactly.

Nixon: Now, whether or not we can do what they want to do, which is of course to support the proposition that they stay in the Security Council, that's really—I think we can support them, but it isn't really going to work.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: I mean, if they get in—if they should—and when they—that's why the whole two China thing is so really rather ridiculous,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 532-17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

² McConaughy accompanied Chiang Ching-kuo on his April 1970 visit to the United States. He also returned to Washington during the fall of 1970. No record of a private meeting between him and President Nixon has been found.

even if we eventually have to come to that. But our position will basically be that we support the Republic of China and especially in the UN. We will continue to. We will not support any resolution—our China position will not support any propositions that have the Republic of China put out of the UN.

McConaughy: Yes.

Nixon: We will be strong, steadfast on that point, so that's one. Now when you get into the other areas, we, after all, have a treaty commitment. We won't manage to break our treaties. We are working with them economically, too.

McConaughy: And they're—

Nixon: But we must have in mind, and they must be prepared for the fact, that there will continue to be a step-by-step, a more normal relationship with the other—the Chinese mainland. Because our interests require it. Not because we love them, but because they're there.

McConaughy: Yeah. Precisely.

Nixon: And because the world situation has so drastically changed. This has not been a derogation of Taiwan.

McConaughy: Exactly.

Nixon: And it's done because, as I say, because of very great considerations in other areas.

McConaughy: Yes. Yeah.

Nixon: It's a hard thing to sell.

McConaughy: Yes it's a—

Nixon: I know it's terribly difficult.

McConaughy: Yes. It's tough.

Nixon: They're going to see it in black and white. And they—my personal friendship goes back many years.

McConaughy: It does indeed.

Nixon: They sent the most beautiful gifts to our daughter's [unclear] wedding and so forth. We just—that's the way we're gonna deal with it. The personal considerations here are—we'll put it this way, we're not about to engage in what the Kennedy administration did with Diem. Because they might think that way. Either physically or philosophically, we don't do that to our friends.

McConaughy: Yeah, exactly.

Nixon: You remember that?

McConaughy: Yes. Of course they—

Nixon: The Kennedy administration has Diem's blood upon its hands, unfortunately. That was a bad deal.

McConaughy: Yeah. The President [Chiang Kai-shek] says repeatedly that you are the President, and your administration is the

administration that understands the China issue and really sympathizes with his government, understands its ideals and its aspirations and its role in the world better than any other American president, any preceding administration, and he's unshaken in that view.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. That's why, of course, it causes me great concern that we have to move in this other direction. When I say we have to move, we have to because our failure to move would be—would prejudice our interests in other areas that are overwhelming.

McConaughy: Yes. Exactly.

Nixon: Let us suppose, for example, we require some cooperation in Vietnam. Let's suppose that we could affect other relations—see many, there are different guesses on that—all these things are there.

McConaughy: Yeah. The real crunch on the UN issue is the Security Council seat.

Nixon: Of course it is.

McConaughy: I'm convinced we can keep them in if there's no tender of the Security Council seat to the Chinese Communists. If there is—as of now it looks like they would withdraw.

Nixon: Yeah.

McConaughy: That would mean they're giving up on the thing. They've pretty well convinced themselves they could make a go of it without UN membership.

Nixon: Oh, hell yes. To be perfectly frank with you—

McConaughy: And that would be—

Nixon: To be perfectly frank with you, if I were to be, if I were in their position, and the UN, as I say, the UN moves in that direction, I would just say the hell with the UN. What is it anyway? It's a damn debating society. What good does it do?

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: Very little. [unclear] They talk about hijacking, drugs, the challenges of modern society, and the rest just give hell to the United States. That's all they do.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: No, my views about the UN, I must say, despite publicly I have to go through the usual facade, the act of praising the UN, but it's had it.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: Every sophisticate knows it.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: I mean, it does not serve our interests to put anything up to the UN. As you know, none of our vital interests have ever been submitted to the UN and will never be while I'm here.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: So as far as they're concerned, I think they ought to not give much of a damn what happens in the UN. I don't think it hurts them one bit, but that's for them to decide.

McConaughy: They recognize that it's got a certain psychological importance, I think. They don't want to be isolated—

Nixon: They don't want to be isolated. They don't want to be outside the community of nations.

McConaughy: A sort of a pariah. And they—they're afraid that other countries might use their absence from the UN as sort of a pretext for discriminatory actions against them, even in the trade sector. And there might be some danger of this. For instance, the European Economic Community is rather inclined to exclude Taiwan from the list of preferential countries, the less developed countries that get preferential treatment on import duties. And they're afraid that there'd be an extra argument for the EEC to cut them out if they're not members of the UN. They might say, "Well then, who are they? They don't even have UN status. Why should they go on any sort of a preferential list for concessions?"

Nixon: Uh-huh. Oh, I see.

McConaughy: That sort of thing. They're just afraid that their efforts to keep up their exports might suffer.

Nixon: No, I—

McConaughy: And they've got to export to live, of course.

Nixon: Oh, yes.

McConaughy: And they've been phenomenally successful, as you well know. And that remarkable rate of growth is continuing. Their foreign—total foreign trade last year was greater than that of entire England and China.

Nixon: Yeah. Sure.

McConaughy: Just over \$3 billion, which slightly exceeded the total import and export trade of the Chinese Communists.

Nixon: Just think of that.

McConaughy: Fourteen million [people on Taiwan] against 750 million [people on the mainland]—they had a little larger foreign trade.

Nixon: Well, you can just stop and think of what could happen if anybody with a decent system of government got control of that mainland. Good God.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: There'd be no power in the world that could even—I mean, you put 800 million Chinese to work under a decent system—

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: —and they will be the leaders of the world. The Indians—you could put 200 billion Indians to work, and they wouldn't amount to a goddamn.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: You know, basically they're different kinds of people.

McConaughy: That's right. Yeah.

Nixon: But the Chinese, they're all over Asia. I know. They've got what it takes.

McConaughy: Yeah, with an elected system of government. The one thing that—

Nixon: [unclear]

McConaughy: I'm just back from New York on some trade conference work for the Businessmen's Council for International Understanding, Mr. President. I've assured them that we are well disposed toward continued American investment there. You know—

Nixon: Absolutely.

McConaughy: This very loyal American investment. I've encouraged them to continue. I've told them so far as I know the political climate is going to remain favorable if they can make an independent business judgment, which they must make for themselves. It's good business risk. Then as far as we know, the political climate certainly would argue for their going in. We don't foresee any change there. We anticipate it will be, continue to be a good climate. We're continuing to give our export guarantees there, in concurrence the Ex-Im Bank program has done an awful lot there—wonderful job. Also, the AID guarantees on investments apply—the same as in other countries. So I encouraged them to continue their interest in investment.

Nixon: They should.

McConaughy: I got a very good response.

Nixon: I consider [unclear] a stable country and I certainly would not fault any course but that.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: But it's a delicate line.

McConaughy: It is.

Nixon: And you're going to have to—we're going to depend on you to be as, you know, as effective as you can be under difficult circumstances to keep them from, well, just throwing up their hands. There isn't anything they can do to us, of course. It isn't that so much. But the point is we take no comfort in seeming to hurt our friends.

McConaughy: Yes.

Nixon: No comfort at all.

McConaughy: Right.

Nixon: But the world is—their's is a very delicate problem.

McConaughy: It's something not to be talked about now, of course, Mr. President, but I conceive of Taiwan as gradually developing its own orbit, separate from that of the mainland.

Nixon: That's what—

McConaughy: And I think this is going to be in our national interest too. We don't need to talk about formal independence now or sovereignty questions. I think we're wise to leave this open.

Nixon: That's right.

McConaughy: In public.

Nixon: That's right. They should—they should go on. I think that's their whole—their whole line of their thinking should be along that line.

McConaughy: Of course, the Generalissimo couldn't come to that now. But someday I think they are going to accept a separate status, independent of the mainland, in a different orbit and a separate status. But Taiwan is a part of the general equilibrium in the Far East, and I think that'd be seriously disturbed, apart from every humanitarian consideration, if the Chinese Communists took it over. It'd be a disaster.

Nixon: If Chinese Communists took it over [unclear].

McConaughy: Yeah. Of course, it'd be a bloodbath, the same as Tibet. But from the geopolitical standpoint it would just change the sensitive equipoise in the area, I think. And I know the Japanese would be greatly disturbed, too.

Nixon: Yep.

McConaughy: The Filipinos would be. And of course with the reversion of Okinawa, the Japanese are all the more sensitive to any change there. I think we've got a real ally in the Japanese. [unclear], they're basically with us.

Nixon: They sign on?

McConaughy: The LDP is. I don't know how the Japanese Socialists would be, if they came into power. They never do. But the LDP is with us.

Nixon: Sure. Sure. Sure. Sure. The Socialists [unclear]. Well, you don't have—there isn't any more delicate assignment, or I must say, as events unfold here, any one that will be more difficult than yours. And I just wish you the best. It's just one of those things, as I say. I look around the world, and you have to deal sometimes with a bunch of damn bandits. We do. And we're dealing with bandits, thugs, international outlaws, and so forth. But sometimes you have to because our interests are so deeply involved. With the Soviet—they're really a despicable [unclear], but you've got to deal with them.

McConaughy: That's right.

Nixon: You've got to talk with them.

McConaughy: Yeah. And we've got a complex interplay here—the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. They've obviously got very mixed feelings about the prospective entry of ChiComs into the UN. They don't really want it, but they think they've got to give lip service.

Nixon: Sure.

McConaughy: I guess they'll vote for the—

Nixon: Oh sure.

McConaughy: —resolution, they don't really want it.

Nixon: Boy, they just love sitting there with them. That'd be the worst thing that [unclear].

McConaughy: Well, you know that I will use every resource in my power, Mr. President, to keep them confident and reassured. [Unclear exchange]. You've given me a lot to work with.

Nixon: Well, I can't say much more to be quite—just say as little as you can. Reassure them. But on the other hand, they have a friend, but we have to continue our other thing for other reasons that have nothing to do with our friendship with Taiwan.

[Omitted here are goodbyes and a gift presentation to McConaughy.]

137. Memorandum for the President's File¹

Washington, July 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval Office

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Paris Peace Talks.]

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files, China, China Trips, July 1971 Briefing Notebook. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig met from 9:18 to 9:52 a.m. and from 9:54 to 10:26 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

The President next turned to Dr. Kissinger's proposals for discussion with representatives of the People's Republic of China during his forthcoming side visit to Peking.² The President stated that the communiqué resulting from the visit should not include names and that in his view the President noted that the position which Dr. Kissinger proposed to take was not strong enough, that it was far too forthcoming and that he wished him not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so.

The President emphasized that the issue of "one China vs. two Chinas" should be mentioned only once in the conversation rather than threaded throughout it as in the present text. He stated that with respect to United Nations representation Dr. Kissinger should specifically ask for the Chinese viewpoint. Concerning the section on Vietnam the President suggested that it be reduced in length and tightened considerably.

The President stated that during the discussions he felt it was important for Dr. Kissinger to emphasize more clearly to the Chinese the threat of Japan's future orientation. He pointed out that Dr. Kissinger should state that the Chinese must recognize that a number of nations are concerned about Asia, particularly the role of Japan in the event the United States leaves. In the case of Japan it is obvious that they have both the ability, resources, and know-how to rebuild their military in a precipitous fashion and that a total disengagement of the United States or a misapplication of forces in the area could result in a resurgent Japanese bellicosity with considerable danger for all.

The President stated that he wanted a somewhat heavier emphasis on the Soviet threat. Dr. Kissinger replied that this issue would have to be handled gingerly and that the Chinese might report what was said to the Soviets. The President agreed but stated that the way to handle this was to refer to facts rather than U.S. interpretation of these facts. For example he should tell the Chinese that we note that there are more Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than those arrayed

² Reference is to a briefing book prepared for Kissinger's trip. Nixon's comments here closely match his handwritten notes on the cover of the briefing book: "Put in fear RN could turn hard on V. Nam. Play up our possible move toward Soviets. Not Ottawa. Leave out names on Communiqué (Agnew, Laird). Don't be so forthcoming on Taiwan—until necessary. Prior to summit: V. Nam, grain or other trade, POW in China. V. Nam too long. Put in more fears re Japan. Summit: Businesslike, Shanghai, limit entertainment. Press: Very small delegation. Limit press to TV + wires. We pick them. Limit political visitors." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Briefing Book for the President, July 1971)

against all of the NATO pact countries. He should refer to this as reports in the press.

The President summarized by stating that in his discussions with the Chinese Dr. Kissinger should build on three fears: (1) fears of what the President might do in the event of continued stalemate in the South Vietnam war; (2) the fear of a resurgent and militaristic Japan; and (3) the fear of the Soviet threat on their flank.

The President stated that prior to a summit certain accomplishments should be arrived at between the two governments. First, the release of all U.S. POWs held in China. Second, at least some token shipments of U.S. grain to Communist China. Third, some progress on the Vietnam war issue. Four, we might conclude, as the outcome of a summit, the establishment of a hotline between the two governments and some kind of agreement on the issue of accidental nuclear war.

Finally the President stated Dr. Kissinger should make it very clear to the Chinese that we expected them to institute a severe limit on political visitors prior to any summit with President Nixon. Following that summit visits of any kind would, of course, be authorized.

The President then returned to the subject of Taiwan and the treatment of it in the discussions with the Chinese. He told Dr. Kissinger to tone down any reference to the fact that Vice President Agnew and Secretary Laird had cancelled their trips. He emphasized that the discussions with the Chinese cannot look like a sellout of Taiwan. He instructed Dr. Kissinger not to open up with a discussion on what we've done and the fact that we will not need troops there forever, but rather to restructure that point by emphasizing that the Nixon Doctrine provides for help to those nations who help themselves and thus it will not be essential for our military presence to remain in some areas forever. The President stated that the overall statement with respect to Taiwan should be somewhat more enigmatic.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger not to mention the Truman 1950 statement with which he personally did not agree.³ In sum, the President asked him to review the entire discussion of the Taiwan issue so that we would not appear to be dumping on our friends and so that we would be somewhat more mysterious about our overall willingness to make concessions in this area.

³ President Truman made several major statements about Taiwan in 1950, including his January 5 news conference, a June 27 statement, and a September 1 speech. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, pp. 11–12, 492, and 613) In the first statement, Truman emphasized that Taiwan is part of China, while in the latter two (after the start of the Korean War) he suggested that its status had not yet been determined.

With respect to future meeting places between the two governments, President Nixon stated that he preferred London where communications would be secure and where the size of the city added to the kind of security that would be necessary. He instructed Dr. Kissinger to refer to London as our first choice. Warsaw would be best for diplomatic contacts, but above all, Ottawa would be unacceptable to the President.

Again concerning Taiwan the President made the point that six thousand of our troops in Taiwan were directly related to our conduct of the war in South Vietnam so that as that issue was solved the requirement for these troops would disappear.

The President stated that the section on Korea was exceptionally well done.

[Omitted here is a brief concluding discussion of the Paris Peace Talks.]

138. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Arms Control Discussions Between Non-Official U.S. and Chinese Experts

Last year the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency examined a variety of possible arms control initiatives which might be taken toward the People's Republic of China.² Many of these proposals were further studied and have been incorporated in NSSM 124,³ among them a suggestion that some neutral organization be approached with a view to encouraging meetings between unofficial American and Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/PRCM Files: Lot 74 D 400, DEF 18, Arms Control, 1971. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Farley who forwarded the first draft of this memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State on June 9; revised by Velities; and cleared in substance by Rogers, Irwin, and Spiers.

² See footnote 4, Document 96.

³ See Document 129.

experts, similar to the early Pugwash sessions. Earlier this year we suggested that the Romanians urge China's attendance at a Pugwash session this summer.⁴ Although the reply was somewhat ambiguous, the Romanians have informed us that the PRC will probably not attend.

Dr. Jack Ruina of MIT, who is a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament and has broad knowledge of U.S. arms control policy, will be working with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from now until early August. If we were to wish to implement the recommendation in NSSM 124, ACDA and the Department propose that we take this opportunity to have Dr. Ruina suggest that the Institute extend invitations to U.S. and Communist Chinese experts to meet in the summer of 1972 in Stockholm. We believe Dr. Ruina would be willing to make such a suggestion at our request. We would make the request by having a member of the SALT delegation in Helsinki who knows Dr. Ruina well travel to Stockholm to talk to him.

In order to increase the chances of acceptance by the PRC, we would authorize Dr. Ruina to indicate to the Swedes that there is official U.S. government sanction for such a conference, making clear, however, that at any such meeting attendance from our side would be restricted to non-governmental specialists. We would leave to the Swedes the question of what other nations, if any, were invited to participate.

We would appreciate receiving your early views on our proposal.⁵

Charles F. Dunbar⁶

⁴ See Documents 96 and 109.

⁵ Haig's July 27 response to Eliot is attached. It reads in its entirety: "We believe that the proposed action in your memorandum, dated July 3, 1971, is not appropriate at this time. The proposal may be appropriate at a later date after we have seen the trend of other related negotiations and after we have a more complete understanding of future United States policy in Asia." Nonetheless, on August 3 Farley followed up with a memorandum to Kissinger on China and arms control. He stated that ACDA was studying ways to include the PRC in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and other venues. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII)

⁶ Dunbar signed for Brewster over Brewster's typed signature.

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese
Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and Americas Department, PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
One Other Chinese Official, and Deputy Chief of Protocol
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: There is special news this afternoon—you are lost.

(Premier Chou offers cigarettes to the American party.) No one wants one? I have found a party that doesn't smoke.

First of all, I would like to welcome you, especially as Dr. Kissinger is the special representative of the President.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a great pleasure to be here. I have looked forward a long time to this opportunity.

PM Chou: As Chairman Mao Tse-tung has already spoken about this to Edgar Snow, there is no need to elaborate. I believe you have first-hand knowledge of this article by now.²

Dr. Kissinger: I read it with great attention.

PM Chou: You do not know Mr. Edgar Snow?

Dr. Kissinger: I have never met him.

PM Chou: Thirty-five years ago he became a friend with us. Now he is an old friend. He is considered an old man in your country now, over 60, I believe 65.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK Visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the "Chinese Government Guest House." According to three memoranda from Lord to Kissinger (July 29, August 6, and August 12), these transcripts were prepared by Holdridge, Smyser, and Lord. Kissinger initialed Lord's memoranda to indicate approval of the transcripts. (Ibid., Box 1033, Files for the President—China Material, China Memcons & Memos—Originals July 1971)

² See Document 103.

Dr. Kissinger: I have read his books with great interest, and all his articles. I read the book in which he recounted his long conversation with the Premier.

PM Chou: I was the first to see him. The most important point is his conversation with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and we read those that had been published.

PM Chou: It seems to me that in 1936 when he left China and went back to the U.S. to write an article, his first article was published in *LIFE*. This time it is also in *LIFE*.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is in *LIFE* magazine. The article of him with Mao Tse-tung has been widely read, particularly by President Nixon, who read it with the greatest attention.

PM Chou: Of course not all his works were so accurate, because they were written in the manner of conversation. Certain points were not so accurate, and in individual places were wrong. It is basically correct.

Dr. Kissinger: President Nixon has asked me to convey his sincere greetings both to you and Chairman Mao. He looks forward warmly to visiting Peking personally in the not too distant future.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his kind attention, and I believe that this desire will be able to be fulfilled eventually through exchanges of our opinions.

Dr. Kissinger: We expect that.

PM Chou: According to our custom, we first invite our guest to speak. Besides, you already have prepared a thick book.³ Of course, later on we will give our opinions also.

Dr. Kissinger: It is most unusual for me to have written notes. However, because of the importance of this occasion and because I wanted President Nixon to see what I would say, I have taken the liberty to write out certain of my comments.

PM Chou: Please.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have already pointed out to you, President Nixon has asked me to convey to you and Chairman Mao his high personal regards. He looks forward to meeting with the leaders of the People's Republic of China personally to exchange ideas.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his regards. As Chairman Mao has already said, we welcome President Nixon to our country for a visit, no matter whether he comes as President or as a private person. Of course, he now is still in his capacity as President.

³ Apparent reference to the briefing books prepared by the NSC staff. See footnote 2, Document 137.

Dr. Kissinger: He expects to remain there for some time.

PM Chou: That's good.

Dr. Kissinger: The President asked that this mission be secret until after we meet, so we can meet unencumbered by bureaucracy, free of the past, and with the greatest possible latitude.

PM Chou: You don't like bureaucracy either.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and it's mutual; the bureaucracy doesn't like me.

PM Chou: Do you know that some people call me the dictator of bureaucracy and warlords?

Dr. Kissinger: But that has been strongly overcome. For us this meeting.

PM Chou: Perhaps you did not understand. Do you know who said that?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: You have not read the articles and documents printed by our northern neighbor?

Dr. Kissinger: They tell us so many things about you that we can't follow them all.

PM Chou: This is a very outstanding article, a recent title.

Dr. Kissinger: For us this is an historic occasion. Because this is the first time that American and Chinese leaders are talking to each other on a basis where each country recognizes each other as equals. In our earlier contacts we were a new and developing country in contrast to Chinese cultural superiority. For the past century you were victims of foreign oppression. Only today, after many difficulties and separate roads, have we come together again on a basis of equality and mutual respect. So we are both turning a new page in our histories.

We are here today, brought together by global trends. Reality has brought us together, and we believe that reality will shape our future.

Because this is the beginning of our discussions, let me generally state our general approach towards the People's Republic of China.

We consider that the People's Republic of China, because of its achievements, tradition, ideology, and strength, must participate on the basis of equality in all matters affecting the peace of Asia and the peace of the world. We consider it in our interest, and above all in the interest of the world, that you play your appropriate role in shaping international arrangements.

We realize, of course, that there are deep ideological differences between us. You are dedicated to the belief that your concepts will prevail. We have our own convictions about the future. The essential question for our relations is whether both countries are willing to let history judge who is correct, while in the interval we cooperate on matters

of mutual concern on a basis of mutual respect and equality and for the benefit of all mankind.

Mr. Premier, I see two principal purposes for our meetings today and tomorrow. First, as Chairman Mao and you have suggested, we should work out satisfactory understandings concerning a visit to China by President Nixon, a visit which he intends to make and to which he looks forward. I am authorized to settle all matters concerning such a visit, including its nature, time, and other details; the manner in which the meeting should be prepared; the subjects to be discussed; the possible outcome; and as well, a possible communiqué when I have returned to the U.S.

Secondly, to make President Nixon's visit the success we want it to be, we should lay the groundwork by discussing issues between us, our mutual concerns in Asia, and the peace of the world.

Among the topics I believe we should cover are the following:

—Taiwan, which, from the exchange of notes between us, we know to be your principal concern in relations between us.⁴ Mr. Premier, you have defined this as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. I am prepared to hear your views and to discuss the matter practically.

—Indochina, which is currently the major area of conflict and tension in Asia.

—Relations with other major countries, for example, the Soviet Union and Japan, which of course will certainly affect the future peace of the world.

—The situation in the South Asian subcontinent, which involves many outside countries.

—Establishment between us of a secure channel of communications which is not dependent on the goodwill or the upheavals in third countries, and which is entirely within the control of our two leaders.

—Issues of arms control, such as the recent proposal for a five power conference, on which we have delayed our reply until we could have the benefit of the views of the Premier.

—Any other topics which the Chinese side would care to raise.

In discussing these matters, Mr. Premier, I will be absolutely candid with you, because I want to make sure that if we disagree, it will be in full knowledge of each other's point of view, and because I hope with full candor we will come closer to an agreement.

As a close associate of President Nixon, I am authorized to explain to you fully what our interests are in major areas of the world and areas of policy, and I hope you will feel free to raise any issue with me.

⁴ See, for example, Document 130.

I need not add that any assurances made in this channel will be honored absolutely.

We will have an opportunity to discuss in detail all of these issues, but there's one issue which I know from the statement of the Premier is very much on your mind, which I would like to take the liberty of raising now.

I know you are concerned about collusion, or what you call collusion, of other countries against you. Let me say now that we will never collude with other countries against the People's Republic of China, either with our allies or with some of our opponents. Of course, you may believe that the objective consequences of our actions will bring about collusion, no matter what we say. But we will consciously strive to avoid this.

It is the conviction of President Nixon that a strong and developing People's Republic of China poses no threat to any essential U.S. interest. It is no accident that our two countries have had such a long history of friendship.

To make these thoughts concrete, President Nixon has authorized me to tell you that the U.S. will not take any major steps affecting your interests without discussing them with you and taking your views into account.

I hope while I am here to arrange for a channel which will enable us to communicate directly and secretly. We are prepared to set up communications comparable to those that link us to other major countries of decision, and other means of communication which will enable us to explain our views to each other better.

I am authorized to discuss with you negotiations in which we are engaged with some of your neighbors which you believe may affect your interests.

Both our countries face a difficult task as we move to formalize these contacts. I know that we must both be true to our basic principles, because neither of us can play a responsible world role or build a lasting peace if we abandon our principles.

My colleagues and I look forward to our conversations here with warm anticipation and a keen awareness of the responsibilities we share.

Many visitors have come to this beautiful, and to us, mysterious, land.

PM Chou: You will find it not mysterious. When you have become familiar with it, it will not be as mysterious as before.

Dr. Kissinger: All have departed with new perspectives, and a few have left some modest contributions behind.

We have come to the People's Republic of China with an open mind and an open heart. We hope that when we leave we may have contributed to sowing seeds from which will grow peace between our countries, peace in this region, and peace in this world.

Thank you.

PM Chou: I thank you for the statement you have made at the beginning and for your general explanations of U.S. policy. Before you came, we had already received a message from the NSC Chief of Gen. Yahya Khan, who told us you were coming here with a frank and sincere attitude and wanted to have serious discussions with us. We welcome this attitude. We come with the same attitude, and we are ready to explain our opinions frankly. It is very clear that the world outlook and stands of our two sides are different. As you just said, each side has its own convictions, and we both believe our ideas will become reality. But this shouldn't hinder our two countries on the two sides of the Pacific Ocean seeking what you mentioned—a channel for co-existence, equality, and friendship.

The first question is that of equality, or in other words, the principle of reciprocity. All things must be done in a reciprocal manner. I agree with what you just said—the Chinese and American peoples are friendly toward each other. This was true in the past and will be true in the future. Recently, we invited the U.S. table tennis delegation to China—perhaps you met some of them—and they can bear witness that the Chinese people welcomed this visit of the American people. We have also received many repeated invitations from the U.S. Table Tennis Association to send a delegation to the U.S. We feel this shows that the U.S. people want to welcome the Chinese people.

Dr. Kissinger: We have talked to Mr. Steenhoven.⁵

PM Chou: He recently sent us a cable.

But the question of friendship between the Chinese and American people began to be discussed very early after New China appeared. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference, I answered questions put to me by some American correspondents on relations with the U.S. But later, due to various factors, it was not possible to continue the exchanges which began from this time. Perhaps Your Excellency knows the reason why. Later on, beginning from August 1, 1955, representatives of our two governments sat down for negotiations.

⁵ On April 21 Graham D. Steenhoven, President of the United States Table Tennis Association, met with President Nixon in the Oval Office. Scali prepared a 2-page April 23 memorandum for the President's file that reported on this meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 84, Memoranda for the President)

Our meetings have gone on for almost 16 years now. We have met 136 times, but there's still no result.⁶ Just as you have now mentioned, it's not so easy to bring about results through official negotiations. This is not solely because the negotiations are official, because these today are official; it is whether there is an intention to solve problems. This is the crux.

You just now mentioned the objectives of your present mission. Your first objective is also linked to your second objective, because your second objective is to engage in a preparatory exchange of views in order to bring our basic stands closer together and make them favorable for resolution.

Just now you mentioned seven issues. Of course, we are not limited to seven because we can each put forward what we like. That was your seventh point. You said that you brought with you the desire of your President to make it possible for our views to a certain extent to come closer, and so be beneficial to a settlement. This is a different situation than that in which the Ambassadorial talks began first at Geneva and later in Warsaw. At that time the U.S. Ambassador always said he would like first to settle the small questions one at a time so that we could gradually come closer. We consistently said that only the settlement of fundamental questions first could lead to the settlement of other questions. Therefore, our stands were always different.

However, since President Nixon came into office he has expressed a willingness to settle fundamental questions with us. From the very beginning, he took the attitude that he was willing to come to Peking to meet us, either to send his special envoy or to come himself.

Of course, after he expressed this opinion there was a cessation of contacts for a period of time. As you know, one reason was last year's Cambodian incident, and this year there was the Route 9 battle. This could not but affect our contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree. That is why I wanted the opportunity to express our views concerning peace in Indochina, so that these differences can be settled, both in Indochina and in our relationship.

PM Chou: That's your second item, that's true. I think that as we are beginning to exchange ideas today, we can put forward all kinds of questions. One item can be expanded to link up with other items in a wider field and we can express clearly the stands and views of each side.

The first question is Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger has put forward views very frankly and we will express our own ideas.

⁶ Reference is to the Warsaw talks.

Dr. Kissinger: I have quoted from a communication from Prime Minister Chou which may account for my uncharacteristic clarity.

PM Chou: You mentioned that the meeting today is an historic occasion. Of course a still greater historic occasion would be if President Nixon comes to China and meets Chairman Mao Tse-tung. That would be an historic occasion, if we could solve problems. Of course, we can begin today to create the atmosphere, because as you mentioned, our two separate roads meet each other. On the other hand, we would like to settle on the basis of equality.

Therefore, the question of Taiwan becomes one regarding which we cannot but blame your government. Of course, you are not responsible for this, and you may say that President Nixon wasn't responsible for it either.

As for the U.S. Government, however, I must say a few words. I will not mention the old meetings in China in which U.S. representatives participated, because this is too long ago. Dean Acheson's White Paper⁷ shows what happened more clearly than anything else, and shows that it was the Chinese people themselves who won their own liberation, who liberated our motherland, and drove away the reactionary rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. At that time, the U.S. Government considered this an internal affair of China. This was during the period of 1949 to the beginning of 1950. By then, Taiwan was already restored to the motherland, and China was that motherland. The U.S. stated then that it had no territorial ambitions regarding Taiwan or any other Chinese territories. And, therefore, the U.S. declared that it wouldn't interfere in China's internal affairs and would leave the Chinese people to settle internal questions.

This attitude was proclaimed in all your documents of that time, although some documents adopted an attitude hostile to us—you wouldn't agree that the Chinese Communist Party was leading a new China, but you couldn't do anything about it. Therefore, you made a statement that you would not interfere in China's internal affairs.

Within a short period afterwards, the Korean war broke out and you surrounded Taiwan and declared the status of Taiwan was still unsettled. Even up to the present day the spokesman of your State Department still says that this is your position.⁸ That is the crux.

Dr. Kissinger: He hasn't repeated it! (Considerable laughter from the Chinese side.)

⁷ *United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1949).

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 121.

PM Chou: If this crucial question is not solved, then the whole question will be difficult to resolve. We are two countries on two sides of the Pacific Ocean, yours with a history of 200 years, and ours with a history of only 22 years, dating from the founding of New China. Therefore, we are younger than you. As for our ancient culture, every country has it—the Indians in the U.S. and Mexico, the Inca Empire in South America, which was even more ancient than China. It's a pity that their scriptures were not preserved, but were lost. With respect to China's long history, there's one good point, the written language, which contains a heritage of 4,000 years based on historical relics. This is beneficial to the unification and development of our nation. But there's also a weak point. Our symbolic language of ideograms restricted our development. You might think that these are all idle words, but they are not. They show that we know our objective world and we can coolly appraise it.

History also proves that Taiwan has belonged to China for more than 1000 years—a longer period than Long Island has been a part of the U.S. In the middle (*sic*) of this period Taiwan was temporarily grabbed away by Japan when China was defeated in the war. It was returned to China in the Cairo and Tehran Declarations, and by the Japanese surrender. Both Acheson's White Paper and Truman's statement serve as evidence to that.

Therefore, in recognizing China the U.S. must do so unreservedly. It must recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and not make any exceptions. Just as we recognize the U.S. as the sole legitimate government without considering Hawaii, the last state, an exception to your sovereignty, or still less, Long Island. Taiwan is a Chinese province, is already restored to China, and is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.

This leads us to the second question: The U.S. must withdraw all its armed forces and dismantle all its military installations on Taiwan and in the Taiwan Straits within a limited period. This is the natural logic of the matter.

Of course, the treaty between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek which was signed by Dulles in 1954 is considered to be illegal by the PRC and Chinese people, and we do not recognize it. So speaking of the Taiwan question, this is crucial. I would like to know your opinion so we can exchange views.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to ask the Prime Minister how he proposes to proceed. We can do it in one of two ways—each stating the problems which concern us, reserving its answers until later, or proceeding with the issues one at a time. Which do you prefer?

PM Chou: What is your opinion?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no strong opinion. One possible way is that since Prime Minister Chou has stated his views on Taiwan, we could state our views on Indochina. Then I could tell him of my reaction to his statement on Taiwan, and he could tell me of his reaction to mine on Indochina. Or we could take each issue one at a time.

PM Chou: Either way, it's your decision. You can say whatever you like. You could speak first on the Taiwan question or Indochina, or together, because you may think they are linked.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe they are linked to some extent. But why don't I give a brief reply to your comments on Taiwan and then speak about Indochina, after which we can have an extended discussion of both.

PM Chou: That's agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me then make a few comments first about Taiwan, and then perhaps say a few things about Indochina.

I agree with a great deal of the historical analysis presented by Prime Minister Chou. There's no question that if the Korean war hadn't occurred, a war which we did not seek and you did not seek, Taiwan would probably be today a part of the PRC. For reasons which are now worthless to recapitulate, a previous Administration linked the future of Korea to the future of Taiwan, partly because of U.S. domestic opinion at the time. Whatever the reason, a certain history has now developed which involves some principles of foreign policy for us.

I have noticed that the Prime Minister in his remarks here went beyond some of the communications we have previously exchanged. Both in these communications and in our Warsaw meetings he has spoken of withdrawing military presence and installations from the area of Taiwan and the area of the Taiwan Strait. Today he has spoken also of certain official political declarations.

PM Chou: This was because in order to exchange opinions one must give the entire opinion on the matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. I am not saying this critically, but simply to divide the matter into two parts—first, the military situation in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and second, the question of political evolution between Taiwan and the PRC.

PM Chou: This differs from our opinion. We hold that our relations with Taiwan is a question of China's internal affairs. We have consistently repeated this in the Warsaw talks and in all our open declarations we have also maintained this same consistent stand. What I was speaking of just now, that if relations are to be established between our two countries, China and the United States, the United States must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government in China and

that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the motherland. Under these circumstances, the U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek Treaty would not exist.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand what you have said with respect to the problem of diplomatic relations. Let me talk about Taiwan in our relations in the immediate present in the absence of diplomatic relations.

First, let me say some things about our military presence and then let me say something, in the frankness that these talks permit, about how we see future relations between Taiwan and the PRC as we see objective reality. I am not talking about the formalities of diplomatic relations for the time being.

First, about our military presence, which was the first point the Prime Minister raised with us in his communications and also in the two Warsaw talks that took place in our Administration. We have demonstrated our general intentions with a number of symbolic steps. For example, we have ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol, removed a squadron of air tankers from Taiwan, and reduced the size of our military advisory group by 20 percent. I know this is not your principal point, and I only mention it to show the general direction of our intentions.

Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements, the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia, and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan, that's two-thirds of our force (I have the detailed numbers here in case you would like to hear them) within a specified brief period of time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a principal obstacle between us. I may say, incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon which have not yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence.

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a "two Chinas" solution or a "one China, one Taiwan" solution. As a student of history, one's prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Chou En-lai indicated to me. But if we want to put the relations between our two countries on a genuine basis of understanding, we must recognize each other's necessities.

PM Chou: What necessities?

Dr. Kissinger: We should not be forced into formal declarations in a brief period of time which by themselves have no practical effect. However, we will not stand in the way of basic evolution, once you

and we have come to a basic understanding. That is all I want to say now in a general way, but I would be glad to answer questions.

PM Chou: It's quite clear that in the relations between our two countries that Taiwan is the crucial issue. We have said this more than once in the Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. And we have said that the matter is not only the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but also the basic relations between our two countries. Taiwan must be regarded as a part of China. The solution of the question must follow in order to find a way out. In our messages, we've also reiterated this, that Taiwan is a province of China.

With respect to what you have just now said, that is, your opinions on historical evolution and that you do not advocate a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" solution, which you just now clearly expressed, this shows that the prospect for a solution and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries is hopeful.

Dr. Kissinger: This depends, Mr. Prime Minister, on the situation of reality and in what time frame. The principles I mentioned are principles of our Administration and you can count on them. The timing of political steps will have to be discussed between us. The easier task will be the military steps than the other steps which will require a little more time.

PM Chou: There are two questions I would like to clarify. I see the necessity for a period of time, but the time that is left for President Nixon is limited. And as a close associate of him, you must be quite clear about this point.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the Prime Minister's estimate of the time left to President Nixon?

PM Chou: I see two stages. The first is one and a half years, and the second, if he is re-elected, five and a half years. This would take us to the 200th anniversary of your country.

Dr. Kissinger: Which time period is the Prime Minister talking about, five and a half years or one and a half years?

PM Chou: When your President comes to discuss matters with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the conclusion could be drawn that when he comes he will answer that question. Because neither the U.S. nor the Chinese people would oppose the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity despite an estrangement of 22 years. But now a time to solve the question has come. Neither of the two questions are of the President's making, but if this issue is solved, it will be one of the factors relating to his re-election. Of course, there are many factors, and precisely because of this we welcome President Nixon and you to come.

Dr. Kissinger: Our policy with respect to the People's Republic of China has nothing to do with the President's re-election, but is related to

his lifetime conviction that there cannot be peace without the participation of the PRC. These decisions we make on the basis of the permanent interests of the U.S. and not the personal interest of President Nixon.

PM Chou: Of course, the President's policy should be established on the basis of equality, in which each treats the other as an equal, and just as you mentioned, we should promote matters in that direction.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to ask the Prime Minister a question, before making an observation. Is the Prime Minister linking a meeting between the President and Chairman Mao Tse-tung to the prior establishment of diplomatic relations, or can the two be separated?

PM Chou: This is not absolute. Of course it should be discussed. If time is needed, it may not necessarily be solved then. However, the general direction should be established.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

PM Chou: This should make their discussions easier. If you say that you need some time, we can understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give the Prime Minister my personal estimate of what is possible. We can settle the major part of the military question within this term of the President if the war in Southeast Asia is ended. We can certainly settle the political question within the earlier part of the President's second term. Certainly we can begin evolution in that direction before.

PM Chou: Can't the matter of a military withdrawal from Indochina be settled at the most by next year? You just came from Saigon.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean from Vietnam or from Taiwan?

PM Chou: I was speaking of Indochina now. You just now mentioned that a settlement of the political part should be later.

I must clarify one point on another matter. What is the attitude of your government toward the so-called Taiwan Independence Movement?

Dr. Kissinger: The Taiwanese? We would not support this.

PM Chou: Was it supported by a part of the people of the U.S. Government, that is, by CIA or the Pentagon?

Dr. Kissinger: There is an exaggerated opinion in the minds of people in many parts of the world about the abilities of CIA. The only two countries where there have been revolutions in Asia in the last ten years were ones where we had no CIA—Indonesia and Cambodia. For your part, you might call these revolutions "counter-revolutions." There was no CIA, unbelievable as that may sound to you.

PM Chou: This was possibly so in Indochina, which I know is one of the places the President is most interested in, but I don't believe it can be said about Cambodia. We can talk about this later.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we can talk socially about it at dinner. I believe it might be to some advantage to us to maintain CIA's bad reputation (laughter from Chinese).

PM Chou: I attach great importance to what you have just now said: the U.S. government and the President do not support, and will not support, the so-called Independence Movement of Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: May I call you "Prime Minister," or is it offensive?

PM Chou: As you like.

Dr. Kissinger: This term is more natural in English.

Mr. Prime Minister, bureaucracies are large, and sometimes not perfectly manageable.

PM Chou: Don't you know that Chiang Kai-shek is complaining greatly that it was CIA which allowed Peng Meng-min to escape from Taiwan?⁹

Dr. Kissinger: You may know that Peng Meng-min was a student of mine fifteen years ago, but I don't want you to think that I had any relationship to this matter (laughter from the Chinese).

Let me be serious. First, to the best of my knowledge, CIA had nothing to do with Professor Peng Meng-min's coming to the USA. Second, if the President and Chairman Mao come to an understanding, then it's my job to enforce it in the bureaucracy, and I will assure you that it will be enforced. And there will be no support from the U.S.

I must be honest with the Prime Minister; there's no sense deluding ourselves. There's no possibility in the next one and a half years for us to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China in a formal way. It is possible to prevent new claims from being established, and that we will do. For example, the Taiwan Independence Movement, forces that disrupt the evolution which the Prime Minister and I have talked about and which could be confirmed between Chairman Mao Tse-tung and President Nixon.

PM Chou: You want to talk about Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: It's the only other point on which I have some notes.

I told your associates on the plane that whenever I talk from notes I talk for fifty minutes. It's a sign of my enormous respect that I don't do so today.

PM Chou: (laughs) You may act according to your own procedure and take longer. We have time.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to take the liberty of discussing Indochina with you. We know your principles and your friendships. We believe

⁹ See Documents 65 and 91.

that the time to make peace has come, for the sake of the people of Indochina, for the sake of peace in Asia, and for the sake of peace in the world.

I can assure you that we want to end the war in Vietnam through negotiations, and that we are prepared to set a date for the withdrawal of all our forces from Vietnam and Indochina as you suggested before.

But we want a settlement that is consistent with our honor and our self-respect, and if we cannot get this, then the war will continue, with the consequences which you yourself have described, and which may again, despite our interests, interrupt the improvement in our relations.

The actions in Cambodia and Laos and other actions that would happen if the war continues will never be directed against the People's Republic of China, but they will have unfortunate consequences for our relations which we would very much like to avoid.

One of the difficulties, in our judgment, which I want to mention frankly, is that we look at the problem from the perspective of world peace, but the North Vietnamese and the NLF have only one foreign policy problem, and that is Indochina.

I know Hanoi is very suspicious, and they are afraid to lose at the conference table what they have fought for on the battlefield. And sometimes I am frank to say that I have the impression that they are more afraid of being deceived than of being defeated. They think that they were deceived in 1954. But I want to say that we are realists. We know that after a peace is made we will be 10,000 miles away, and they will still be there.

So it is in our interest to make a peace that they will want to keep. We do not want the war to start again.

Let me tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, where I believe we stand in our negotiations.

As a specialist in secret trips, I took a secret trip to Paris on May 31 and made a proposal to the North Vietnamese with which you may be familiar.

PM Chou: I am not familiar with it.

Dr. Kissinger: I offered the following on behalf of President Nixon:—we would set a date for a withdrawal from Vietnam.

PM Chou: A date for complete withdrawal?

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

—Secondly, as part of the settlement, there should be a ceasefire in all of Indochina.

—Third, that there should be a release of all prisoners.

—Fourth, that there should be respect for the Geneva Accords.

There were some other provisions for international supervision and no infiltration, but I consider those subsidiary.

On June 26, at another secret meeting, Le Duc Tho replied with a nine point proposal which is different from the seven point proposal of Mme. Binh in some respects, but not in great detail.¹⁰

There are some positive, but two negative aspects to this Vietnamese reply.

There are some detailed military proposals which are unacceptable in their present form, but which I think we can negotiate and with which I shall not bother the Prime Minister unless he wants to discuss them.

PM Chou: If you like, you may speak of it.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, they give a shorter deadline than we. They want December 31, 1971, which is too short. But, we believe that within the next year what you mentioned can be settled; this is possible and I believe that we can find a compromise there. Within the next twelve months. The Prime Minister asked whether before the election this could be settled, and this is my answer.

Then there are demands, such as that we must pay reparations, which we cannot accept in that form as consistent with our honor. We are willing to give aid voluntarily once peace is made, but we cannot as a matter of honor pay reparations as a condition of peace.

But these are issues which we believe we can probably settle with North Vietnam, although I do not believe that they have survived 2000 years by being easy to deal with.

PM Chou: It is a heroic country.

Dr. Kissinger: They are heroic people, great people.

PM Chou: They are a great and heroic and admirable people. Two thousand years ago China committed aggression against them, and China was defeated. It was defeated by two ladies, two women generals.

And when I went to Vietnam as a representative of New China on a visit to North Vietnam, I went personally to the grave of these two women generals and left wreaths of flowers on the graves to pay my respects for these two heroines who had defeated our ancestors who were exploiters.

¹⁰ Copies of the seven and nine-point proposals are in Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, eds., *American Foreign Relations, 1971: A Documentary Record* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1976), pp. 295–306 and Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 111–114.

In France, Joan of Arc was also worthy of respect.

Dr. Kissinger: Women in politics can be ferocious. (Chinese laughter)

Even though they are now our enemies, we consider them an heroic and a great people whose independence we want to preserve.

There are two obstacles now to a rapid settlement, and not the ones I have mentioned. The two are the following:

—One, North Vietnam in effect demands that we overthrow the present government in Saigon as a condition of making peace.

—Secondly, they refuse to agree to a ceasefire throughout Indochina while we withdraw.

With respect to the political solution, they claim that the present government is a phantom government supported only by American forces. If this is true, then the removal of our forces should bring about the conditions which they are speaking of and which they desire.

Moreover, they are unrealistic. The longer the war goes on, the longer we will strengthen the Saigon Government; and the more we withdraw our forces, the less we can meet demands they make of us. They threaten us with the continuation of the war which will make it impossible to fulfill their demands even if we wanted to, and we don't want to.

As for the ceasefire, the reason we believe it is essential for all of Indochina is that if they attack our friends while we are withdrawing, we will be drawn into war again. And then the conflict will start again with incalculable consequences. They propose to make a ceasefire only with us and not with others. That is dishonorable, and we cannot do this.

I would like to tell the Prime Minister, on behalf of President Nixon, as solemnly as I can, that first of all, we are prepared to withdraw completely from Indochina and to give a fixed date, if there is a ceasefire and release of our prisoners. Secondly, we will permit the political solution of South Vietnam to evolve and to leave it to the Vietnamese alone.

We recognize that a solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without interference. We will not re-enter Vietnam and will abide by the political process.

But what we need is what I told the Prime Minister with relation to Taiwan. The military settlement must be separated in time from the political issues. It is that which is holding up a solution.

On July 12, after I leave here, I shall see Mr. Le Duc Tho in Paris, and I shall make another proposal to him along the lines I have outlined to you.

If Hanoi is willing to accept a fixed date for our complete withdrawal, a ceasefire, a release of prisoners, and a guaranteed international status for South Vietnam, which can be guaranteed by any group of countries, including yourself, then we have a very good chance for a rapid peace.

If not, the war will continue, and it will be a misfortune for everybody.

We seek no military bases or military allies in Indochina, and we will pursue no policy in that area which could concern the People's Republic of China. We are willing to guarantee this either alone or together with you, whichever you prefer.

The President has asked me to tell you that we believe the time for peace has come. It is not up to us to tell you what, if anything, you can do. We believe that the end of the war in Indochina will accelerate the improvement in our relations. In any event, what we want is the people of Indochina to determine their own future without military conflict.

Let me say, Mr. Prime Minister, that regardless of what you do, we are prepared to withdraw that part of our forces on Taiwan which is related to this conflict within a specified time after the conflict is over.

I am not mentioning this as a condition, but for your information.

PM Chou: I thank you for telling us rather systematically about your position on the Indochina question. There is a common point between us in that both of us have respect for the greatness and the courage of the Vietnamese people.

I believe that, in my opinion, for the Vietnamese people to feel that they were deceived during the first Geneva Conference is not groundless, because on this point all signatories at that time, including the U.S., have the responsibility for this.

Dr. Kissinger: That is understood.

PM Chou: Since we have such a common understanding, it is easier to discuss. The secret documents, that were exposed in the *New York Times*,¹¹ show up the truth. A document which is no less significant is the White Paper produced by Dean Acheson.¹² Of course we knew of these events.

That a country should not sign an international agreement but would abide by it was a precedent which was set by Dulles, and never before seen in history.

¹¹ Commonly known as the Pentagon Papers.

¹² See footnote 7 above.

I think now that if at that time we had been more cool-headed, we could perhaps have forced him to sign the agreement, saying we would not sign unless the U.S. did.

Dr. Kissinger: It is hard to believe that the Prime Minister could be anything but cool-headed.

PM Chou: But on this I did not think enough. It was possible for us to be more cool-headed.

Chairman Mao has spoken of this many times with our Vietnamese friends. Our Vietnamese friends do not blame us for this. But we could have done more at that time.

The French were ready to withdraw and did not want to get involved in military adventures. Also at that time the British Government didn't want to be embroiled in adventures. President Truman had already had a role in the war in Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe it was Eisenhower.

PM Chou: But it began with Truman.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

PM Chou: So did John Foster Dulles, indirectly, as advisor to the State Department—later he became Secretary of State.

So it was quite clear that the U.S. authorities at that time were preparing to step in the shoes of France.

Looking back from now, we can see that was the worst precedent set in international history.

It is not necessary to say any more on that, since you have now made public many portions of secret documents.

Dr. Kissinger: I hate to admit this, but they were made public by another student of mine.

PM Chou: I believe that and also thought that.

Dr. Kissinger: If I can make a comment about the difference between 1954 and 1971.

PM Chou: I agree there are differences.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a formal similarity, but an objective difference.

In 1954, Secretary Dulles believed that it was America's mission to fight communism all around the world and for the U.S. to be the principal force, to engage itself in every struggle at every point of the world at any point of time.

President Nixon operates on a different philosophy.

We do not deal with communism in the abstract, but with specific communist states on the basis of their specific actions toward us, and not as an abstract crusade.

We believe that if people want to defend themselves, they must do it on the basis of their own efforts and not on the basis of the efforts of a country 10,000 miles away.

So when we offer to withdraw from Vietnam, it is not in order to devise some trick to re-enter in some other manner but rather that we want to base our foreign policy on the realities of the present and not on the dreams of the past.

I can assure the Prime Minister that any agreement that he makes with us will be kept in the letter and in the spirit.

PM Chou: In this matter, I trust, I believe that Dr. Kissinger, as a special envoy of President Nixon, has sincerity.

And it is precisely because of this that I would like to explain to you the historical developments, which is why our Vietnamese friends are holding out so strongly.

Secretary Dulles' policy at the time, which you explained, was brinkmanship. We understand that. That policy was to isolate the socialist countries and to try to win control over the middle areas in between. Perhaps you have read Chairman Mao's works in which he mentioned this.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Such an assessment is not wrong.

Dr. Kissinger: It is correct.

PM Chou: Therefore, the Vietnamese people feel that they were greatly taken in and deceived at that time. It was stipulated very clearly that one year after the 1954 Geneva Agreement a plebiscite would be held in Vietnam and that the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese would come together to organize election committees which would draw up the election law. No matter what election law might have been drawn up, with international supervision, it was a certainty that President Ho Chi Minh would have been elected if an election had been held. That was where the hearts of the people lay. It was impossible to go against the trend, the evolution of history.

Toward this one must take an attitude of historical realism. There was a great love of the Vietnamese people for Ho Chi Minh. He gave them a sense of national dignity, and national pride. We were very old friends. I knew Ho Chi Minh myself in 1922.

Dr. Kissinger: He joined the Chinese Communist Party.

PM Chou: In Paris.

It was the activity of the U.S. which went against all that and forcibly fostered the Diem puppets in order to overthrow Bao Dai,¹³ the regime at that time, and disrupt the agreements. In this way the Geneva Agreements were completely violated.

¹³ Last emperor of Vietnam's Nguyen Dynasty, 1925–1945, and Vietnamese head of State, 1949–1955.

And the result was that the broad masses of the people of South Vietnam were unable to win liberation and were naturally disappointed. They were again submitted to oppression and massacre.

Hundreds of thousands of them in South Vietnam were thrown into jail and killed. Many went to the north under the Geneva Agreements. It was in such a way that the patriotic movement of the South Vietnamese people began. Even Ngo Dinh Diem was dissatisfied with this. You must know about that. President Kennedy did this. Before he was assassinated, he had Diem and his brother killed.

This cannot but give rise to the just resistance movement of the South Vietnamese people.

The Vietnamese people have continued their resistance movement up to this day. You know the Vietnamese have not asked the Chinese people to send troops. They have counted on themselves alone for the past ten years. This is quite a thing.

Of course, the biggest battles were from 1964–1968. The incident of the Tonkin Gulf was also in your documents. In this way the Geneva Agreements were completely violated.

When President Nixon came to office, he wanted to withdraw troops. That is true. We must say that the total number of U.S. troops now in Vietnam is quite less than the highest number under President Johnson's Administration.

Therefore our attitude toward the Vietnam question and toward a solution of the question of Indochina is composed of the following two points:

The first point is that all foreign troops of the United States and the troops of other countries which followed the United States into Indochina should be withdrawn.

The second point is that the peoples of the three countries of Indochina should be left alone to decide their own respective fates.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree with both points.

PM Chou: You must know that for all this time we have truly supported them, but we have not sent one single soldier to fight.

As to what political system the people choose for themselves, it is for them to decide. So long as no foreign force interferes in that area, then the issue is solved.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give you the personal impression from the other side of the Pacific, from one who has seen Le Duc Tho five times and Xuan Thuy nine times.

I agree the Vietnamese are heroic people. The same qualities which make the Vietnamese such great fighters make it hard for them to make peace. The singlemindedness with which the Vietnamese people fight may deprive them of the perspective to make peace. If some of their

friends, and you may not want to reply to this, can help with their perspective so that they understand that some political evolution is necessary, then we could end the war rapidly. If the war continues it will not be in the interest of the people of Indochina, or peace, but only perhaps for outside peoples. It would only disturb our relationship.

The two principles you mentioned, we are prepared to accept them.

PM Chou: You have talked so many times with them. It is the first time that I have met you.

Dr. Kissinger: I regret that. We must catch up very quickly.

PM Chou: At the Paris talks there have been 122 sessions, about as much as the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks which have lasted sixteen years and 136 meetings.

Dr. Kissinger: My meetings are always private so they don't count.

PM Chou: Of course that's true.

As for the two principles that I have put forward, I would like to put forward some detailed questions:

Does the U.S. agree to withdraw *all* its military forces from Indochina including the army, the navy, the air force, and the marines, as well as its advisers and its military installations?

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to withdraw all organized military units and all installations within the time period I gave to the Prime Minister, and the advisers in a somewhat longer time period, but in a definite period. But we are willing to accept an upper limit on advisers.

PM Chou: Because that was the loophole in the Geneva Agreements. The war flared up from the matter of military advisers.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make one other point. The advisers would not be combat advisers. They would be logistic and technical advisers, like some of those you have had in North Vietnam.

PM Chou: We have had no military advisers. They were only to build roads.

Dr. Kissinger: Whatever the situation, we need the advisers for somewhat longer. Every organized military unit, the army, the navy, the marines, and the air force and all their installations would be removed. Some technical advisers, up to an agreed limit, would remain longer up to a time limit, and then they too would be withdrawn.

PM Chou: What about the forces of the other countries which followed the U.S.? (He named the countries.)

Dr. Kissinger: They would withdraw also. All would be withdrawn within the same time period as the organized U.S. military units.

PM Chou: On this point, I must state that the Vietnamese people are not shortsighted. It is precisely they who have made a great con-

tribution to world peace. You must know that your newspapers and your people and even some of your demobilized army men and active army men all declared and expressed your cruelties in Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: But you have to understand two things. This is the tragedy of the war. President Nixon has two objectives:

First of all, he is dedicated to ending the war, and he has already withdrawn over 300,000 troops.

Secondly, he is also dedicated not to sign a peace which will undermine our basic principles in the world. I frankly believe that this would not be in your interest. If we are to have a permanent relationship, it is in your interest that we are a reliable country.

We must look at it from the point of view of a great country, not in terms of a local problem. Therefore, we may need to continue if we do not get reasonable terms, such as I have mentioned, which I have presented and will propose again Monday to the North Vietnamese. The war may have to continue, no matter what the newspapers say. But to continue is not in the interests of the peace of the world. There's no sense in continuing the war.

PM Chou: I have not finished.

If all these conditions were met, there's still another question which you must think about.

That is that even during Ho Chi Minh's lifetime, he said that if U.S. military forces were to withdraw, he would send them off on a red carpet, in order to show respect for the American people and not harm their national dignity. The American people, of course except for those who violated the Geneva Agreements, are not held responsible.

Wouldn't it be a good thing if the American troops could peacefully go home?

It would be another thing if after the U.S. armed forces should be withdrawn, if the roots of evil were still left and the Vietnamese people once again were thrown into the miserable abyss and submitted to slaughter. Then the civil war would still continue.

You should answer that question. Since the U.S. has sent troops for ten years, you must answer that question.

Dr. Kissinger: I would answer on two levels.

First, we should have a ceasefire for all of Indochina in good faith. Secondly, there should then be a reasonable effort by all the forces in Indochina which exist to settle their differences among each other.

Thirdly, we are not children, and history will not stop on the day a peace agreement is signed. If local forces develop again, and are not helped from forces outside, we are not likely to again come 10,000 miles. We are not proposing a treaty to stop history.

PM Chou: This question involves an even greater sphere.

For instance, in Cambodia, the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak clique staged a coup to overthrow Prince Sihanouk, Head of State in Cambodia. The broad masses of the people of Cambodia are supporting Sihanouk and wish to overthrow the Lon Nol regime. So even if foreign military forces were to withdraw, the civil war would still continue, until the people of Cambodia had driven out Lon Nol and the Government of National Union had returned to its rightful place.

How can you answer that?

Dr. Kissinger: I once said at one of the Vietnamese negotiations that a curious thing about Laos is that most of the Laotian freedom fighters whom we find speak Vietnamese.

If North Vietnam withdraws genuinely its forces from Cambodia and then the civil war is fought only by Cambodians, it's not an international problem. However, if the North Vietnamese troops are there, then it is an international problem. If the North Vietnamese return to their country, we would consider it an internal matter of Cambodia for them to decide and not an international problem.

Secondly, if the People's Republic of China and the U.S. in a demonstration of goodwill, together with other nations, would guarantee a settlement, it would be different from 1954. Because we would be thinking of each other not from the point of view of hostility but of cooperation.

PM Chou: The U.S. should be held mainly responsible for the enlargement of the war in Indochina, and there is no way to shirk that responsibility.

Dr. Kissinger: That is history, and our problem now is how to end it.

PM Chou: But as you just now mentioned, you would like to make an honorable retreat. We think that the best way to do this is forthrightly withdraw and completely withdraw all forces and leave the problems of Indochina to be determined by the people of the three countries of Indochina, no matter which way they would like to solve them. This is the most honorable and glorious way to withdraw from Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: I have stated our views and don't believe I need repeat them. I have stated the conditions which we have offered, which include complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and leaving the future to the people of Indochina, if there is a ceasefire and the release of POWs. I have explained our position, and that is the position which we will be forced to maintain.

PM Chou: Anyway, the cause of the war in Indochina and the responsibility for the beginning of the war in Indochina should be borne by the U.S. Government. Even though President Nixon's Administration wishes to change previous policy and carry out its present poli-

cies, it still must take the primary responsibility and must take it upon itself to end the war. Because the Nixon Administration enlarged and expanded the war to all three Indochina countries and spread it to cover the whole area.

The war was expanded with the invasion into Cambodia last year and the battle of Route Nine in Laos this year.

Therefore, if you want the Vietnamese people to continue fighting, they are prepared to do so. They have only two prospects. The first is for the U.S. to withdraw all its military forces. The second is to continue fighting on.

Since you have admitted that withdrawal of your forces is a good thing and beneficial for world peace and peace in the Far East, you should be able to make up your mind and withdraw from Indochina. This would be an honorable withdrawal and a glorious withdrawal. And you, Excellency, as adviser to the President, should be the first to make up your mind.

At least you should want peace in the Far East. If you speak of the Far East this also involves other questions we can speak of. Because if you don't end the war in Indochina, we must think of other areas. That means Japan, where you are rearming the Japanese militarists. You know of the present Fourth Defense Plan, which was drawn up according to the Joint Communiqué of President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato of Japan. You must know that the Sato Cabinet has been reorganized, and the plan is to be fulfilled ahead of schedule. The Japanese are bent on expanding; their economy has expanded to such an extent. Economic expansion will of necessity lead to military expansion. And once they expand, the Far East will be the first to feel the effects. They have openly decreed that Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam are linked up with their security.

What attitude toward peace is that? Isn't that a threat? We are not afraid of that.

Therefore this is a question on which we must frankly state our views in a clear way.

Dr. Kissinger: Regarding Indochina, I, of course, know your principles. I did not expect that I would convince you on our point of view or that you would tell me if I had convinced you.

I think perhaps after studying what I have said, you can decide what is appropriate, if anything, and needs to be done.

I will say nothing more except that we are sincerely interested in ending the war. It is a danger to peace in Asia. It obscures fundamental problems, one of which you have mentioned, which is the relationship with Japan and maybe with the other great powers. If the war continues, it will menace Asian peace. If you wish, I am prepared to discuss those with you.

PM Chou: Let us have a break and prepare for dinner. We can continue later on.

(At this point, 7:55 p.m., there was a break for dinner. During dinner, in addition to light conversation, there was a substantive discussion on Indochina, the highlights of which follow:

PM Chou: The U.S. should withdraw from Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: I said that the U.S. was prepared to do so.

PM Chou: One cannot blame the Indochinese people for struggling.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not blame them, but the withdrawal of outside forces would meet the aspirations of the Indochinese people and strengthen world peace.

PM Chou: There should be a ceasefire with the U.S. because the U.S. is withdrawing. This does not solve other problems [in Indochina]¹⁴ and therefore there can be no ceasefire with those people. One must remove those who are in power, either through democratic elections or by overthrowing them.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in favor of democratic elections and support them.

PM Chou: We don't believe in the elections in South Vietnam. It is a different situation. There are August elections and October elections and you help Thieu. Have you discussed this situation with Mr. Minh?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, on this trip.

PM Chou: They want you to get rid of the government.

Dr. Kissinger: They can't ask us both to withdraw and get rid of the government of Vietnam. To do both of these is impossible.

PM Chou: We have not exchanged views at this point. We have always thought on this matter that we cannot interfere in these affairs. If you withdraw and they want to continue the civil war, none of us should interfere. The situation has been created over a long time.

How can you make the Cambodian people recognize Lon Nol?

Dr. Kissinger: First, concerning Cambodia, there were 50,000 North Vietnamese troops there before any Americans crossed the border. Secondly, I can assure the Prime Minister that we were as surprised by the coup in Phnom Penh as the Prime Minister was. I thought it was a Sihanouk trick to show hostility against the North Vietnamese, because he was going to Moscow and Peking to try to get them to use their influence against the North Vietnamese forces.

PM Chou: The result was the standing together of the Indochinese people.

¹⁴ All brackets in the source text.

Dr. Kissinger: It was not our doing; it was unfortunate. We did not want Sihanouk overthrown. Why should we lie? What difference does it make now? We were negotiating with North Vietnam at that moment. The coup ruined negotiations that we were conducting and that we wanted to succeed.

PM Chou: The result was that Sihanouk stood together with the Indochinese people.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the result [the coup]. We did not produce, cause, or encourage it.

PM Chou: Was it possibly done by the French?

Dr. Kissinger: That is conceivable, but it certainly was not done by us.

PM Chou: How about the shipload of American weapons taken by Lon Nol?

Dr. Kissinger: I know the incident. It had nothing to do with the coup. It was a historical accident. For two days I believed that Sihanouk had staged the coup as his own maneuver, so that he could come to Peking to impress you with the fact that he had a lot of domestic opposition. I'm not proud of my analysis, but that's what I thought.

PM Chou: Perhaps you were deceived by others.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm too vain to admit that.

PM Chou: You have said that the bureaucracy was not manageable?

Dr. Kissinger: A revolution could not be started by the bureaucratic apparatus. Perhaps an isolated incident like Peng Meng-min could, but it could not happen that a revolution would start without my knowing it. I knew Peng as a student. I don't believe CIA was involved. I can assure the Prime Minister that we will not support the independence movement.

You can rely on my word.

PM Chou: We have noted your statement.

(The formal meeting then resumed after dinner at 9:40 p.m.)

PM Chou: We can go to 11:00 p.m. tonight and if we don't finish, we can continue tomorrow. The main thing is that our guests do not get tired.

Just before dinner and at the table, Dr. Kissinger said that we should look at things from a global point of view. This was also mentioned by President Nixon on his way to San Clemente on July 6 when he said that the U.S. should not concentrate its energies on the Indochina question.¹⁵ The U.S. had been tied down for ten years and had suffered a lot.

¹⁵ Reference is to the President's remarks to news executives in Kansas City, Missouri. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 803–813.

He said that world problems are very large. Indeed, former administrations had driven the U.S. into a dead alley and it couldn't get out.

Since both the President and Your Excellency look at things in broad perspective, it should be easier for the U.S. to extricate itself. Of course, Your Excellency said that the U.S. must look after its honor, and an honorable peace. I think the greatest honor would be a glorious withdrawal. Because that is the call of the overwhelming majority of the people throughout the world, inside or outside the U.S. One can say in all frankness that if it were not for the help given the South Vietnamese puppets, the Saigon regime would have collapsed long ago.

Why must you want to leave a tail on this matter and be unwilling to give it up? As your President has said, you are tied down the last eight to ten years. Why do you not extricate yourselves? This is said by public opinion in the U.S. as well as the world.

So I cannot quite understand what you mean by wanting to leave a tail there, although you reaffirmed moments ago your complete withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by a tail?

PM Chou: One would be Thieu. In our view, you should just simply withdraw completely and never mind how. They might fight. We will not interfere. We believe they will solve their problems by themselves.

If you remain there, the fighting will continue and world opinion will not tolerate what you do.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not believe that I have explained our position clearly to the Prime Minister.

If there are no negotiations, we will eventually withdraw, unilaterally. But it will take longer, the government in Saigon will be strengthened with more equipment, and the outcome will still be decided in the long run by the Vietnamese. What we are now proposing is that we have rapid negotiations. We will set a deadline for withdrawals, and during withdrawals there should be a ceasefire, and some attempt at negotiations. If the agreement breaks down, then it is quite possible that the people in Vietnam will fight it out.

PM Chou: If you, while planning to withdraw, want the Vietnamese to undertake obligations tantamount to recognizing that Thieu will remain or be in a coalition government, then that is a conditional withdrawal on your part.

At the same time, you are maintaining the rule of Lon Nol/Sirik Matak in Cambodia. How can they accept that? They cannot accept that.

If that came to be the case, with Thieu and Sirik Matak continuing to oppress and slaughter their people, then the Vietnamese and Cambodian people would rather fight on.

Particularly after the summit conference on the three Indochinese peoples held last year, they in effect became allies.¹⁶ After the war, they will have different social systems, but at the present they are as one in fighting against aggression. I do not quite understand what good it is for the U.S. to maintain such unpopular rule.

Dr. Kissinger: Our position is not to maintain any particular government in South Vietnam. We are prepared to undertake specific obligations restricting the support we can give to the government after a peace settlement and defining the relationship we can maintain with it after a peace settlement.

What we cannot do is to participate in the overthrow of people with whom we have been allied, whatever the origin of the alliance.

If the government is as unpopular as you seem to think, then the quicker our forces are withdrawn the quicker it will be overthrown. And if it is overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene.

PM Chou: Then the following question arises: while withdrawing, will you look upon such a government as the legitimate government, as an ally; or will you pay no attention to it?

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the question, but I don't understand the significance of the question.

PM Chou: That means, would you still continue to support this regime, such as with military aid? You would not have troops, but if there is military aid you would still be giving support.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to accept an agreed international status for South Vietnam, i.e., precisely stipulated limitations on the amount of military aid the kind of military aid we would maintain.

For example, we are prepared to look at point 5 of Mme. Binh's seven point proposal. Some aspects of it we are prepared to negotiate on.

Then if after some time, the government changes, these limitations would remain in effect.

The same restrictions would apply with respect to Cambodia. It is the most practical way, we believe, of dealing with the problem, which still leaves open the evolution of the political forces.

¹⁶ Representatives of North Vietnam, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the National United Front of Kampuchea, Prince Norodom Sihanouk (deposed Cambodian head of state), and Laotian Communists met on April 24–25. They pledged to forge a unified anti-American struggle in the region. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970* (Bristol: Keesing's Publications, Ltd., 1970), pp. 24030–24031.

PM Chou: But you have a prerequisite with that, that is, a cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: For some period of time. We can put on a time limit, say 18 months or some period.

PM Chou: We cannot consider these specific matters. We are not Vietnamese. If you discuss the Taiwan question, then the details are more familiar with us. On Vietnam we only give them assistance.

Your information on military advisers is entirely inaccurate. We only have technical advisers to re-build roads, railroads, and bridges, and when this was done they went back. Because we must protect our engineering personnel, we had anti-aircraft batteries. As soon as we complete the construction work, we will all go. So the situation is entirely different from what we did in Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister is fortunate not to be involved in the details of the Vietnamese negotiations. This reminds me of a complicated situation in Europe in the Nineteenth Century, a negotiation which only three people ever understood. One of these was dead, the second was in an insane asylum, and a third was himself but he had forgotten everything.¹⁷ (Laughter from the Chinese.) I recognize that your possible direct concern over the details of the negotiations is limited. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity of presenting the problem, which as you correctly point out is ours and brought about by our actions. But since it affects the peace of Asia, and our relationship, I wanted to present our point of view, and I appreciate the courtesy with which you have listened to me.

PM Chou: I would like to go into some explanation. Since you mention peace in the Far East, not only Indochina, should I limit it to Indochina or discuss other areas?

Dr. Kissinger: No, let me hear about all the problems we have discussed.

PM Chou: I will do so, including South Asia and the subcontinent.

First, East Asia. You have troops in South Korea and know about the situation there. You have troops in South Korea and then the South Koreans sent troops to South Vietnam. Therefore, in your withdrawal, all South Korean troops in Vietnam should be withdrawn too.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

¹⁷ "Lord Palmerston, with characteristic levity had once said that only three men in Europe had ever understood [the Schleswig-Holstein question], and of these the Prince Consort was dead, a Danish statesman [unnamed] was in an asylum, and he himself had forgotten it." See R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe, 1789–1914* (1937) cited in Angela Partington, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Fourth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 505.

PM Chou: Your troops in South Korea should also withdraw. We withdrew our people voluntarily from Korea back in 1958, but you said that the Chinese troops were only just behind the Yalu and could easily come back. However, there must be a reason; they cannot just cross over. That would be interference in internal affairs. There must be a guarantee in international relations, and we have given that guarantee. There are two points expressed in this agreement, which are: all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territories of other countries, and let the people of those countries settle their affairs in the way they see fit without outside interference.

Dr. Kissinger: I was talking about this.

PM Chou: If we were to expand these to other points, would we agree?

Dr. Kissinger: If you agree to these principles, we are willing to sign an agreement with you on the basis of the Five Points of Peaceful Coexistence.

PM Chou: We put those forward many times.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: We believe that the peoples of any country should be capable of solving their own affairs without outside interference by others. There is the fact that twenty-five years after the Second World War, your hands are stretched out too far and people suffer from it in another country. Now if you do not withdraw, there will be a sticky situation. The President was right in Kansas City when he said that 25 years ago nobody would believe the U.S. could be in such a difficult position today. But Chairman Mao foresaw this at the time. He wrote an article shortly after World War II on the international situation. The word had spread that an attack was imminent against the USSR. Chairman Mao disagreed, and said that this was only a slogan whose purpose was to gain control over the intermediate areas of the world between the USSR and the U.S.

Chairman Mao pointed out the existence of two intermediate zones: First, the intermediate zone of what is generally known as the third world of Asia and Africa, Latin America, the developing countries, where there was a question of the struggle for control of these areas. The second intermediate zone, was the more developed countries. What was the result of this struggle for control? The result was as the President said. Now in Western Europe, a new collective strength has appeared. The problem in the President's thinking is that West Germany is out ahead of this, although England, France and others are also included. In the Common Market there were six, and there are now ten countries. In East Asia, there is Japan.

Your President also looks upon China as a country with potential strength. Although our country is large in size and has a large

population, yet comparatively it is not developed. So at the present time we only have a voice. But Chairman Mao on many occasions has said that we would absolutely not become a superpower. What we strive for is that all countries, big or small, be equal. It is not just a question of equality for two countries. Of course, it's a good thing for our two countries to negotiate on the basis of equality to exchange views, and to seek to find common points as well as putting on the table our differences. In order to really gain a relaxation in the international arena over a comparatively long period of time, one must deal with one another on the basis of equality. That is not easy to achieve.

After 25 years it's no longer possible for the U.S. to exercise a position of hegemony. Japan has become strengthened, and if you will now withdraw all foreign troops from the Far East, it's your purpose to strengthen Japan so it can serve as your vanguard in the Far East in controlling Asian countries. When we blame you for this, you say that it isn't the case.

Dr. Kissinger: Blame us for Japan?

PM Chou: Yes. You have troops in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Indochina, and also Thailand. As for Taiwan, we discussed that. That is the situation in the Far East. So, if we don't discuss these matters, how would it be possible to live in equality?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we should discuss these matters. I had them in my opening remarks but decided it would be better first to discuss concrete matters before proceeding to philosophical problems.

PM Chou: These are not only philosophical matters, they are also concrete.

Dr. Kissinger: Partly philosophical, partly concrete. Philosophical because it's what each thinks of its place in the world. Concrete in the conclusions we draw from our philosophy.

Let me begin with a concrete example that you mentioned, namely Korea, then make general observations on how we see the U.S. role in the world, and then proceed to Japan and other problems. Is this all right?

PM Chou: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: On the narrow issue of U.S. troops in Korea, a great deal depends on the general relationships in this area and on the wisdom with which both of us handle the transition from one phase of international relations to another phase of international relations. Sometimes even correct things must be done gradually, because if done too quickly they have a shocking impact and create an opposite effect from what one intends. For example, if the relationships between our countries develop as they might, after the Indochina war ends and the ROK troops return to Korea, I would think it quite conceivable that before the end of the next term of President Nixon, most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea.

PM Chou: Next term, not this term?

Dr. Kissinger: We have already reduced U.S. troops in Korea by 20,000 men.

PM Chou: There are still 40,000 or more.

Dr. Kissinger: We still have about 40,000 there. This process of reductions can continue as political relations in the Far East improve, until by a gradual process after a few years there will be either very few or no U.S. troops left there.

PM Chou: I would like to make an observation on this matter. You have such heavy burdens and military expenditures, but what are the results? For instance, precisely because you have been protecting Japan, Japan spent very little on military expenditures before 1971, and is able to expand its economic strength very rapidly. The President mentioned the last ten years; I looked at the figures which you have published on your military expenditures which were \$700 billion.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right.

PM Chou: While Japan has had practically no expenditures, with the result that Japan developed rapidly. Now the President says they are very powerful. Of course, your businessmen have a great investment in Japan. So what purpose is there for you to keep 40,000 troops in South Korea—just honor? You already have a treaty with the Koreans, Park Chong-hee recently was re-elected, and your Vice President went to congratulate him. You have tied yourself down.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, if there were Japanese troops in Korea, without making any judgments about your policy, I imagine that you would be more disquieted by these Japanese troops than by American troops.

PM Chou: We would oppose foreign troops in Korea, no matter whose.

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I don't think that the Korean problem need detain us very long. I am certain that a political evolution is occurring in which this will take care of itself. Our military presence in South Korea is not a permanent feature of our foreign policy. A precise timetable for withdrawal is perhaps something which President Nixon can discuss, or else the matter will take care of itself in the very foreseeable future.

But if I may make a general observation about the problem of super powers and of the American involvement in world affairs. The U.S. is a complex nation for outsiders to understand because at one and the same time it's extremely materialistic and extremely idealistic—and by Marxist standards, naively idealistic. I believe it's quite possible, Mr. Prime Minister, that at the end of World War II Chairman Mao could have understood the tendencies in American policy better than American leaders themselves. I refer to the essay you described.

PM Chou: You are right. There's a saying in China that those on the sidelines often are more clear about issues than those directly involved.

Dr. Kissinger: The U.S. attitude until the end of World War II was that it really believed it need not participate in world affairs at all. It was protected by two oceans, and if there were international troubles, they were due to the short-sighted attitudes of other countries.

At the end of World War II, we confronted an objective reality for which nothing had prepared us and which we had in part generated by our own actions during the war. Every European country had been occupied at one time or another except England, which had been economically destroyed. So there was a vacuum in Europe. And there was also a vacuum in Asia produced by the complete defeat of Japan, and for a while by the Chinese civil war.

So the U.S., against its inclinations, found itself engaged all over the world, in every part of the world, simultaneously. (Chou nods.) It had two different policy doctrines carried out by two different groups dealing with this. First a military doctrine which drew a lesson from World War II to the effect that every aggressor had the same character and that therefore Communism was like Fascism, and had to be dealt with like Fascism. The other tendency was a social welfare tendency which dealt with the world's developing nations, accepting the principles inherited from the New Deal.

These said that if you ease economic conditions a little, without political organization and without economic doctrine, a political organization would emerge automatically. This was a mistake which I must say you never made.

At any rate, Americans spread across the world engaged in two unrelated enterprises, with the social welfare group not understanding that in a developing country before economic progress you must have political organization, and the military-oriented people like Dulles not understanding that to have a true defense there must be a consciousness of a common threat, and that an outside country cannot supply the will to resist even if it supplies the weapons.

So a curious thing occurred, Mr. Prime Minister. We didn't look for hegemony as we spread across the world; this was an undesirable consequence and led us into many enormous difficulties. In fact, our liberal element, very often because of missionary tendencies, got itself even more involved, for example, as in the Kennedy Administration, than the more conservative element. (Chou nods.) So here we are. When President Nixon came into office, we found ourselves, as you say, extended around the world without a clear doctrine under enormously changed circumstances. Europe had recovered, and was forming itself into an economic unit.

PM Chou: How much money did you spend on the Marshall Plan?

Dr. Kissinger: I think about \$30 billion.

PM Chou: Was it paid back?

Dr. Kissinger: By nobody.

PM Chou: Was it the same for Lend Lease?

Dr. Kissinger: Essentially.

PM Chou: How much did you spend on Lend Lease?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know.

PM Chou: It's too far back.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Lord was not born yet.

PM Chou: He can study.

Dr. Kissinger: My staff will catch hell over this when we get back because they're supposed to prepare me for every question.

PM Chou: It was an accidental question.

Dr. Kissinger: I will get the figures for you, and once we have established communications, will get this to you.

PM Chou: It doesn't really matter.

Dr. Kissinger: I will place a telephone call.

PM Chou: Ambassador Huang Hua will help me get the figures.

Dr. Kissinger: There's no need. We will get the figures for him.

At any rate, this Administration has had a very difficult task of adjusting American foreign policy to new realities at the same time we also have to conclude a very painful and difficult war. (Chou nods.) We have established the principle that the defense of far away countries cannot be primarily an American responsibility. That responsibility must in the first instance be their own, and in the second instance must be the responsibility of other countries of the region. And the U.S. should intervene primarily when a super-power threatens to establish hegemony over countries which can never be strong enough to resist on their own. This has been our philosophy since we came into office.

PM Chou: On this point, there is a difference in our respective views.

Dr. Kissinger: Indeed, this philosophy has brought me here.

PM Chou: I understand. There is another super-power.

Dr. Kissinger: Here? To the North?

PM Chou: Yes. We don't believe that super-power will be able to control the world. It will also be defeated as it stretches out its hand so far. You are feeling difficulties now, and they too will also feel difficulties. They are just following after you.

Dr. Kissinger: With all respect, I think they triggered us, they caused our actions. Even today their constant probing makes it very hard to have a real settlement with them.

With this as our philosophy, we have, for example, reduced our military forces in parts of the world other than Vietnam by over 100,000 men, and civilians by about 50,000 since we came into office. But as we move into a new period, certain contradictions become apparent. The Prime Minister has on a few occasions mentioned Japan. Let me say two things: first, as between a strong Japan and a strong China, we believe a strong China is not expansionist because this is your tradition.

PM Chou: This is not only because of our traditions but because of our new system. In the past, we had an expansionist tradition, and committed aggression against Vietnam, Burma, and Korea. But New China will not commit such aggression, because that is decided by our system and ideals.

You overestimate us when you say we will develop our economy after five to ten years. We don't go so fast, but we don't want to move along at a snail's pace. But you are correct that the new China will not practice expansionism. It's not the same for Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: A strong Japan has potentially some of the tendencies which the Prime Minister mentioned. A strong Japan has the economic and social infrastructure which permits it to create a strong military machine and use this for expansionist purposes if it so desires. The American forces on Japan are in this respect totally insignificant. They play no role compared to the potential power Japan represents. In fact, they create a paradox because it is our belief, and this is one of the occasions where we may be right, our defense relationship with Japan keeps Japan from pursuing aggressive policies. If Japan builds its own military machine, which it will do if it feels forsaken by us, and if it builds nuclear weapons, as it could easily do, then I feel the fears which you have expressed could become real indeed.

In fact, Mr. Prime Minister, from the point of view of the sort of theory which I used to teach in universities, it would make good sense for us to withdraw from Japan, allow Japan to re-arm, and then let Japan and China balance each other off in the Pacific. This is *not* our policy. A heavily rearmed Japan could easily repeat the policies of the 1930's.

So I really believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that with respect to Japan, your interests and ours are very similar. Neither of us wants to see Japan heavily re-armed. The few bases we have there are purely defensive and enable them to postpone their own rearmament. But if they nevertheless rearm heavily, I doubt that we will maintain our bases there. So we are not using Japan against you; this would be much to dangerous for both of us.

With respect to South Asia and your northern neighbor, perhaps we can discuss them separately. I have talked too long already.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter. With respect to Japan, there are some points we have in common, whereas some others we can further discuss.

I would like to ask one question—in Secretary Laird's recent visit to Japan and South Korea, I believe one of the questions discussed was military cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. I think he is still there, for ten days. He goes to Korea on the 13th.

Dr. Kissinger: If I can tell the Prime Minister something in the frank manner we are discussing, one reason Secretary Laird is so long in Japan was that he was going to Taiwan, and I kept him from going there while I am here. Mr. Prime Minister, if you believe this was easy, you don't know our bureaucracy.

PM Chou: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Two things. I believe that our Cabinet members this time of year discover important reasons to take them round the world and these visits very often assume local significance. For example, Secretary Laird was invited to Japan by Nakasone, but had the misfortune the day he arrived that his host was no longer in office. (Chou laughs.)

PM Chou: This was not expected, I believe.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that it was not planned. In what Secretary Laird said, you should be in no doubt that he was not expressing the President's national concepts, but was exploring how to make it technically easier for us to cooperate. I will have to look into this matter. He may simply be looking at U.S. bases.

But it is absolutely against President Nixon's policy to project Japan's military power outside its home islands into other areas for possible offensive uses. This would be uncontrollable, short-sighted, and extremely dangerous, all of which does not exclude some bureaucrats from making technical arrangements. But they would not be of great significance.

PM Chou: One question I would like to ask which I did not ask. It's a very strange phenomenon. On the question of the reversion of Okinawa itself, the Japanese people are saying three things: first, that this arrangement still contains no guarantee for Okinawa's non-nuclear status; secondly, that this reversion cannot be said to be unconditional, that there are still conditions; and thirdly, it is not a complete reversion and some rights are to be retained by the U.S. Why do you insist on maintaining the Voice of America two years more on Okinawa, something which gives rise more easily to resentment?

Dr. Kissinger: On the first point, with respect to Okinawa's non-nuclear status, I don't understand the criticism because I was somewhat involved in the negotiations myself and I know that it will have exactly the same status as Japan, that is, a non-nuclear status. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

Second, with respect to a conditional or unconditional reversion, of course there were certain financial provisions associated with it with which I am prepared to deal if the Prime Minister wishes to raise any issues.

As to VOA, there is still some time before I leave here. If the Prime Minister is patient for another ten minutes' discussion, I want to explain how our government works. It will be important for him when we set up direct communications to understand who communicates with whom on what subject, what subjects should go in what channels, and what roles the various bureaucracies play. For example, it is very fortunate for our presence here that the Prime Minister has corresponded through President Yahya rather than through our Ambassador in Warsaw, which would have produced a quite different result. We will discuss this separately.

On continuing the VOA in Japan for two years, it didn't seem worth the bureaucratic fight to overrule what the bureaucracy had decided and agreed upon. That was the easiest thing to do. It didn't seem that important an issue. Had these conversations taken place between the Prime Minister and myself, or between Chairman Mao and the President, before the negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa, the result would have been different because we would have attached a different importance to the issue.

PM Chou: I did not intend to go into this matter today. It came to me just on the spur of the moment. However, it is not only an irritant to the Chinese people, but also to the people of the Far East and the Japanese people themselves.

Dr. Kissinger: I asked the Prime Minister to put questions to me which puzzle him, and I believe that this is one of the good results of this meeting.

PM Chou: That's right. I have come to understand not only your philosophy but also your actual policies. Because these actual policies represent the thinking of the President who has put them into effect; they have helped to explain the position of the U.S. at the present time. In this respect, I have paid particular attention to the talk given by your President at Kansas City on his way to San Clemente. It was long, especially that part on international affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't read it yet; I have been travelling.

PM Chou: We'll get you a copy.

Dr. Kissinger: When Ambassador Huang Hua comes to Canada, we will send him the latest Chinese statements.

PM Chou: So this concludes our discussion for tonight.

Tomorrow, depending on the weather, if we kept you in this house for talks without letting you take a look, as hosts we would feel uneasy. I suppose you will get up about 8:00 a.m., Peking time.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: So if the weather is good, we will ask you to take a look at China's former Imperial Place.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be most grateful.

PM Chou: It can be kept closed to the public for a short time in the morning. You can see two parts, the exhibition of various historical relics, and the Imperial Palace itself. Among the relics are antiques unearthed during the great proletarian cultural revolution in ten different provinces.

Dr. Kissinger: That sounds very interesting.

PM Chou: The relics are from 2000, 1000 years ago. The two parts should take two hours.

Dr. Kissinger: We are very grateful.

PM Chou: We can then continue our discussions. I invite you to a roast duck dinner at the People's Hall at noon.

If there is rain the tour is troublesome. An alternative would be to go together to the Summer Palace for boating in the evening after the people have left. So the alternative depends on the weather.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we will continue our discussions tomorrow.

PM Chou: Yes.

140. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hsu-Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

(At the opening of this session, Prime Minister Chou and Dr. Kissinger informally discussed the tour of the Imperial Palace grounds that the American party had taken that morning. Dr. Kissinger said that it was a very moving and interesting experience. When Prime Minister Chou noted that it involved a lot of walking, Dr. Kissinger replied that with all the eating the Americans were doing, this was the minimum they could do. Prime Minister Chou explained that the first Great Hall that the Americans had seen was built about 600 years ago and the second one was built during the reign of the Third Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, during which the capital was moved from Nanking to Peking. Dr. Kissinger said that the buildings were very impressive, as were the symmetry of the courtyards and the relationship between the roofs and the courtyards which formed an ensemble. Prime Minister Chou noted that they had also seen antiques which had been unearthed, and Dr. Kissinger commented that the Director of Archeological Museums had been a very excellent guide. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that they had had a short break during their tour and were in good shape.)

PM Chou: Yesterday, although we were not able to go into all the seven issues raised and there was some that we did not touch, yet generally we went over the subjects. I should now like to give our opinion of the issues you raised yesterday in the same manner as you did when you began yesterday, that is, to give a brief general opinion, after which you can give your opinion. We will then still be free to exchange views. Then later on this afternoon, as you have agreed, we can give a summary of our views and have it recorded.

Dr. Kissinger: On the taping question, we should first agree on everything else and then see about the taping.² That presents a special problem for me.

PM Chou: Our suggestion was that we could record the opinions of each side in a concise way at the end, and summarize them and have them recorded for you to use to report to President Nixon. This would also be a rather concentrated report which I could deliver to our leader Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Piao, and the Chinese Communist Party.

² Not further identified.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is agreement that this would be the only use and there would be no public use, that would be one thing. The difficulty with respect to public use is that between the two of us it is possible to do more privately than we can say publicly.

PM Chou: This would not be for public use. I have no such intention whatsoever.

Dr. Kissinger: I also would have a personal problem. As I told you, you will be so much more precise and better organized than I, that I would be shown up at a disadvantage. It is a point of vanity.

PM Chou: This may not be the truth, then, because you are younger and have more energy than I. Of course, we can talk about this later. First we can have free exchanges.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's have a discussion and agree on everything else. Then let us broach this in a constructive way. We can find a solution.

PM Chou: I would now like to answer the issues which you brought up at the beginning session and some of the issues you touched upon later.

From beginning to end yesterday, you constantly said that you wished the question of Indochina to be seen not only as an Indochinese question but also as an instance having a relationship to the general world situation.

Yesterday, you said that we should find a way to implement any overall agreements we had reached in a way beneficial to peace between our two countries in Asia and in the world.

This truly is the overall question. When we entered into the latter part of our discussion yesterday, I mentioned that the situation of the world after the Second World War was not one of relaxation; on the contrary, after the Second World War wars had never stopped. Although there was no world war, local wars existed including wars of resistance, wars of aggression, and civil wars. In your government documents, for example Lodge's Report (The Report of the President's Commission on the UN) this fact is also recognized.³ In reality, this is so. The report said that it can be said that such wars have almost never stopped since World War II. Can we say we can get rid of the present situation? Under present circumstances, this may not be quite so possible.

In his talks with the press en route to the West Coast, your President also admitted that in the past 25 years the situation has been tense. Have you received a copy of his remarks?

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. I have had an opportunity to read it.

³ Submitted to President Nixon on April 26, 1971, and published in part in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1971, pp. 128–136. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume V.

PM Chou: Yesterday I also mentioned that Chairman Mao analyzed the situation since World War II, describing it as one in which two super powers are contending with each other to win over the first and second intermediate regions. This situation is becoming more active, and not relaxing. The desire which your President expressed was that the five forces which have emerged cease their military competition, and embark upon economic competition.

The first part of our answer will be that we do not consider ourselves a power. Although we are developing our economy, in comparison to others we are comparatively backward. Of course, your President also mentioned that in the next five to ten years, China will speedily develop. We think it will not be so soon, although we will try to go all out, aim high, and develop our socialist construction in a better, faster, and more economical way.

The second part of our answer is that when our economy is developed, we will still not consider ourselves a superpower and will not join in the ranks of the superpowers.

Can the situation now make a turn toward easing tensions? Yesterday I also answered this question, saying that our two sides should make an effort to ease tension in our relations. But may I say with respect to the timetable which you described yesterday, this does not seem to be possible. That is, the steps which you are taking in your withdrawal from Indochina and the relationship of this withdrawal to the normalization of relations between our two countries, as mentioned in the first message which your President sent to us through President Yahya Khan.

Dr. Kissinger: I am afraid I don't understand what the Prime Minister has in mind on the last point.

PM Chou: This was the President's oral message of November 1970,⁴ saying that he wished to move toward friendship with China. If you are going to move towards friendship, this should mean normalization of relations between our two countries. According to the opinion which you gave to us yesterday, you would withdraw all armed forces from the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits gradually within a fixed period, and only after that would you consider solving political questions. These would be left to your President's second term to be solved.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I made myself clear. Political evolution can start concurrently with our military withdrawal. It will take a somewhat longer period of time, but it can start at the same time.

⁴ Apparent reference to the efforts of Sainteny and Walters to deliver messages to PRC representatives in Paris. No record of Walters' contact with the Chinese in 1970 has been found. See Documents 89 and 90 and footnote 2 thereto.

PM Chou: But when you mentioned political evolution, and moving toward friendship with us, the following must be included:

—It must be recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people.

—It must be recognized that Taiwan belongs to China; that it is an inalienable part of China which was returned to China after World War II.

—That, as you mentioned yesterday, the U.S. does not support a two Chinas or a one China, one Taiwan policy and does not support the so-called Taiwan Independence Movement.

—Also, as you pointed out explicitly yesterday, the spokesman of the Department of State no longer reiterates what he said, that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.

If all these questions should be left to a later period to be solved, however, wouldn't the intermediate period be one of tension? And if none of these issues were resolved during your President's visit, then what would be the result of his visit? Not only the people in our country but the people of the world would ask us this question and ask you that question. If the President's visit is decided and confirmed, there should be efforts to move in this direction. Of course, we do not set that as a precondition for the President's visit, but we believe that there must be a certain direction of efforts as a result of the visit, because we have always viewed the question of Taiwan as our internal affair which we must solve ourselves. And if these questions are just hung up, then the tension that has existed between our two sides will continue to remain.

In other words, tension is also chaos. In our view, in the twenty-five years since World War II, the world all along has been in turmoil, the present has not settled down and is still in turmoil. In the example which you mentioned yesterday, the possibility that India will attack Pakistan in South Asia, from news which we received today it seems that the tense atmosphere has been stepped up.

Dr. Kissinger: Has something new happened?

PM Chou: There has been more propaganda from the Indian side. I also said yesterday that we always believed that such a possibility existed. The question of India is a question in which you two big powers, the U.S. and the USSR, are taking a hand in.

Dr. Kissinger: We (the U.S.) are taking a hand?

PM Chou: You are taking an interest in this affair because, as you said yesterday, you warned India when you went there. Of course, the Soviet Union has also declared that it hopes the two sides (India and Pakistan) will reach conciliation. Didn't they (the Soviets) issue the so-called Tashkent Declaration before? But these are only superficial things. With India able to get such a large amount of military equipment, it will take expansionist turns.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, India doesn't get military equipment from us.

PM Chou: That's what I have heard, but you are giving Pakistan some equipment.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but so are you.

PM Chou: We do so because India is committing aggression against Pakistan. They have also committed aggression against us, too, as you said yesterday . . .⁵

Dr. Kissinger: No, you mentioned that.

PM Chou: . . . in accordance with Nehru's traditional thinking as expressed in the book, *The Discovery of India*. So with respect to the issue of the South Asian subcontinent, this region continues to be in turmoil and is not settling down. The turmoil in East Pakistan in a very great way is due to India. The so-called Government of Bangla Desh set up its headquarters in India. Isn't that subversion of the Pakistani Government?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister doesn't think that we are cooperating with this, does he?

PM Chou: I would not like to draw a conclusion on that at present, but simply want to point out the phenomenon—we cannot but pay attention to this. Perhaps our attention will be even greater than yours. This issue is before our eyes.

When we talk about the tensions in South Asia, this is to say nothing about the Middle East, Europe, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea or the Atlantic. And what about this side of the Pacific, aren't there many military maneuvers in the Sea of Japan? On this very day joint U.S.–Japan maneuvers have taken place. Of course the Soviet Union is very tense about all this; there is mutual tension.

With respect to Indochina, according to the withdrawal plan which you described yesterday, you cannot accept the proposal put forward by Mme. Binh in its entirety?

Dr. Kissinger: Not entirely, but we can accept a substantial part.

PM Chou: According to what we discussed yesterday, there is the possibility that, through your strengthening the Saigon Government and the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak regime by military equipment, and because you left that "tail" behind, the civil war will expand.

Dr. Kissinger: Not increase, decrease.

PM Chou: But yesterday you also said that if the Vietnamese people did not accept your plan and allow you to withdraw according to

⁵ All ellipses in the source text.

your plan, then the war will certainly continue and the result would be incalculable consequences.

Dr. Kissinger: I will let the Prime Minister speak first and make my comments afterward.

PM Chou: The Taiwan question is the same.

When I mentioned the Japanese question yesterday, and talked about the ambitions of the Japanese militarists, I was not only thinking of Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam but also of Northeast China, Indochina and the Philippines and areas way up to the Straits of Malacca which the Japanese regard as their lifeline. Thus there is a great possibility that before the U.S. forces have withdrawn from these areas and from Taiwan, armed forces of Japan shall enter. Entry into Taiwan would be possible because Japan and Taiwan still have a treaty, concluded with Chiang Kai-shek—the so-called Peace Treaty, and they are now stressing that fact.

All this is to say, that due to the development of history in the past 25 years, powder kegs have been set up everywhere. According to our philosophy, wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance. You have referred to Chairman Mao's theories of people's war in this connection, but such resistance is stimulated by your oppression, your subversion, and your intervention. Another aspect to be mentioned is the contention between the two superpowers. As a result, according to the objective facts the world is not moving toward relaxation of tensions, but on the contrary it continues in turmoil. This is precisely why we are digging air raid shelters here. I was using more diplomatic language yesterday.

Dr. Kissinger: You wouldn't tell me whom they are against.

PM Chou: I would like to tell you today in a more forthright manner, because if we are going to dig air raid shelters, we must think about the consequences. You like to talk about philosophy. The worst would be that China would be carved up once again. You could unite, with the USSR occupying all areas north of the Yellow River, and you occupying all the areas south of the Yangtse River, and the eastern section between these two rivers could be left to Japan. In the past Japan has been interested in Shantung and Chingtao; it also has been interested in Shanghai. It had been to all these places before when Japan committed aggression against China. You are familiar with that.

If such a large maneuver should occur, what would the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao be prepared to do? We would be prepared to resist for a protracted period by people's warfare, engaging in a long-term struggle until final victory. This would take time and, of course, we would have to sacrifice lives, but this is something which we would have to contemplate.

Of course, you can say that such things will never happen. Friends from Europe say that the Soviets will not attack. We say that we will never provoke an attack, but once they enter our borders, we must be prepared. We have to be prepared for attacks from all sides including from India as in 1962 or even on a greater scale. We shall use this to educate our peoples with the result that all issues will be solved. We will also educate the next generation, and guarantee that after victory a socialist country will emerge which is able to be truly developed without outside assistance.

Perhaps you have read some of Chairman Mao's poetry. Perhaps not. When he returned to his native town in 1959 after having been away 32 years, he wrote a poem in which there are these two lines: "It is the bitter sacrifices that strengthen our firm resolve, and which give us the courage to dare to change heavens and skies, to change the sun, and to make a new world." That is, we must be prepared to make even greater sacrifices to consolidate our new China.

I believe that this is the same case with the Vietnamese people and Indochinese people—they think in similar terms. As I mentioned yesterday, the Vietnamese people have made up their minds that if they are not allowed to live in peace they would be willing to sacrifice another million men and fight on to the end. Ho Chi Minh himself said before he died that he would not allow a single foreign soldier, that is, American soldier, to remain on Vietnamese soil and would fight on to victory. Therefore, this situation of great turmoil in the world exists, and no matter what you think, the objective situation develops in this way.

American friends always like to stress the dignity, the honor, and the face of the U.S. As I mentioned yesterday, the best thing for you would be to withdraw all your armed forces lock, stock, and barrel and withdraw all other foreign forces and do so on your own initiative. That would be the greatest honor. If you continue to want to leave a "tail" behind, then the Vietnamese people and the other Indochinese peoples will be able to say that you have something up your sleeve and will not be able to accept such a proposition. Also, as I mentioned yesterday, there have been 25 years since the Vietnamese people began their resistance against the French. In their relations with you, your aggression and oppression in South Vietnam has been going on for ten years now. If you proceed from the standpoint of equality with all countries, no matter big or small, you should also have respect for the dignity, honor and glory of the Vietnamese people. When we discuss what you call philosophy, we should view the objective world of developments in a cool manner.

Because of this, I have first touched upon the seventh issue which you mentioned yesterday, the general world situation first. In the messages which we exchanged between our two sides it was said that the

two sides could discuss any subjects they desired to raise. There are also many other detailed questions, but most are included within the major issues. We believe that at present there is chaos under heaven, and believe that in the past 25 years there has been a process of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization. Your President also said (in Kansas City) that 25 years ago you could not imagine that the present situation could emerge. He also said that in the remaining third of the century that efforts should be made to cease military competition and to embark upon economic competition. However, economic competition in itself involves economic expansion, and then will necessarily lead to military expansion. Japan is the most telling case in point, but the danger may not be less in the case of West Germany in relation to Europe.

Yesterday I also mentioned the USSR. The Soviet Union is following your suit, in stretching its hands all over the world. You said that you were triggered by the Soviet Union's probing throughout the world. No matter whether there is a case of contention or a case of being triggered, anyway there is a situation of tension, of turmoil. This is the objective situation. If we look at the development of the objective world in a cool-headed manner, then we are called upon through our subjective efforts to attempt to undo some of the knots.

As you mentioned, there are links between the Taiwan question and the Indochina question. But the alternative that you put forward yesterday means dragging the situation on—going one step and waiting to see before embarking on the next. The result would be, before solving a question that you complicate it to such a degree that you would reach a certain point at which you would be unable to halt the course of events. For example on Taiwan. If you cannot determine your policy of moving toward a policy of friendship with the People's Republic of China, and put forward a very clear plan, but take one step and look before taking the next step, then the consequence would be that Japan would go into Taiwan and have a hand. This would be because if you withdrew part of your troops and wait to see what would happen next, Chiang Kai-shek would know what you were doing and would seek another way out even though he says himself that he is opposed to a policy of two Chinas, a one China, one Taiwan solution, or Taiwan independence, and opposes the fallacy that the status of Taiwan is unsettled. If he feels that the U.S. is⁶ unreliable, he could go to Japan, and Japan itself wants to be drawn into Taiwan and already considers Taiwan within its security sphere. Chiang Kai-shek is not only a single person but has others below him, and they could come up with various different proposals.

⁶ A handwritten correction changes "in" to "is."

Once your policy becomes fuzzy, and his policy is not able to be in accordance with yours, he will try to find a loophole and seek another way out.

Therefore, the Taiwan question is a very small matter to you. As you said, it was created by President Truman, and what use is Taiwan to you at the present moment? Taiwan is not an isolated issue, but is related to recognition of the People's Republic of China, and it is also related to the relations of all other countries to China. If your President were to come to the PRC without a clearcut attitude on this issue, then what impression would this give to the world? In my view, it would be inconceivable.

The second question is Indochina. As I have said we support and have formally stated our support for Mme. Binh's seven point proposal. Yesterday we discussed the crucial question of your leaving Indochina and also recalling all troops of other countries that went into Indochina with you. As for your two puppets, there is no need to pay any attention to them, and there is no sense giving any assistance to them because this can only do you discredit and not add anything to your honor, but on the contrary do dishonor to you. Only by leaving Indochina can you win honor. Of course, if you are able to change the puppets, and promote the establishment of a coalition government, that would be even better. If they will not agree, then if you just pay no attention to them they will collapse of their own accord. This can be said with certainty. This will be the case for Thieu and would be the same for the Lon Nol–Sirik Matak regime. By doing this you would be making an effort to change the turmoil of the objective world and let it settle down. If you do otherwise, and let things drag on messily, the only result would be ever greater turmoil for the world and the war would flare up again in the area even though you had withdrawn. If you still leave a "tail" there of experts and advisers, you will still have to protect them and history will repeat itself. Of course, history never repeats itself, though, and if the war flares up again in that area, the consequences will be even worse and you will be even more unpopular. You mentioned "incalculable consequences." These consequences are not incalculable for the Indochinese people, but only for the U.S. people.

The third question we discussed yesterday was Japan. In our opinion, Japanese militarism is being revived at present. This revival of Japanese militarism is being encouraged and supported by the 1969 statement issued between your two countries.⁷ The total sum to be spent in Japan's fourth defense plan is equal to more than half of the total sum of the previous three plans. It is one and a half times all the

⁷ Apparent reference to the joint statement made by Nixon and Sato, November 21, 1969. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 953–957.

three previous plans. The fourth plan is more than \$16 billion, while the whole total amount of the previous three plans was a little more than \$10 billion. According to findings by two U.S. Congressmen who went to Japan to attend the U.S.–Japanese Parliamentary discussions, the strength that Japan wants to build up during the fourth defense plan greatly exceeds Japan's own needs. The findings also revealed that according to Japan's present economic strength, Japan would not need five years to fulfill the fourth defense plan, but only two to three years to rearm itself. Sato himself has acknowledged this. With respect to the question of Japan, yesterday both we and you mentioned some dangers of a revival of militarism there.

You say yesterday that the withdrawal of troops from South Korea could only be realized during the latter part of the President's second term.

Dr. Kissinger: I said *during* the President's second term, and that it would begin fairly soon.

PM Chou: If you put it that way, you can say it has already begun because you have pulled out 20,000 troops already.

Dr. Kissinger: I said it would continue. I am not trying to win legalistic arguments with the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: Of course, that's not the main point.

The fourth issue was the South Asian subcontinent. In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by. On May Day 1970 Chairman Mao met the Indian Chargé on the Tien An Men, and he suggested that we exchange ambassadors speedily. Actually, that could have been done, and we are prepared to do it now. They asked us to send our ambassador first, which was no great problem, but they have been spreading rumors throughout the world that they are going to seek out the Chinese for negotiations and there haven't been any. They are just spreading rumors. We also learned something about that during the latter part of the rule of Nehru.

Of course, when one speaks of the South Asian subcontinent, this means mainly India and Pakistan. However, China also has a part there. You said you were pressing India not to provoke a disturbance, and we also believe that you would like to improve your relations with Pakistan. I believe that you probably did say to India what you told us. We also support your opinion, that is advise India not to provoke such a disturbance, because President Yahya Khan is most concerned about the situation. For its part, Pakistan would never provoke a disturbance against India because in all military fields Pakistan is in a weaker position than India. There is still one special characteristic in

this situation: the morale and fighting capacity of Pakistan is greater than India. We can bear witness to that because we have had contacts in such a sense with India, and if India is going to go ahead and provoke disturbances in the subcontinent, then India itself will be the victim. India, I believe, is one of the countries most heavily in debt, and it is also well known that the life of the Indian people is not easy—if such a disturbance is created, they will be the victims. Those who will suffer will also be the rulers of India. That is the fourth issue.

On the fifth issue, communications between us, I would like to speak later on.

The sixth issue is arms control. You cited as an example of this question the proposal for a five-nation nuclear conference. I can answer Your Excellency now officially. The Chinese Government completely disapproves of the proposition of the Soviet government to hold a five-power nuclear conference. They are trying to lasso us. We didn't take part in the tripartite treaty on partial nuclear test bans in 1963 and we didn't take part in any later treaties or agreements on outer space, etc., because we do not believe that this is in accordance with the basic problem, which is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons which we advocate. Some people have asked us, since we have taken such a stand, why we are testing nuclear weapons. We must say very frankly that we do so to break the nuclear monopoly and to fight against the nuclear blackmail of certain great powers. All our nuclear tests have been held under the condition that they are necessary, and are limited. We do not engage in indiscriminate nuclear testing and every time we test, we make a statement that we will never be the first to use them. What we say counts. What we propose is that all nations of the world, whether large or small, should come together to discuss this problem and reach agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step, should reach agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. It won't do to try to lasso us. The Soviet Union has such a scheme. That is our answer to the sixth question.

I would like to say a few words about the disarmament conference.

Dr. Kissinger: Which one?

PM Chou: The Geneva Conference, which, of course, includes the SALT talks. We don't know the content in your SALT talks, and the only thing we know is that your defense budget rises every year and the result is that the more you talk about disarmament, the more armaments expand and that adds to the disquiet, the turmoil of the world. I am not prepared, I do not intend, to go into any more detail on that.

I would like to go back to the fifth issue, further communication. Since Your Excellency has come to China in the capacity of the President's special envoy to have a free exchange of views, we would be

willing to continue in such a manner of a free exchange of views. But to have these communications in the capital of a third country, no matter how much care is taken, secrecy is hard to maintain.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree completely.

PM Chou: Therefore, we would welcome Your Excellency coming again, and we will do our best to accommodate you. If you yourself or the President picks another representative in whom you also have confidence, we would be willing to welcome him as your representative, to stay maybe not only two days but to remain a longer period of time. He could discuss things for a period and then go back. Or if he would like to stay here for a period and investigate things in China, we would welcome this too. Aren't there Soviet representatives in China talking over the border question? However, I feel it would perhaps be easier for us to talk, because we have told you everything. And I believe you will also tell us your opinion. The question between us is particularly that of Taiwan, the only question between us two, although of course there are other issues. We are raising what the President said in his first message about our moving toward friendship. Because we are moving towards friendship we believe we should normalize our relations and should be able to continue our discussions in accordance with such relations.

The final issue you mentioned yesterday is how to draw up an announcement which could be made public after you go back to the U.S. on a date which both sides could release simultaneously and with the same wording. I would like to hear your opinion on that.

What I have just now said is the answer I would like to give to what was said yesterday.

There are two ways we can now proceed, if you would like to consider them. We could first have lunch and then continue discussions after that. Or we could continue immediately. Or you could say one half of what you want and then take a break for lunch. I don't want it to be a one-sided talk. That would be unequal, and therefore we could hear some of your words first before we have our meal.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate the frankness with which you have spoken and the completeness of your presentation. Perhaps, if you agree, I will give my answers to you now. Given the scope of your presentation, it is conceivable that something will occur to me during lunch, and I hope you will permit me to speak also later. One of my personal tragedies is that ideas occur to me after the occasion to use them has past.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter—you can say what you want later on.

Dr. Kissinger: But I would like to reply now. You, Mr. Prime Minister, followed very faithfully the presentation which I made yesterday, and dealt with both topics, that is the visit of the President, and each

of the other topics I put down to narrow our differences on substantive matters.

As for the visit of President Nixon to Peking, you will remember that this idea resulted first from your initiative which we are happy to accept, and therefore, of course, you must decide when the time is opportune and when it is not opportune. If you judge that the time is opportune now, then this is a better opportunity to agree on it than through whatever other channels which we will need to rely upon after my departure and which would be more complicated, bureaucratic and less related to the general direction of our policies. But since this is your invitation, I will say no more about it and we will have to decide at the end of our discussion whether this is an item we would wish to include in our announcement if there is an announcement.

With respect to the specific issues we have discussed, there are several categories—some issues where we disagree in principle, and some issues we agree upon in principle but disagree on the timing of events. There are issues where I believe we agree in substance but where you seem to blame us for an evolution of events which we are not directing, for instance the possibility of Japanese expansionism. And there are also issues of the general philosophy of where the world finds itself, which you, Mr. Prime Minister, have put in every eloquent and very moving terms.

It is obvious that two countries which have been isolated from each other as we have for such a long period of time face a major problem in re-establishing first, normalcy, and then friendship. In this, it is necessary to be both patient and understanding with each other. We should not destroy what is possible by forcing events beyond what the circumstances will allow.

With this as background, let me turn to your points with respect to Taiwan. First, I would like to remind you, Mr. Prime Minister, that during this Administration both in your communications to the President and in the two Ambassadorial meetings at Warsaw, you mentioned only our military presence on Taiwan and in the area of the Taiwan Straits, and I have come with what we believe is a forthcoming answer to the demands which you made on this issue.

PM Chou: But does that mean you are only prepared to withdraw your military presence, and are not prepared to move toward friendship between two countries, that is diplomatic relations? It seems to me that this is a contradiction, because a normal consequence of improving relations is diplomatic relations. This was also mentioned in the Ambassadorial meetings. Recently you have in fact been referring to us as the People's Republic of China, and we refer to you as the United States of America. Doesn't that imply normal relations? Your President refers to us publicly in these terms.

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't finished what I have to say, and the Prime Minister is criticizing me for incompleteness, and not for the substance of my views. To answer your question, we deliberately referred to you as the People's Republic of China for the first time in a public document of the United States as a symbol of the direction we want to go, and therefore you understand us correctly, that is we want normalization and we want friendship.

While I have been here, the Prime Minister has mentioned four other points:

- Recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China;
- Recognition of Taiwan as belonging to China;
- Accepting the proposition that we do not support two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan;
- Not supporting the Taiwan Independence Movement.

PM Chou: In your words yesterday, you said that you did not support two Chinas or the policy of one China, one Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: That's correct.

PM Chou: And when I mentioned yesterday that when the State Department spokesman referred to Taiwan as territory whose status was not settled, you said he had not repeated that.

Dr. Kissinger: This was not by accident.

PM Chou: Precisely.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this your fifth point?

PM Chou: It is also your answer to what I mentioned, and you can count it as a fifth point. If you are going to move toward friendship and normal relations, the logical outcome is that we must recognize each other; otherwise how would we be able to have exchanges? But when you asked me yesterday whether we considered recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government as a precondition to the President's visit, I said this was not absolute.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me state my view.

PM Chou: What must be determined is whether you are willing to move toward the establishment of normal relations.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore, let me state our views. I will say something on each of the five points, but let me say something more fundamental first; we'll never be able to escape the morass of all the issues we have mentioned unless we separate fundamentals from details. If you, Mr. Prime Minister, and I, or even more importantly, Chairman Mao and the President, agree on a fundamental course, then we will know what will happen and then the only issue remaining is "when." A visit by President Nixon to Chairman Mao has, of course, a considerable substantive significance, but it also has a tremendous symbolic significance because

it would make clear that normal relations were inevitable; otherwise there would be no point of such a visit. It would be our understanding that they would agree on the timing, with some steps to be taken in this term and the remaining steps in the first half of the next term.

Of the five points which the Prime Minister mentioned, four can be accomplished within the near future. I am sure that the President would be prepared to repeat to Chairman Mao, as I have told you, that we will not support the Taiwan Independence Movement. I am sure that he will repeat that we will not support one China, one Taiwan.

PM Chou: Nor a policy of two Chinas.

Dr. Kissinger: I was coming to that—the Prime Minister is always one step ahead of me.

PM Chou: Because it is a serious issue for us, an outstanding issue for 25 years.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that the President will repeat he will not support a two Chinas solution. And therefore with respect to the Prime Minister's second point, that Taiwan belongs to China, this will take care of itself as a result of the other three points.

Therefore, the only issue that we will have to leave until after the elections is the formal acceptance of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China. Nevertheless, the direction is obvious.

PM Chou: But there will be a contradiction in this, which I don't know how you will solve. There will be people among you who will want to recognize the People's Republic of China, while in the world arena the number of countries which have recognized New China or wish to recognize it is increasing. Even a greater number of people in various countries wish to do so. Such a situation will also appear in international organizations. What are you going to do?

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to raise this point as a practical matter with the Prime Minister, as a matter of fact. First, let me say—

PM Chou: But I was just going to say that this is a substantive matter.

Dr. Kissinger: It means the same thing. Obviously, if our two heads of government determine to move toward normal relations and friendship, they will do so without trickery because on this matter of great import and on all other matters we must deal on a basis of good faith because so much else depends on it.

What has occurred to us with respect to the international organizations issue is the following formula: we would be willing to agree that the admission of the People's Republic of China can be by a majority vote, and we would withdraw our view that it should be an important question. We would say that the expulsion of other countries

now in the UN, with seats now in the UN, should be by a two-thirds vote.

In this manner, you would be able to take the Security Council's seat allocated to China, and as soon as you can get the two-thirds vote for expulsion, you would be the only representative of China in the UN. Indeed, you would get the China seat now.

In other words, we would solve the contradiction before our public by withdrawing our opposition to entry of the People's Republic of China. But we have not yet announced this because as a sign of our good will, the President wanted me to discuss this matter with you before we adopted a position.

PM Chou: Your Excellency must know that we do not consider the matter of reclaiming our seat in the UN as such an urgent matter. We have gone through this for 21 years, and we have lived through it. Even if war should break out again, we should be able to live through it. Therefore, we do not attach any importance to the UN question, and I didn't mention it yesterday. But as you analysed it just now, we find that you will be in a contradiction if it is not solved.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question that the course I have outlined will present us with a dilemma and a surface contradiction. The important point is that if both countries know where we are going, it will only be a question of time until the end result is acknowledged.

PM Chou: There is also the question of world public opinion. It's easier for us here, because we don't have to hold a press conference every week and can wait maybe a half year before giving our answer. Although perhaps now the situation may change.

Dr. Kissinger: If our decision is to adopt the course which you and I have discussed, whatever formal public position we would take, would be free of the hostility toward the PRC which has prevailed over the past because we would be working toward cooperation and friendship and not isolation. That we can guarantee.

PM Chou: But the following question will come up. If you adopt such a formula, we won't pay much attention to it, but to people who ask for our attitude we will of course say that all of China's legitimate rights in the UN must be restored. Even in your country many correspondents and politicians will agree with our attitude, and the result is that you will call for a two-thirds majority in order to expel a regime which represents no one. You will be criticized by public opinion for that. We will not be able to agree to such a formula. How could we agree?

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think that you could agree. This is simply a stage on the way.

PM Chou: But when people come to ask for our attitude, we will have to proclaim to the world that we are against it, and then where

will you be? First of all, when the proposal of countries which support us is put forward, there will naturally be debate. Yesterday I didn't want to raise this question, but since today you are willing to confirm these points, that you are willing to let relations between our two countries move toward normalization, therefore we will have to face the objective facts which will occur later in the latter half of this year. For example, if your well-known friend Mr. Reston asks me about this, of course I will have to say to him what I have said to you. He isn't coming now. He's on the way.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that his journey to Peking will take him just as long as my presence here.

PM Chou: He's coming by rail.

Dr. Kissinger: He will probably complain about the slow train service.

PM Chou: No matter. We can say that we are more backward.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell you first my assessment of American public opinion. Under this formula, we would vote for the admission of the People's Republic of China, but against the expulsion of Taiwan. We could also stick to the present formula, just changing nothing. On this, frankly, I can tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, what a diplomat couldn't tell you, if he were here.

PM Chou: We are not engaged in a diplomatic dialogue.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. For us there is a practical problem of how to reach normalization of relations which cannot be done this year or next year, but which can be done in the first two years of the President's next term. As I have pointed out, the readiness of the President to accept your suggestion is itself symbolic of where we want to go. If Mr. Reston asks you about this matter, you will of course express your opinion; that's all right with us. (Chou nods.) That is, as long as you don't use too many adjectives to describe the President (laughter on the Chinese side). Have I made myself clear on the issue of Taiwan, or is there anything more I should say?

PM Chou: You were just now mentioning one thing—that Taiwan began to be put under the protection of the U.S. under President Truman. In other words, that is how the occupation occurred. Now, however, when you withdraw military forces, you need to do so in steps, and you will also have to establish normal diplomatic relations with us in steps. Then you will have the responsibility of not letting Taiwan loose, not letting Japan have a hand in meddling in the affairs of Taiwan, and not letting an independence movement break out in Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me answer with a number of views. I was going to come to the question of Japan's relations with Taiwan anyway. We will strongly oppose any Japanese military presence on Taiwan.

With respect to the Taiwan Independence Movement, we will give no support, either direct or indirect. If you have any reliable information to the contrary, get it to me and I will see that whatever is going on is stopped. (Chou nods.) We cannot be responsible for things which may happen without American encouragement, without American support, without American participation. But we will give it no support in any form whatsoever. I repeat, if you have information to the contrary, get it to me and we will stop whatever is going on.

I would like to make one other U.S. domestic political point. The only President who could conceivably do what I am discussing with you is President Nixon. Other political leaders might use more honeyed words, but would be destroyed by what is called the China lobby in the U.S. if they ever tried to move even partially in the direction which I have described to you. President Nixon, precisely because his political support comes from the center and right of center, cannot be attacked from that direction, and won't be attacked by the left in a policy of moving toward friendship with the People's Republic of China. You can see that I am speaking to you with great frankness. If you repeat this to Mr. Reston, I will have to ask for a job as an adviser in your Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Considerable laughter from the Chinese.)

PM Chou: Would you imagine that I would say such a thing to him?

Dr. Kissinger: I have complete confidence in you.

PM Chou: And you will also understand why it was when President Nixon expressed willingness to come to China for a visit, we expressed willingness to invite him. You have read Edgar Snow's article and from this will know that we believe the President does have the desire to resolve issues of relations between China and the U.S. Of course, he must rely on his advisers, such as you, to work out the ways to do so. Therefore, you can see a lot of politicians we have not invited to come here. I have a great pile of letters from them on my desk asking for invitations, which I have not answered.

Dr. Kissinger: What you have done is greatly appreciated by President Nixon.

PM Chou: This is done under the instructions and wisdom of Chairman Mao.

Dr. Kissinger: I think to get this new course firmly established, this is a wise policy. We think, in fact, that the new direction toward cooperation and friendship should be inaugurated personally by President Nixon, after which all other contacts could take a normal pattern. This will prevent this issue from becoming a political football. (Chou nods.)

PM Chou: And there are many such things like that in your country.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: After Chairman Mao heard of the directions set by your President, he particularly wanted to meet with him because he could be able to talk about anything with him.

Dr. Kissinger: This is exactly our view. This is also why President Nixon believes that fundamental changes in our relationship should be inaugurated at the highest level. Then there will be full confidence on both sides that the things talked about will be carried out.

PM Chou: So I believe the second item which you wanted to go into is Indochina, which is also very long. I suggest rest now and relaxation. Otherwise, you will be under tension and the duck will be cold.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be the most calamitous. Tension we can take.

(The two sides then broke for lunch at 2:35 p.m.)

During the roast duck luncheon Prime Minister Chou wanted to know if Dr. Kissinger had heard about China's Cultural Revolution. When Dr. Kissinger remarked that this was the internal affair of the People's Republic of China, Chou said that, no, he wanted to tell about it.

He called attention to Edgar Snow's interview with Mao Tse-tung in *LIFE* as being generally accurate concerning the purposes and results of the Cultural Revolution, even though Snow had not been correct on some other points in this article. As Snow had said, Chairman Mao and others had not foreseen the extent of the disturbances, and in fact some members of the People's Liberation Army had sacrificed their lives. The struggle between the two lines had indeed been very serious. However, the opponents of the Cultural Revolution had ultimately been struck down, including Liu Shao-chi who was the leader of the oppositionists, with the result that China was now firmly guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

In conveying this message Chou was deadly serious. He appeared to be genuinely anguished when talking about the difficulties which had cropped up during the Cultural Revolution, and sincere in his belief that whatever had occurred, it had been all to the good, in terms of keeping alive the revolutionary spirit and striking at bureaucratization.

The formal meeting then resumed at 4:10 p.m.)

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, let me continue with the points you raised, which actually followed the ones I mentioned first yesterday.

With respect to the problem of Indochina, I believe I have already explained to the Prime Minister what our essential position is. But I would like to add that this is one of the cases where other nations, particularly those with whom we are beginning to cooperate, might look at our problem with understanding and patience.

We realize your experience in 1954 leads you to the belief that if there is any of what the Prime Minister calls a tail left behind, it will leave us with an opportunity to re-enter the situation. But in view of the experiences we have since made, and in view of the changed philosophy which I explained to the Prime Minister last evening, this is not, and cannot be, our purpose.

What we require is a transition period between the military withdrawal and the political evolution. Not so that we can re-enter, but so that we can let the people of Vietnam and of other parts of Indochina determine their own fate.

Even in that interim period, we are prepared to accept restrictions on the types of assistance that can be given to the countries of Indochina. And if no country of Indochina is prepared to accept outside military aid, then we are even prepared to consider eliminating all military aid.

I have told the Prime Minister yesterday, and I am willing to repeat this, that if after complete American withdrawal, the Indochinese people change their governments, the U.S. will not interfere.

The United States will abide by the determination of the will of the people.

The Prime Minister spoke of the million people that the Vietnamese will be prepared to lose. What I am trying to tell the Prime Minister is that there need not be another million people lost.

We are prepared to make peace quickly if it can be done within the framework I have mentioned. But if the Prime Minister has another proposal regarding the transition period, or if Hanoi has another proposal, we are prepared to consider it.

PM Chou: I discussed this matter just a moment ago, and also yesterday. That is we support the seven point proposal put forward by Madame Binh of the PRG of South Vietnam. And Your Excellency mentioned yesterday that you are willing to set a fixed time limit for the withdrawal of forces and the dismantling of all military bases. I would just like to say that how you fix this time, that is for you to negotiate with the people of Vietnam and not for us to speak on their behalf.⁸

Our hope, however, in this problem is that you will leave completely and not leave behind any tail, including any technical advisers. And, secondly, the demand of the Vietnamese that the regime fostered

⁸ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

by you be removed, as to how to remove it, this also is for you to discuss with the Vietnamese, and we won't interfere.⁹

Yesterday, you expressed appreciation for point 5 of Madame Binh's seven point proposal. That of course is a matter for you to solve in talks with them. As for us we support their proposal.

We support them. So long as the war does not cease, we will continue our support. This support is not only for the people of Vietnam, but also the people of Cambodia and Laos. Of course, you are aware of comments they have made that they fight together on the same battlefield.

But, as for what system they adopt, and what final solution they achieve after they overthrow reactionary regimes, that is a matter for them to decide themselves and we will not intervene.

We advocate that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from those countries where they are stationed and that the people of those nations be allowed to solve their problems any way they choose, whether there is a revolution or not. That is the right of these people and not outsiders. This is our basic position whether you like it or not. On this point there is a difference of principle between us. You said that if a regime should be subverted by an outside force, then you would intervene.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Then there must be a mistake in the record.

(At this point there was some confusion on the Chinese side and some discussion of what the U.S. had said the day before.)

You mean that this was your position in the past? You mentioned yesterday that when a country could not stand up to a super-power, then you would intervene. What is the scope of this statement?

If we follow this principle that you put forward yesterday, then you are engaged in a war in Vietnam now which we consider aggression, and it could spread to Cambodia and Laos. Then, accepting your same principle, we could send in troops; and then we would be face to face. That is the problem.

Our way is to ask you to go and to let them choose by themselves their own system through negotiations.

If there is no possibility of negotiations, we are opposed to any aggression, for example, as did the Soviets against Czechoslovakia. Or, as you say, if in circumstances where the victim is weak and unable to resist, you should send troops to another country, we would also express opposition to this.

⁹ Nixon underlined the final clause in this sentence.

For example, now, Soviet troops are in the Mongolian People's Republic. We are opposed. They pose a threat to us. We are opposed to that, but we do not adopt the practice of also sending troops to fight. But if these troops pass through the territory of the MPR to invade even one inch of our territory, then we would immediately resist and fight back.¹⁰

Korea is somewhat different. Up to now there is only an armistice agreement. So now China is meeting every week at the military demarcation line. There are still constant incidents and clashes along the DMZ.

On the side of South Korea are your representatives and also the representatives of Park. On the North Korean side there are the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and also China. So the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a point in feeling that it is a rather tense truce. Your troops are still in South Korea. And other countries still have token forces, though probably not many.

Under these circumstances, of course, the Democratic Republic of Korea would find it rather tense. Originally, a peace treaty was to be concluded in 1954 at the Geneva Conference but it was opposed by Dulles and then by his deputy, General Walter Bedell Smith.

And so the roots of discord are left there. So the Democratic Republic of Korea has grounds for feeling ill at ease. Because they don't know when the other side will attack them.

So the situation is such as I said before lunch, that the world is still in upheaval, and that is why we emphasize again and again why it is not possible to relax in Indochina.

But at the same time we made clear that if the situation does not relax in Indochina, we must continue to give aid to Indochina and first of all Vietnam. Because they indeed have suffered very serious losses the past ten years and are very heroic people.

Indeed, we hope very much you can come to some real understanding in your Paris discussions. But we cannot say that it will be possible for you to reach resolution very quickly.

Although you are occupying Taiwan, yet there is not war there. So we can go on discussing with you for over 15 years. Of course, such a state of affairs should not continue.

But in Vietnam there is still a war there, and people die and are wounded every day. So you must consider both possibilities: One is success in negotiation and the other is failure.

¹⁰ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

And we believe that through putting forward the seven point proposal by Mme. Binh the positions of the two sides should get closer together.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister a question? Does the Prime Minister also consider North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia as foreign troops that should also be withdrawn?

PM Chou: That is their matter. You made them fight together.

Dr. Kissinger: But under conditions of peace?

PM Chou: That will be solved by them. It is stipulated in the Communiqué of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese People, which said that after the war questions of peace will be settled by the people of those countries themselves and territorial limits restored to what they were beforehand. This can be decided only after the civil war stops in those countries.

Why are the Indochinese people so interested in your getting rid of Thieu and Lon Nol–Sirik Matak? Because they are archcriminals with regard to the people of their own country. In a general sense, it is you who are responsible for them. As for the Indochina Accords, they were long ago torn up by the U.S., and there is no possibility of any discussion of that.

So we can only discuss our two principles which I mentioned and it is impossible to return to the Geneva Agreements. From the very beginning the U.S. sabotaged them. It would be ludicrous to want us to guarantee something you had already torn up. So we can only guarantee formally that all foreign forces should withdraw from Indochina and the three Indochinese people should solve their own questions by themselves.¹¹

Dr. Kissinger: It is probably not very fruitful to pursue this discussion because we have stated our points of view. There are two things the Prime Minister should keep in mind. One is a technical issue. There are two proposals from the other side. One is the seven point proposal of Madame Binh, and the other is the secret nine point proposal which Hanoi has recently made. They are not exactly identical. I will not bother the Prime Minister with that difference because they are substantially the same.

The second point is this: I will talk to the nine points when I see the North Vietnamese because this is what they presented to me. We believe that either the nine or the seven points, if interpreted in a flexible spirit, can offer many bases for negotiations.

¹¹ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

So we will not reject the whole program. We believe that if the other side approaches the negotiation in good spirit, good will, and some understanding of common purposes, negotiations can succeed.

We are not asking the People's Republic of China to stop giving aid to its friends, nor am I asking the Prime Minister what he may discuss privately with his Allies.

I do want you to understand that the two principles he mentioned to us, or that the seven or nine points given to us, could offer a basis for negotiation, if there is some flexibility and some willingness to look at the needs of the other side.

We are in complete accord with the Prime Minister that a rapid end to the war in Indochina would ease all the other problems we are now discussing. We will approach negotiations in that spirit.

Does the Prime Minister want to say something, or should I go to the other issues he raised?

PM Chou: There are still some different points of view on our two sides on Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: That is quite correct.

PM Chou: We have expressed our views.

As for the seven point proposal of Madame Binh, our newspapers expressed our country's support. We believe that it is possible to bring about a rapprochement on the basis of this seven point program.

It is because, as Your Excellency said, that there would be incalculable consequences if the war is not stopped, that I discussed the possible turmoil that could continue.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, Mr. Prime Minister.

PM Chou: As for guarantees, we only express our political attitude toward the two points. We consider the Geneva Agreements a thing of the past. As for the other matters, it is best that you settle with the other party. We'll continue our support to them so long as agreement is not reached.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand and you understand our position. That is all we can do. (Chou nods.) I hope this will become a moot issue in a period of time, because it will be solved.

PM Chou: Yes, because the Indochina question is indeed a crucial problem, both for the Indochina people and for the world. For example, the American people have a very strong reaction, even stronger than ours to this issue.

So if you are able to solve this question, of course, we will be happy. If not, we can only continue to give them support.

What is more, we must be ready to meet the consequences of possible expansion.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your position. There's no misunderstanding. As I said in my opening remarks, we understand you are a man of principle. (Chou nods.)

Mr. Prime Minister, you discussed the issue of great power relations, specifically Japan and the Soviet Union, and you used the very striking phrase that there is chaos under the sky.

With respect to Japan, we are of the view that Japan must have the ability to defend itself. We will not encourage, and indeed we would oppose, any military expansion by the Japanese. Indeed, I believe that in the area of relations between large countries, our interests and yours are very parallel. If Japanese military expansion takes place, we would oppose it.

With respect to Soviet intentions, contrary to some of my American friends, I do not exclude the possibility of Soviet military adventurism. In fact, speaking personally and frankly, this is one of the new lessons I have learned in my present position. I had not believed it previously.¹²

But that is a problem essentially between you and the USSR. As far as the U.S. is concerned, I can tell you flatly that there is no possibility, certainly in this Administration, nor probably in any other, of any cooperation such as you have described between the U.S., the Soviet Union and Japan to divide up China.¹³

We are facing many potentially aggressive countries. How could it conceivably be in our interests, even for the most selfish motives, to encourage one superpower to destroy another country and even to cooperate with it? Particularly one with which, as the Prime Minister has himself pointed out, after the solution of the Taiwan issue, which will be in the relatively near future, we have no conflicting interests at all.

While I do not want to presume to tell the Prime Minister how to dispose his troops in his own country, I want to tell him that such forces as are prepared to defend the area you think the U.S. would occupy, he could employ more usefully elsewhere.

PM Chou: But to deal with Taiwan, we must still have them there.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand but I consider this problem will be solved.

PM Chou: Do you know anything about Taiwan?

Dr. Kissinger: I have never been in Taiwan. Only Mr. Holdridge of my staff. I only know what I read in diplomatic and other reports.

¹² Nixon drew a line beside this paragraph.

¹³ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

If we are looking at the future in an historical context, and if we want to reduce some of the chaos in the world, then I believe that in relations among large countries the United States will be your supporter and not your opponent.

As I pointed out yesterday, we will not participate in efforts to lasso you. Now, as long as I am talking about Japan, I might as well comment on news reports I got this morning about remarks which Secretary Laird is supposed to have made in Japan.¹⁴

If he was accurately reported to have said that Japan should look to its own nuclear weapons for protection, then he was acting contrary to White House policy and you will find that these phrases will never be repeated or implemented, as in the case of the State Department spokesman.

So I repeat the offer I have made to you—that we attempt to discuss with you, if we can find the means, any proposal made by any other large country which could affect your interests, and that we would take your views very seriously. Specifically, I am prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral negotiations we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT, so as to alleviate any concerns you might have in this regard. So while these negotiations will continue, we will attempt to conduct them in such a way that they do not increase the opportunity for military pressures against you.

I think that is all I want to say on great power relations.

Should I turn to South Asia or has the Prime Minister any questions?

PM Chou: You may go on to South Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, with respect to South Asia, I think our analysis is not too different from yours. We have, of course, friendly relations with India, and we have given, in conjunction with other countries, substantial economic assistance. We have not given any military assistance of any kind since 1965. In connection with East Pakistan, we have given some humanitarian aid to help the refugees.

You know from President Yahya Khan the strong friendship we feel for him and his country. We strongly oppose any military action to solve the problems of East Pakistan. And if India takes military action in East Pakistan, we would strongly and publicly disapprove of it. Furthermore, we would under no circumstances encourage Indian military adventures against the People's Republic of China. Nor would we permit the indirect use of our aid for such purposes.

¹⁴ Apparent reference to statements made by Laird during and after his trip to Japan and Korea. See Takashi Oka, "Laird Advises Japanese to Spur Defense," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1971, p. A-3.

We want the people of India to develop their own future, but we also want them to leave their neighbors alone.

With respect to arms control, I have understood the Prime Minister's views. We understand that the People's Republic of China will not participate in the five power conference. Our own intention is to respond very slowly. Because of the pressure of other countries we may accept it in principle, but we will spend a lot of time on preparations, and we will conduct it in such a way that it offers no framework for pressures against the People's Republic of China.¹⁵

In nuclear matters, we will put principal emphasis on negotiations which concern us and the USSR primarily, mainly the limitation of nuclear strategic arms. And on these, as I have pointed out, we are prepared to keep you informed, as we have attempted through the rather inadequate means of communication we now have.

Now let me say a word about the communications between our two countries, unless the Prime Minister wants to raise questions about what I just said.

PM Chou: Please go ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, the problem of communications has several aspects.

One, with which, of course, you are familiar, is just physically how do we get in touch with each other. The other, which is bureaucratic, is with whom in our government should you deal. If the Prime Minister can be patient with me for a few minutes, I would like to give him a little explanation of our bureaucratic processes.

We have not had the benefits of the Cultural Revolution which the Prime Minister described at lunch time. So we have a large, somewhat undisciplined, and with respect to publicity, not always reliable bureaucracy. A bureaucracy which, as you found out in Warsaw, operates in a very formalistic manner. Therefore, anything which goes through regular diplomatic channels goes through a very cumbersome bureaucratic process and we cannot guarantee that it will be fully protected from publicity.

Each President deals with this problem in his own way. President Nixon deals with it by handling the most sensitive matters directly in the White House, attempting, in matters of extreme importance, to reach agreements in principle with the senior leaders of other governments and then using the bureaucracy essentially for implementation. Until there is such an agreement in principle, it is his policy not to attempt to control every last thing that every official does. On the other

¹⁵ Nixon drew a line beside this paragraph.

hand, once there is agreement in principle, he makes very certain that it is implemented.

Therefore, if we are to move to an era of cooperation and friendship, it is important to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and Chairman Mao and others to understand with whom you should deal on what issue. It is easy to get a lot of activity started in regular diplomatic channels, but if you want results, the procedures we have now adopted are the best.

As a practical matter, it simply is not possible for me to come to Peking often enough, and impossible to come secretly this way again, to make this our only channel for communication.

Also, although we hope not, it is conceivable that there may be an emergency at some time in which either of us may wish to contact the other immediately, reliably and secretly.

On the other hand, it is not satisfactory—I agree with the Prime Minister—to use a third party, no matter how friendly, for these detailed exchanges.

I was, therefore, wondering whether the Prime Minister could designate some official of the People's Republic of China in some acceptable capital, such as Paris, or London, or Ottawa, whom we should contact to pass communications for the Prime Minister, and in some rare cases, for Chairman Mao, and who in turn could pass some communications to us directly.

In our government, these communications would be known only to President Nixon and myself, and perhaps to one or two staff members, but in any case to nobody outside the White House.

This does not exclude sending an emissary here on some occasion, although the problem of finding one in whom the President has full confidence and who will respect those channels of communication is not easy.

The best man we have for this purpose is Ambassador Bruce, who is now in Paris for the Vietnam negotiations. But he will retire from there soon, and after that he might be available for some mission such as this. That can also only be occasional.

For other normal matters, we can use any embassy convenient to you, Warsaw or anywhere else. But we consider that a subsidiary problem.

That is all I have on the subject of communications, but I would be grateful for the Prime Minister's reaction.

PM Chou: I would like to ask Your Excellency what you meant when you said you might send Ambassador Bruce on some rare occasion to Peking. Would you make it public?

Dr. Kissinger: We could make it public. We have no specific proposal, but the Prime Minister said if I could not come, we could send

somebody we could trust. That would be Ambassador Bruce, and he could come perfectly openly.

But openness introduces an element of bureaucracy and he would not have quite as much latitude with you as I have enjoyed. But he is still a very good man.

PM Chou: He would have to report to the bureaucratic apparatus.

Dr. Kissinger: He could separate his reporting but have to do some for the bureaucracy. He would also have to bring interpreters, etc. It is thus more difficult to control than the other means I have suggested.

PM Chou: Is the Civil Service System in the United States as strict as that in Britain? It seems to be more liberal in the U.S. than in Britain.

Dr. Kissinger: It is much more liberal and less disciplined.

I have spoken with great frankness to the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: So I told you of our transformation during lunch. We do not cover up the facts of our transformation.

When your President comes and talks to Chairman Mao he will speak much more. We sometimes wonder whether we can talk about such things. But Chairman Mao speaks completely at his will.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a sign of great inward strength.

PM Chou: That is true and that is something we are not up to.

Maybe you have not had time to read the editorial on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. I will send you the English or French copy and you can look it over while you are resting. It is the summary of the struggle between the two lines in our party over the past 50 years. It is most instructional. Our party has gone through many trials and tribulations. Our party has gone through many victories and defeats, twistings and turnings, and more victories and defeats to final victory. The correct line of the party was replaced by a mistaken line which was surmounted. Then another mistaken, then another correct, line. Then even after we won one great victory, we were defeated again. Finally, the bogus reactionary line was defeated, and we won the final victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

An individual is bound to experience success and failure. So it is with the party. Only then can we surmount our experiences and continue to advance.

Our country was fortunate to have found such a great leader with tremendous strength to carry us through so many great struggles. The Chairman has been leading us since the founding of the party. Fifty years have passed. But in this process there were several occasions when persons in the party excluded Chairman Mao from the top leadership and carried out a mistaken line, but they were defeated.

So we don't care if the leadership makes mistakes, so long as the cadres want revolution. Leaders will surely come who will follow the correct line.

If the masses do not want a revolution, it is not possible for a revolutionary leader to arise. Man is influenced by his time and his environment. There have been times in the history of the Chinese Communist Party when the leadership was very bad. But the revolutionary momentum did not fail to advance because of that.

The first leader was Chen Tu-hsin, who went with the Trotskyites and is now dead. Then, sometime later, there was Wang Ming, who first had leftist tendencies, then rightist deviation, and now has become the biggest traitor and renegade. He is now in Moscow. He was trained by the Russians and has returned to Moscow.

The third was a man who caused a split in our armed forces. He was known as Chang Kuo-tao. Your CIA knows him.¹⁶

Mr. Holdridge: I have met him.

PM Chou: He served as a living dictionary for a time. I am sorry to say that it was only after 17 years in the party that he went against it and went to Chiang Kai-shek. During the Long March he commanded quite large sections of the Red Army, but when he ran off he could not bring even one soldier. He could only write about his 17 years in the party. He made various distortions and sowed discord. You gave him royalties on his book. Once he used them up he had no more to do. He left Hong Kong. Now he is in Canada.

The next one is Liu Shao-chi. You know something about him.

So in every party, where bourgeois or revolutionary, there are bound to appear some renegades against that party.

We are fortunate that out of our great people has risen the great leader Chairman Mao. So in this sense we agree to have President Nixon come to China and to have conversations with Chairman Mao.

After President Nixon expressed a desire to come, this was put forward by Chairman Mao himself. At that time the President said he might come in his capacity as President, or maybe after he had retired. In fact, President Nixon even said that his daughter might spend her

¹⁶ Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxi), founding member of the CCP, purged from major posts in 1927 and expelled from the party in 1929; Wang Ming (Wang Ming), pseudonym of Ch'en Shaoyu (Chen Shaoyu), CCP representative to the Comintern from 1931 to 1937, generally powerless after his return to China, returned to the USSR in the mid-1950s; and Chang Kuo-t'ao (Zhang Guotao), founding member of the CCP who defected to the Chinese Nationalists in 1938, then fled to Hong Kong after the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

honeymoon here. Shortly after your President said that, our message was sent to you.

That is all I have to say to you.

Dr. Kissinger: On the issue of communications, I am not clear. I will turn to the Summit later. On communications, what is your pleasure? Is there any place where it is possible for the White House to leave messages with you other than through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan?

PM Chou: We will study this matter and tell you either tonight or tomorrow morning. Anyway, we will certainly establish some means of contact.

Dr. Kissinger: If the President is to come here, we must agree beforehand on procedures, an agenda and other things. We would prefer to do this through private channels rather than publicly.

PM Chou: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: Would you like to say something on the matter first?

PM Chou: Communications?

Dr. Kissinger: No, on the visit of the President and the communiqué.

PM Chou: The communiqué will be covered tonight or tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: It sounds like one of my staff meetings. On my staff only the masochists are left.

PM Chou: Would you like to say something about the President's visit?

Dr. Kissinger: On the question of the visit, I would like to say, as I pointed out in my discussion, that to move toward a relationship of cooperation and ultimately friendship between the PRC and the U.S. is an historic opportunity.

Therefore, President Nixon welcomes this invitation and is in principle prepared to accept the invitation.

On the basis of the discussions we have had, I am prepared to proceed with discussions concerning details. But since you are the host, I think the specific suggestion of when it would be convenient should come from you.

PM Chou: We first knew that President Nixon wanted to visit China when he announced it publicly in an interview to the press. That is, he expressed his wish. However, for the Chinese Government to issue an invitation, it would be a formal invitation. That, of course, as we have made clear, is a serious matter. As Your Excellency said in his analysis of developing events, we estimate the timing might be a bit later. That is after a number of matters have been thrashed out, and various things have occurred.

This raises the following questions.

For example, has your President ever considered the possibility of visiting the Soviet Union, or having leaders of the Soviet Union come

to the United States, or to have the President and the leaders of the Soviet Union meet somewhere else?

If there is such a possibility, it would be best for President Nixon and the Soviet Union to meet before President Nixon visits China.

We are not afraid of a big turmoil. With the objective development of events, this might be possible. But we would not want to deliberately create tensions.

You saw, just throwing a ping-pong ball has thrown the Soviet Union into such consternation. So many Americans going to the Soviet Union, and Russians to America, did not create such a stir. We paid no special attention to that.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be candid. This subject has been discussed. The President has received an invitation to visit Moscow.

As you know from your own dealings with the Soviet Union, there is a tendency on the part of Soviet leaders to attempt to squeeze every advantage out of any situation. (Chou laughs.)

Therefore, after extending the invitation, certain conditions were attached which we can meet as a matter of fact, but as a question of principle it is now held in abeyance.

It is not a question that we cannot meet them, but that we believe that if the President talks to the Head of State of another government it must be on its own merits. The same is true in your case.

But the principle of a meeting between the President and the Soviet leaders has been accepted. The visit [*invitation?*] has been extended by the Soviet leaders and a visit may still take place within the next 6 months.

PM Chou: In that case, we might set the date of the President's visit sometime in the summer of next year, say after May 1. That might be a more appropriate time for your President.

Dr. Kissinger: One difficulty with this is that after May the political campaign begins in America. While it would be advantageous from a political point of view to have the visit during that season, I think, frankly, for our mutual interest, that we would not start our relationship under the suspicion that it has this short-term motivation.

So it should be somewhat earlier; a few months earlier would be better than in the summer. March or April.

PM Chou: Fine. I will report this to Chairman Mao and then give you a reply. But you do agree to the principle that it would be good for the President first to visit Moscow and then China? Would this be better for you?

Dr. Kissinger: The problem in our relations with the Soviet Union is different from the problem of our relations with the People's Republic of China.

I understand your hesitation to begin with. In our relations with the Soviet Union we have a number of concrete issues but no overwhelming political issues.

PM Chou: Much more concrete issues.

Dr. Kissinger: But no overwhelming philosophic issues. You have had your own experience in negotiations with the Soviet Union, so I need not describe it. They lend themselves less well to meetings at a very high level because they always get lost in a great amount of detail. And some very petty detail.

Our relations with the People's Republic of China are at an historic turning point which requires the intervention of top leaders who can set a basic direction and then let the details be worked out later.

So the problem is that with the Soviet Union we can do a lot of business in regular ways, while with the People's Republic of China we can do the most important business really only between Chairman Mao and the President. That is the difference. (Chou nods.)

But in principle, I repeat, there is a formal agreement that makes clear we are prepared to meet with the Soviet leaders, and they have expressed their willingness.

In all honesty, I cannot promise you it will happen no matter when we set a date. We shall try, but we will not meet prior conditions either with Moscow or with Peking; but you haven't made any prior conditions.

PM Chou: That's right. We agree.

What is your thinking on an announcement of the visit?

Dr. Kissinger: What visit?

PM Chou: Would it cover only your visit or also President Nixon's visit?

Dr. Kissinger: We could announce my visit and say that Chairman Mao has extended an invitation to President Nixon and he has accepted, either in principle or at a fixed time, next spring.

What is your pleasure? I think there are advantages in doing both together.

PM Chou: Then would it be possible for the two sides to designate some of our men to draft an announcement?

Dr. Kissinger: We should draft in the context we have been discussing.

PM Chou: Both visits.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be all right.

PM Chou: We shall try it. For our side, it can be Ambassador Huang Hua and the Marshal.

Dr. Kissinger: Could I say myself? This is undemocratic centralism. (Laughter from the Chinese.) The Prime Minister has given me an idea at lunch and now I have to see how I can reduce my staff to two.

PM Chou: I have an appointment at six o'clock that will last until ten o'clock. My office is free to you. Or you can go to your residence for discussions. You can have supper and rest and a film.

Dr. Kissinger: We will meet at 10:00.

PM Chou: Yes, I will come to your residence. We will work deep into the night.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister keeps hours which make me look like a softie. But I want to work as long as is necessary.

PM Chou: Yes, I understand.

141. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 10, 1971, 11:20–11:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hsu Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: I'm sorry to be so late.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all right. We had a good walk.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK trip to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.

PM Chou: I would like to discuss two specific matters. The first is the announcement. Ambassador Huang Hua will come very shortly and show you our draft. You also have a draft.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that his calligraphy is better than mine. We also have prepared a draft, which is very brief.

PM Chou: We can check the two drafts.² If yours is very brief, ours is also brief. The second thing which I wanted to discuss is your time for departure tomorrow. Is it noon or one o'clock?

Dr. Kissinger: That depends on our discussions. I can stay until 1:00, but if our discussions are concluded in time I would prefer to leave at 12:00.

PM Chou: I think that two hours tomorrow morning would be sufficient, and then the time of departure can be decided. I think that this should be between 12:00 and 1:00.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's say 1:00, and then we will have flexibility.

PM Chou: You will take off then at 1:00.

Dr. Kissinger: If that's agreeable.

PM Chou: That doesn't mean you will leave here at that time.

Dr. Kissinger: About 12:30 p.m.

PM Chou: 12:20 would be safer.

Dr. Kissinger: You are our host, and you should decide.

PM Chou: Then there is a third question, that of the tape-recording. We discussed this before, but there is now no need for a tape-recording since we fully exchanged our views today and will tomorrow, and there is no need. I'm very sorry to keep you up.

Dr. Kissinger: Not at all. I enjoyed the opportunity to take a walk outside. I was resting until 10:00 p.m. anyway.

PM Chou: I had to make you gentlemen get up from bed.

Dr. Kissinger: It's good for the members of my staff to see someone who works even longer hours than I do.

PM Chou: That's all the more reason to ask them to work harder when you get back to the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger: While we are talking—if you have no other points—I thought I might elaborate on two or three things if you are interested.

Mr. Prime Minister, as my first point, you mentioned the necessity of keeping troops to protect yourselves against an invasion from Taiwan.

PM Chou: That's right.

² Attached but not printed.

Dr. Kissinger: It is the policy of this Administration to give no support whatsoever to any nationalist attempt to invade the People's Republic of China from Taiwan, and without our support they are technically unable to invade the mainland.

PM Chou: That's right. It's not possible for them to send troops en masse. Generally speaking, Chiang Kai-shek is able to control his armed forces, but there are those among his troops who deliberately want to make adventures—deliberately to create trouble for him, and for you. That's why we maintain defenses along our coast—to let people know that we are fully prepared and they cannot succeed. Some years ago Chiang sent spies against us by means of landing-craft, but all of these were wiped out. During recent years there has been less provocation. But once we make our announcement public, there will be a small number of such people who will want to launch adventures and deliberately cause trouble. That is why I tell you in all frankness that we keep on alert.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we don't want to keep you from stationing troops for your defense: we only want to clarify our policy.

PM Chou: That's right, you have already made this clear. As you requested, if we gain any information to the effect that U.S. or KMT elements want to create trouble, we will tell you; you will do the same for us.

Dr. Kissinger: What I said about the Taiwan Independence Movement can be applied to this matter as well.

The second point which I wanted to raise concerns a possible meeting between the Soviet leaders and our President which you asked me about. Our position is this. I didn't want you to misunderstand our position. If there should be an agreement in the negotiations with respect to Berlin, or on strategic arms control, it is very possible that our respective leaders would meet to sign it. But we will not arrange a meeting in the abstract unless there is a specific occasion for one. This could happen within the next six months. I say this only so that you will not be surprised, but there is no fixed plan now.

PM Chou: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: And on these agreements, as I promised you, when we have established communications, we will inform you of any provisions that could affect you. We have so far refused any proposal that could be applied to nuclear countries other than the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: Does this apply to the SALT talks?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: May I ask what is your thinking on the Berlin question? If you haven't gotten into any specific stages yet, I won't ask.

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell the Prime Minister that I am notoriously indiscreet. Therefore, I'll be glad to tell you about this.

On Berlin, there are three major issues and one minor issue. The first major issue is access from the Federal Republic of Germany to Berlin across the territory of the Democratic Republic of Germany. The second is the presence of organs of the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin. The third is the Soviet political presence in West Berlin. Then there is the fourth issue, which is of interest primarily to the Germans, and concerns travel of people from Berlin in East Germany and East Berlin.

What we are trying to bring about is a situation in which Berlin becomes less of a source of tension and a source of conflict in Central Europe. And we are making some progress in our discussions.

PM Chou: Your Excellency is probably aware of the incident which occurred along the Ussuri River at Chenpao Island.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I am.

PM Chou: At that time there was high tension over the Berlin question because the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to have elections for its Parliament in West Berlin. The Soviet authorities created the Chenpao incident so that all the Parliamentarians from West Germany could go to West Berlin to have the elections there, and so undo the crisis.

Dr. Kissinger: You think so?

PM Chou: Of course, because Ulbricht found himself in a very difficult situation the Soviets made it appear that we created trouble. However, it was they who deliberately created the incident to escape their responsibilities over Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: It was hard for us to judge because we didn't have all the information.

With respect to the incidents in Sinkiang, though, I can say the following. When I assumed my present position I thought that the Chinese were always the aggressors. (Chou laughs.) Then I looked at the map of that part of Sinkiang where the incidents took place—this was in the summer of 1969—and saw that it was three miles from the Soviet railhead and 200 miles from a Chinese railhead. It then occurred to me that the Chinese military leaders would not have picked such a spot to attack. Since then I have looked at the problem with a different perspective.

PM Chou: It is also possible to misunderstand the origins of the Sino-Indian conflict.

Dr. Kissinger: That's possible.

PM Chou: The Indians said that we created the Ladakh incident. It occurred on a peak of the Karakorums on the Aksai-chin Plateau of Sinkiang. At this point a ridge of the Karakorums falls off very sharply

downward on the Kashmir side. The elevation is very high and even the Soviet helicopters used by the Indians could only gradually work their way up the steep slope. Our people were on top of this ridge and could see down on the Soviet helicopters gradually coming up. The Aksai-chin Plateau is the route along which we have to travel when crossing from Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet. The height of the plateau is 5000 meters. We started to build this highway in 1951—

Dr. Kissinger: The Indians call this region Ladakh.

PM Chou: Actually, Ladakh is farther below, but the Indians call all of this region Ladakh. Even the British colonial maps do not show this as a part of India, and Nehru was only able to provide a claim on the basis of a map drawn by a British traveller. Even three years after the road was built, Nehru didn't know about it. It runs all the way from Western Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet.

In my discussions with Nehru on the Sino-Indian boundary in 1956 he suddenly raised the issue of the road. I said, "you didn't even know we were building a road the last three years, and now you suddenly say that it is your territory." I remarked upon how strange this was. Although the so-called McMahon Line was a line that no Chinese government ever recognized, at least it was a line drawn by a Britisher, even though in drawing it he included more than 90,000 square kilometers of our territory in India. However, in the western sector there was no such line.

There was no agreement with us either in 1956 or 1957. And so in 1959 the Indians sent small patrols crawling up the steep slopes to attack our post. Our guards were at the passes. This was in December and the weather was extremely cold—40 degrees below zero. Our post was in the form of a fort and we could see them climbing up. So when the Indians attacked they suffered more heavy losses than we. However, we did have some wounded, and we raised a protest with the Indian Government. TASS said of this incident that the Chinese committed aggression against India. Khrushchev, without inquiring, took the same position on the grounds that the Indians had suffered such heavy casualties. This was the first such anti-China statement from the USSR.

Khrushchev wanted to go to Camp David. Just before, in June 1959, he tore up the Soviet agreement on atomic cooperation with China, and he brought these two things (the Soviet support for India and the tearing up of the nuclear cooperation agreement with China) as gifts to Camp David.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we didn't know about this until much later.

PM Chou: Were you there?

Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't in the government then, but because I had been a part time advisor to several governments I knew a number of

our senior officials. They didn't believe that there was a split between Moscow and Peking until well into the 1960's. But whatever the Soviets do to you, they do for their reasons, not for our reasons.

PM Chou: I'm aware of that, but I wanted you to know what had taken place.

Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't present at Camp David, so I cannot tell what was happening.

PM Chou: You were not in the government at that time. When Khrushchev returned from Camp David he came to Peking for the Tenth Anniversary of the People's Republic of China. Here, in the same banquet hall which you saw this afternoon, he made a speech in which he openly declared that there were "roosters who like to fight."

Dr. Kissinger: Who were the roosters?

PM Chou: By this he meant the Chinese. We understood well what he meant, but he put it in abstract terms.

The next day we asked him why he said what he did in such an open forum. We also asked him first of all why it was that on the eve of his departure for the U.S. he had declared we had committed aggression against India—without even asking us about it. He said that he did not need any other information, and the mere fact that India had lost more men proved that we were the aggressors. This was strange logic, totally illogical.

On the border question, at the beginning he didn't understand it, but afterwards he understood very well what the actual situation was. This is a thing of the past.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Weren't you aware of the fact that in 1960 he withdrew all Soviet experts from China and tore up all Soviet contracts?

Dr. Kissinger: I personally became aware of this only in 1962.

PM Chou: That's right. It's not difficult to understand that. You entered political life only gradually.

Is there anything more that you wish to discuss tonight? If not, I will leave you to discuss the joint communiqué. I suggest you go into the big room for discussion. This one's too hot.

142. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 11, 1971, midnight–1:40 a.m. and 9:50–10:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC (Second Session Only)
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

At the working session which began about 12:00 midnight on the night of July 10–11, both the U.S. and the PRC sides presented preliminary drafts of a joint statement announcing the visit of Dr. Kissinger and the summit meeting between President Nixon and the Chinese leaders.²

Present on the Chinese side were Ambassador Huang Hua, Chang Wen-chin, and the two interpreters, Mr. Chi and Miss Tang. On the U.S. side were Dr. Kissinger and Messrs. Holdridge, Lord and Smyser.

Both sides agreed that the announcement should be kept simple. Dr. Kissinger, finding the wording of the Chinese draft in certain respects to be in accordance with what the U.S. had in mind, soon took this language as the basis of the discussions (attached at Tab C).³

The first significant issue which emerged was the Chinese desire to make it appear that the President had asked for an invitation to visit China. Dr. Kissinger reminded the Chinese of the fact that it was the Chinese who had actually proposed such a visit in their communication to the U.S., although the President admittedly had commented on visiting China during a press conference. After some discussion, the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.

² The final version of the announcement is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820. The President announced the contacts with the PRC in a television address the evening of July 15. The statement was forwarded to all diplomatic posts in telegram 128513, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHICOM-US)

³ Tabs A–C were attached but not printed.

Chinese agreed that there should be a mutually expressed desire for a summit.

A second issue which then arose was a proposal by Dr. Kissinger that the announcement not set the purpose of the summit meeting only as seeking the "normalization of relations" between the U.S. and the PRC. The Chinese, who had submitted this formulation, objected when Dr. Kissinger wanted to broaden the summit scope to state that the meeting would be beneficial to Asian and world peace. There was considerable discussion concerning this issue. The Chinese acknowledged that in the President's message of May 19, 1971, to Prime Minister Chou, the President had suggested that each side should be free to include topics of principal concern to it in the summit discussions. Thus, something in addition to the normalization of relations was in order.

At 1:40 a.m. the Chinese asked for a thirty minute recess to permit them to consider wording which would be responsive to these two issues. They did not, however, return that night—at 2:55 a.m. the U.S. side was informed that they would not return until about 9:00 a.m. the next morning.

On Sunday morning, the Chinese returned at 9:50 a.m., accompanied this time by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying. (Prime Minister Chou remained outside pending approval of the draft announcement.) From the U.S. standpoint, the wording of the new Chinese draft (attached at Tab B) was a great improvement over that of the preceding day. The Chinese, on their own initiative, then changed the date for the summit from "in the spring of 1972" to "before May 1972." Dr. Kissinger said this was a better formulation. With respect to the initiative for the invitation, the Chinese draft said "in view of" President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC. However, after a certain amount of give-and-take the Chinese agreed to a formulation in which Prime Minister Chou, "knowing of" the President's desire, had extended the invitation. As to the purpose of the visit, they had included in addition to seeking a normalization of relations, the phrase "and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides." Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. preferred the phrase "peace in the world" but accepted the Chinese formulation since it met the principal U.S. concern of broadening the scope of the summit.

After further brief discussion the two sides agreed on an announcement in English and Chinese (attached at Tab A). In working during the night on a new draft to meet the U.S. concerns, and in the verbal exchanges at these sessions, the Chinese clearly made an effort to find mutually acceptable compromises. This attitude was reciprocated by the U.S. side.

There was a brief exchange on when the joint announcement should be made. Dr. Kissinger suggested the evening of July 15, U.S.

time, while the Chinese preferred July 19. Dr. Kissinger explained that a Thursday evening announcement would allow for more intelligent coverage of the event in the American Sunday newspapers and weekly news magazines. Prime Minister Chou then entered the room to continue the discussion at 10:35 a.m.

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 11, 1971, 10:35–11:55 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hsu Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
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Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: Our talks have become compressed and rushed toward the end. However, at the end each side is respecting the views of the other side.

We will need to address the question of the time for the announcement. We must pick an appropriate time, because the 15th appears to be a bit too early for our side. You are going to mention in your announcement that the President has accepted our invitation, and therefore you need time to report to him.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be back in California on the morning of July 13.

PM Chou: So quick?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.

Dr. Kissinger: We have proposed to make the announcement on the evening of the 15th for us, which would be the morning of the 16th for you.

PM Chou: Do you think we can postpone the announcement until Friday, or two days more? Today is Sunday. Is it that you don't make announcements on Saturday?

Dr. Kissinger: We don't generally do so because the Sunday newspapers are essentially printed on Friday and on Saturday morning.

PM Chou: Perhaps you don't like the Friday date—

Dr. Kissinger: We could possibly do it on Friday night. A problem which I wanted to explain to the Prime Minister—one which is not decisive—is that the weekly news magazines such as *TIME* and *Newsweek* are printed on Friday and Saturday. Therefore, if the announcement is made on Thursday night, they can do a better job of reporting it than if it were on Friday night, which would give them only a half day to write about it. But this is not a decisive matter.

PM Chou: That means it would be more appropriate to make the announcement on the evening of the 16th your time, and the morning of the 17th our time.

Dr. Kissinger: The evening of the 16th gives the news magazines only a half a day to do anything, while the evening of the 15th gives them almost two days. I represent our view to the Prime Minister, but this is not a matter of principle. The evening of the 15th, though, does mean that the news magazines could give fuller treatment and above all the Sunday newspapers, which in America are very big. They are printed on Friday and Saturday, and therefore if the announcement is Friday evening they wouldn't be able to give any analysis on Sunday.

PM Chou: The morning of the 16th is all right, but we must do some work before that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have to do some work too.

PM Chou: "Before May" in the announcement could also mean this winter. Chairman Mao just called us to expressly speak on this issue. He said he would like to put forward this date formulation for your President.

Dr. Kissinger: We are very grateful for his courtesy.

PM Chou: So if your President finds it necessary he can come in anytime during this period, including this winter. There is another question to consider. We would welcome very much a public visit by either yourself or by Ambassador Bruce during the interval between your departure and President Nixon's visit. This is because you mentioned it is difficult to find another representative. You could make a short visit when necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: For very selfish reasons I would like to come myself.

PM Chou: I believe your colleagues would agree to that.

Dr. Kissinger: Since it may be difficult for me to get away, we may send Ambassador Bruce. However, it will be either he or I.

PM Chou: That is agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't have to put this into the communiqué. You have been very agreeable and very helpful in this matter.

PM Chou: There is also the matter of our direct communications. The best thing would be to do this in Paris, because Canada would give rise to too much speculation.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

PM Chou: In Paris we have wider scope and you yourself or your Ambassador could send an oral or written message to Ambassador Huang Chen.

Dr. Kissinger: The only man who will be authorized to contact your Ambassador on the President's behalf is General Vernon A. Walters. He is our military attaché in Paris and has direct communications to the White House. He used to be the personal interpreter for the President, and we have used him for contacts with the North Vietnamese. He's completely our man. It is easier for me to come to Paris secretly than to Ottawa, strangely enough.

PM Chou: We understand—that's why we suggested Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: We will communicate through unsigned letters to your Ambassador which General Walters will hand to him. On matters of great importance I will come personally to talk to him.

PM Chou: That's all right. Or if you have some confidential letters to hand to us, you can seal them, leaving them unsigned or signed as you prefer, and give them to us. You can talk directly with Ambassador Huang or hand over unsigned messages.

Dr. Kissinger: Which do you prefer?

PM Chou: It's up to you. A third course would be to hand over data or material which you would like to hand to us in confidence *sealed*, and give it to our Ambassador. We fully trust him. He is one of the members of our Central Committee.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have information we believe of national interest to you we will put it in a sealed envelope and give it to him. Similarly, we would prefer you to do the same to us.

PM Chou: Approach the U.S. Military Attaché in your Paris Embassy?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: At another site or at our Embassy?

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't we ask Walters to work that out? He has no authority to discuss matters of substance, just to transmit messages. But he's reliable.

PM Chou: You can discuss with Walters which method of communications you would prefer, instruct him, and he can talk to us.

Dr. Kissinger: We'll ask him to call your Ambassador. When can he call?

PM Chou: Perhaps Wednesday, the 14th.

Dr. Kissinger: He will call your Ambassador after the announcement.

PM Chou: Maybe next Monday, July 18.

Dr. Kissinger: The 18th then. On the meeting with the President when he comes to the People's Republic of China, how many days do you think it should take?

PM Chou: I don't think it should take too long because you are very busy, but five days at least.

Dr. Kissinger: For the President that's very long.

PM Chou: Of course, the time could be shortened.

Dr. Kissinger: We could say "up to" five days. Maybe it would be a little shorter. Should he visit only Peking?

PM Chou: Any other place would be satisfactory. It is possible that Chairman Mao might not be in Peking, and they therefore could go to some other quiet place.

Dr. Kissinger: You have had many barbarian invasions, but I am not sure that you are prepared for this one. (Laughter on the Chinese side.)

PM Chou: This is not necessarily the case—when Khrushchev came he was most ferocious.

Dr. Kissinger: The President will be very gentle, but his security officers are in a special category. That doesn't matter. We will bring the minimum number necessary.

PM Chou: If you find that necessary. In reality, if you want to guarantee the safety of a guest, the host must be held responsible first. This time you placed great trust in us, and nothing happened.

Dr. Kissinger: We still have two hours. (Chinese laugh) The President may want to go to one other place, but won't want to visit too many.

PM Chou: There won't be too many.

Dr. Kissinger: As for the press, he would prefer a small press delegation, not a large delegation, and we would be very grateful if you could help us by limiting the number whom you admit.

PM Chou: The number shouldn't exceed ten.

Dr. Kissinger: Something like that. If we change our view, we will let you know. As for the size of our delegation, we propose that it be rather small, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, myself, and maybe one aide for the Secretary and one for me. Is that agreeable?

PM Chou: There is no question about that. It's up to the President's decision.

Dr. Kissinger: On the agenda, Ambassador Bruce or I can come and discuss this before the President's visit. (Chou nods.) However, we could cover roughly the same subjects you and I have discussed. (Chou nods.)

PM Chou: Please tell President Yahya Khan that when necessary we'll still use his channel. We have a saying in China that one shouldn't break the bridge after crossing it.

Dr. Kissinger: We might exchange some communications through him for politeness.

PM Chou: This is because you have confidence in him, and we also respect him.

Dr. Kissinger: There are just some things which we don't want to say through friends, no matter how trustworthy.

PM Chou: We'll send nothing substantive. Please convey my regards to him, and those of Chairman Mao also.

I would also like to take the opportunity to say we express thanks for the gifts which the President and you have sent to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and myself. You may say that Chairman Mao and I both send our regards to President Nixon. Since we are short of time now, we won't return gifts but we will prepare for the next time. This time, hearing you like Chinese tea, we just have some Chinese tea—this is not a gift but a little token.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, and I thank you very much.

Concerning the matter which we discussed yesterday: we think that to enable us to carry out most easily the relationships we have made, and to assure that the issues we have discussed won't become a political football in the United States, I think it would be best if the President could become the first political leader to initiate our new departure.

PM Chou: You were saying that we were advancing in this direction, and the course will not be too slow. It will accelerate as it goes on.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be best if it did not become an issue, if the President was first and started the process. This is better than a whole group of politicians coming before his visit, each making statements which have to be answered and defended. The China lobby might start up again, etc. (Chou nods.) This doesn't apply, of course, to the visits of newsmen and to cultural exchanges.

PM Chou: With respect to newsmen, we always reiterate the principles we have discussed here. After the announcement is made public, I'll be in more trouble than I am at present, but I'll still be better off than you because I don't see too many newspapermen.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to raise the issue of how to handle the press after our announcement. I would like to listen to your views.

PM Chou: Couldn't you mention only what is in the announcement and nothing else?

Dr. Kissinger: In America it is impossible not to meet the press at all, because this will cause unbelievable speculation and many unauthorized people will speak. Accordingly, I propose to meet on a background basis with a group of newsmen on Friday the 16th on the trip and without discussing any substance, just give them a little flavor of who took part in our conversations and where they took place. I say nothing in a half an hour very effectively, but this gives them a feeling they have heard something. But I will not make substantive comments and will not list the topics we discussed.

PM Chou: You are going to announce on the evening of the 15th? Will this be in the name of your press secretary, Ziegler, who will read it out?

Dr. Kissinger: Either he will read it out, or the President will release it. It is possible that the President will want to read it.

PM Chou: Is the title to be a communiqué or an announcement?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably there should be no title at all.

PM Chou: We use the term "announcement."

Dr. Kissinger: All right, we'll use the term "announcement."

PM Chou: We'll probably do it through the New China News Agency as a news announcement.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you use the same English text and not make a new translation?

PM Chou: Both the Chinese and English texts will remain as agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: I say this only because when we made the SALT announcement, the Russians used a completely different text in English from our own, saying that this was their translation from the Russian. We had to make them correct it.

PM Chou: We Chinese don't do things that way. Should we sign a statement about using the same text?

Dr. Kissinger: No. You are men of honor.

PM Chou: We have a gentleman's agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to learn to trust each other.

PM Chou: That's very important in international relations.

Dr. Kissinger: We have much more important things to do together.

For your consideration, and you don't need to settle this now, we are prepared, when the President visits, to discuss and sign an agreement for the mutual renouncing of force between our two countries such as you proposed in 1955.

PM Chou: You know that this question must be linked to the Taiwan question and the question of China's internal affairs. Once these questions are brought into shape, then this question (of renunciation of force) will be easier to deal with.

I hope that your trip to Paris will see some development, and we will tell our Vietnamese friends about this part of our discussions after the announcement is made.

Dr. Kissinger: That is of course proper. What I now propose will not be a request, but we will let your Ambassador in Paris know what part of the SALT agreement might be appropriate for negotiating bilaterally between us, for example, preventing accidental war, and if you want to discuss that with us, we will be prepared to do so, but we are not asking. If you want to discuss, we are prepared. But this is not a formal request. It is entirely up to you. We won't embarrass you by a formal request.

PM Chou: Of course, when you feel that the time is appropriate, you can approach us.

Dr. Kissinger: We will inform you of what the content is, and if it is of interest to you, we can discuss it separately.

PM Chou: This is mainly, as you told me yesterday, an agreement between your two countries (the U.S. and the USSR.)

Dr. Kissinger: The SALT talks, yes, but there is one section in the agreement now being negotiated on preventing accidental war through technical accidents. The general agreement would be discriminatory to you if you were to join SALT now when you are at the beginning of your nuclear program. But the accidental war part might be of interest to you.

PM Chou: You can tell us when you feel it is necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to tell you, as I did yesterday, that sometimes there are clauses proposed to us that can be interpreted as applying to other countries, and which until rejected are still on the agenda. I want to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will not accept such clauses and will always tell you first about them, regardless of what any other party tells you, rather than to have you learn about them through other channels.

PM Chou: Thank you. We believe you will first tell us.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure.

PM Chou: Although, as we said, we now have no interest.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

I have one or two final points. One point—I suppose you see no need to resume the Warsaw talks under these conditions? (Chou nods.) I agree.

PM Chou: We better relieve our people there of their burdens.

Dr. Kissinger: And relieve our bureaucracies from the responsibility of writing instructions.

PM Chou: It would be another matter if our representatives met at diplomatic functions.

Dr. Kissinger: Should we send instructions to our Ambassadors to speak to one another at diplomatic receptions? I was just joking.

PM Chou: I believe that they know each other.

Dr. Kissinger: One final point. The President asked me to raise this as a matter of personal kindness. We are aware of four Americans sentenced to prison in China. While we are not disputing the circumstances, we would consider it an act of mercy if the People's Republic of China could pardon all or some of them whenever, in its judgment, it felt that conditions were right. This is not a request. I'm asking it as a favor.

PM Chou: There is a point in our law that if they themselves have behaved well, we can shorten the period of their sentence. We shall continue to study this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be very grateful. We recognize that this is entirely within the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, but it would be a voluntary act of mercy. That's all.

PM Chou: I have a few points, too.

First, is the Taiwan question. As you have said, it will need time and we agree. Of course, once the direction is decided upon we should gradually advance in that direction. We believe the President's visit will accelerate the pace. I believe that as we gradually come to understand each other, by the time we have established diplomatic relations the treaty between the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek should not have any effect. We don't recognize the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand that you don't recognize it, and maybe history can take care of events.

PM Chou: By that time, when all your armed forces have withdrawn from Taiwan and we ourselves have solved the matter, it should no longer be a problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.

PM Chou: We are doing our best to do so. You will also need to undertake not to let the Japanese armed forces into Taiwan before you have left. Because this would be a great danger not only to us but you and peace in Asia and the world.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: And the Taiwan Independence Movement should not be allowed to prepare activities in Taiwan. This would also set Chiang Kai-shek at ease.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister must understand that where both conditions are within the power of the U.S., we will not encourage the Taiwan Independence Movement and indeed have asked the Prime Minister to give us any information to the contrary; we will also oppose the establishment of a Japanese military force on Taiwan. But if the Taiwan Independence Movement develops without us, that is not in our control. However, we will do nothing to encourage, support, finance, or give any other encouragement.

PM Chou: That should include not agreeing to Japan's engaging in such activities.

Dr. Kissinger: We will oppose this to the extent that we can control Japan.

PM Chou: Your attitude should be as it has just been. We have heard that Secretary Laird's words (about Japanese rearmament)² have been denied in Washington, and also that he himself has denied them under instructions from Washington. As you mentioned yesterday, he was prohibited from departing from White House policy.

We have also heard that Agnew was indignant over Park Chong-hee's discourtesies to him. Recently, the attitude of small men such as these has been such—there is an old Chinese saying that if you are close to someone like this, he will become mischievous and act in a spoiled way, but if you are far away from him, he will complain about you. Rhee was such a person, Diem was such a person, Park is such a person, and so are Thieu and Sirik Matak.

But if friends are equals, they will respect one another. For example, today it suddenly occurred to Chairman Mao that it might be convenient to your needs if maybe the President's visit was earlier and not necessarily in the spring. And so we came up with "before May." Once the announcement is made it will shake the world, which won't be able to sleep.

Dr. Kissinger: It will first of all shake our bureaucracy.

PM Chou: And Chiang Kai-shek, according to his temperament, might collude with Japan or the Soviets, and you must beware. He will demonstrate against your President. I am most familiar with him—I believe that you know my history. I was Political Commissar under him in the Whampoa Military Academy when he was Director of Training.

However, even though in the past he has massacred and slaughtered innumerable amounts of our people, if he could restore Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland, that will be a good thing. And it

² See footnote 14, Document 140.

would relieve you of a burden. That place is no great use for you, but a great wound for us.

Dr. Kissinger: How should we establish the date for the meeting?

PM Chou: Haven't you just mentioned a special channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We should make suggestions to you. I understand anytime winter–spring, from December to April.

PM Chou: November would also be all right. According to your needs, you can put forward a date, and we will answer.

Dr. Kissinger: But you would in any case want Ambassador Bruce or me to come openly before?

PM Chou: Yes. We expect that if you have anything especially urgent, and would like to tell us personally, it would of course be best if you come here to discuss the matter, because we can do things in better detail.

I must raise this point to your attention. You should know that if you put forward a formula in the U.N. such as you describe, it will raise great difficulties for you, and not for us.³ We will oppose because that means two Chinas. Taiwan will also oppose.

Dr. Kissinger: This is temporarily one China, one Taiwan.

PM Chou: I understand that this is only a temporary phenomenon. The President's visit will also manifest the phenomenon. On the one hand you recognize Taiwan and on the other you come here. You could say that this phenomenon began on the 9th. I must tell you that.

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize this. We may not propose this resolution ourselves, but might support it if someone else puts it forward. We recognize that you will oppose it, but if we can moderate our rhetoric about each other that will be progress.

PM Chou: Taiwan will also oppose that (the resolution) and there will be opposition from all quarters.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be a good way to end the issue.

PM Chou: It should be ended.

The second question I have concerns Indochina. I believe that you are quite clear as to our stand. We support Madam Binh's seven point proposal.⁴ We hope that your withdrawal will be most complete, thorough, and also honorable. Sentiments there will change. I know you say that you still have internal difficulties, but also you say that the President is the only one who can solve these issues. Therefore, I hope that your negotiations in Paris will be good for you.

³ See Document 167.

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 139.

Dr. Kissinger: Thanks.

PM Chou: And that you won't leave a tail behind.

Dr. Kissinger: There's no danger of misunderstanding the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: My third question concerns Korea. You now have mixed army units with the South Korean forces, which also include a Thai unit.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: This was reported in the news, which said that an American commands the army, with a South Korean as a vice commander.

Dr. Kissinger: In Korea or Thailand?

PM Chou: Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: I know of no Thai units but I will check on this. The joint command is not a new policy; its purpose is to make our withdrawal easier, and not to increase our commitment.

PM Chou: However, North Korean opposition will increase, and we will also oppose that. The second point is that the Japanese defense forces every month send personnel in civilian clothes to South Korea to look into the South Korean military situation; and Japanese military men will never forget Korea or Taiwan, though these territories did not belong to them. You should pay attention to that. You oppose revived Japanese militarism going abroad and now it's beginning?

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I was not aware of these things. I am not disputing them, and will look into them. I repeat, it is not our policy to support Japanese military expansion outside their home islands.

PM Chou: But I must bring to your attention the fact that Japan has now grown big. Even your President has also said that either this year or next Japan's steel production will meet or exceed that of the U.S. Japan is already so big that it cannot contain itself. We are rather familiar with Japan, and you also have a history of relations with Japan dating back 100 years. The Japanese people are industrious and intelligent, and should have their independence and rightful status. However, recently the minority of the ambitious militarists in Japan have been expanding also, and their war-lord mentality has been expanding as well. I am mentioning this to you so that you can also bring it to the attention of your President. The Emperor of Japan is the basis of this system that maintains the militarism of Japan. This year or the next he will go to your country. He is in a different situation than the British Queen who travels all over the world.

Dr. Kissinger: One point about Korea: we oppose military aggression by South Korea against North Korea. But I also must tell you that sometimes North Korea has been very harsh in its military measures both against South Korea and against the U.S. We believe that it would

help maintain Asian peace if you could use your influence with North Korea to not use force against the U.S. and against South Korea.

PM Chou: The Military Demarcation Line still exists, and every week we meet there with you and South Korea on one side, and ourselves and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other. This is a powder-keg left over from Dulles. At that time I suggested that you at least allow the Geneva Conference to apply to Korea. Many Foreign Ministers of other countries were persuaded by me, especially Spaak of Belgium. At the time of the Geneva Conference, Eden, who was in the chair at the time, almost agreed. My only request was to let the meeting continue. However, the U.S. representative, Smith,⁵ who was not very fierce, all he could do was wave his hands in opposition toward Mr. Eden, after which he changed and dropped the whole thing.

As for John Foster Dulles not wanting to shake hands with me, I wouldn't want to shake hands with him, either. This was the first time we engaged in such international activities.

Another point I mentioned for the cause of peace in the Far East, is that it would be best for you to withdraw all foreign troops from the Far East, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indochina. There is no need to discuss Taiwan anymore. I put this forward as a principle; this would be a popular move.

You know that Japan wants to recover certain islands to the north . . .⁶

Dr. Kissinger: From the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: . . . and members of the opposition party asked us what they should do. I said that they must prove that Japan will not restore militarism, and because the Japanese people oppose the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, they must do away with it. If they acted in this way, the Soviets would be forced to talk to them. However, if they told the Soviets that I said this, they would run up against a stone wall.

This shows that it is not easy to arrange peace in the Far East, and if things continue there could be even greater violence in the Far East. I must point this out to you.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have said, the danger from Japan of which you speak does not come from us, and withdrawal of our forces from Japan may increase the danger that worries you.

⁵ Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister from April 22, 1954 to May 11, 1957, Head of the Belgian Delegation to the Geneva Talks and Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State from February 9, 1953 to October 1, 1954, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Talks.

⁶ All ellipses in the source text.

PM Chou: You know we are not afraid of that, as I told you yesterday. No matter how large Japan grows it has had experience with us. If they want to create great trouble, let them come. Changes have also occurred among the Japanese people over the last 25 years since the war. You have an expert on Japan—I believe his name is Reischauer⁷—isn't he rather clear about this?

Dr. Kissinger: He is a friend of mine.

PM Chou: How much knowledge does he have of Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: Quite a lot of knowledge.

PM Chou: Does he believe that the evil roots of Japanese militarism still exist?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that he sees some tendencies.

PM Chou: More than that, their present defense means exceed their necessities.

There are two pieces of news that I would like to tell you. On July 9, the day you came, Indian and Pakistan artillery shelling occurred for the first time in an area near the borders of East Pakistan, India, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The Indian side sent more than 300 shells and the Pakistani forces in that area returned more than 300 rounds themselves. In the evening, the firing ceased.

Dr. Kissinger: On the 9th?

PM Chou: Yes. You will learn about this when you get to Pakistan.

The second item is that on the 10th, a coup d'état was attempted in Morocco staged by some people in the military, who broke into the Palace, killed the Air Commander and the Defense Minister, and also the Belgian Ambassador who was in the palace to see the King. Hassan the Second was not killed because that day he was celebrating his birthday.

Dr. Kissinger: He was not overthrown?

PM Chou: I don't know the results—perhaps he escaped.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate this information very much.

PM Chou: This shows that the turmoil is continuing. The world is in a great upheaval.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I think we have done some historic work here. I hope that we have laid the basis for a new relationship of cooperation and friendship between the American people and the Chinese people.

PM Chou: We have gone the first step.

⁷ Edwin O. Reischauer, Ambassador to Japan from March 1961 to August 1966, and well-known Japan scholar.

Dr. Kissinger: And we hope this will help reduce the turmoil under the heavens about which you spoke yesterday.

PM Chou: Our subjective efforts are in this direction, but the objective trend of affairs may not develop along the lines of our subjective ways.

Dr. Kissinger: We must try to do it. I came aware of the achievements of the People's Republic of China and its people, so I was not surprised by that. I have been especially moved though by the idealism and spiritual qualities of yourself and your colleagues.

PM Chou: I suggest that we have a quick lunch.

Even though our achievements are still small, we have a large population and country. It is not an easy task to organize a large country of 700 million people and still maintain and elevate the revolutionary vitality of these people and build up a socialist country. Perhaps the world expects too much from us, and I hope that you are not disappointed. We don't want to spread our hands all over the world. You and the Soviet Union have learned that lesson, and we don't want to follow in your paths.

Dr. Kissinger: My colleagues and I want to thank you for your grace and courtesy with which you have received us. In my subjective, and personal view, I came with hope and leave in friendship.

PM Chou: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I have also gotten to know new friends.

PM Chou: Shall we end here?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Please tell President Yahya Khan that if India commits aggression, we will support Pakistan. You are also against that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will oppose that, but we cannot take military measures.

PM Chou: You are too far away. But you have strength to persuade India. You can speak to both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do our best.

144. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

San Clemente, California, July 14, 1971.

[Omitted here is a 23-page narrative review of the July meetings under the following headings: What Happened, The Chinese, Summit, Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, Korea, South Asia, Communications, Great Power Relations, Arms Control, and Americans Detained in China.]

SUBJECT

My Talks with Chou En-lai

Introduction

My two-day visit to Peking resulted in the most searching, sweeping and significant discussions I have ever had in government.² I spent seventeen hours in meetings and informal conversation with Chou En-lai, flanked by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, member of the Politburo and of the Military Commission; Huang Hua, the new Chinese Ambassador

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK trip to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Printed from an unsigned copy, which is 27 pages long. Nixon and Haig were in San Clemente, California, from July 6 through July 18. A 21-page version of this memorandum, July 17, contains less information on commitments made by the Kissinger or Chou on behalf of their respective nations, for example, information on U.S. officers to inform the PRC leaders of any agreements reached with the Soviet Union is absent from the shorter version. (Ibid., RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers, Entry 5439, China) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 9.

² An undated message from Haig “for Henry A. Kissinger very first opportunity on his return from destination” reads in full: “Leader has requested that you flash me via this channel, as first priority of business and regardless of hour, cryptic assessment of outcome. He is particularly interested in status of July 15 announcement.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, HAK, Very Sensitive Trip Cables) In response Kissinger cabled a short report on his talks while in the People’s Republic of China, which was forwarded by Haig to the President. (Ibid., Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 7. Nixon’s July 11 response to Kissinger’s initial reports on talks in the PRC began: “Your reported conversations were the most intensive, important and far-reaching of your White House experience. If we play the game up to the hilt from now on out, history will record your visit as the most significant foreign policy achievement of this century. When you return, I plan to give you a day off in compensation for your superb service to the nation—far beyond the call of duty. Please extend my appreciation to the dedicated members of your staff whose superb efforts have contributed to this achievement.” Copies of Nixon’s message, sent through Haig, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, HAK, Very Sensitive Trip Cables. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 8.

in Ottawa; and Chang Wen-chin, head of the West European and American Department in the Foreign Ministry. Another four hours was spent with Huang and Chang, mostly on drafting a communiqué. These meetings brought about a summit meeting between you and Mao Tse-tung, covered all major issues between our two countries at considerable length and with great candor, and may well have marked a major new departure in international relations.

It is extremely difficult to capture in a memorandum the essence of this experience. Simply giving you a straightforward account of the highlights of our talks, potentially momentous as they were, would do violence to an event so shaped by the atmosphere and the ebb and flow of our encounter, or to the Chinese behavior, so dependent on nuances and style. Thus, this memorandum will sketch the overall sequence of events and philosophic framework, as well as the substance of our exchanges. For the intangibles are crucial and we must understand them if we are to take advantage of the opportunities we now have, deal effectively with these tough, idealistic, fanatical, single-minded and remarkable people, and thus transform the very framework of global relationships.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the talks between Kissinger and Chou En-lai.]

Conclusion

I am frank to say that this visit was a very moving experience. The historic aspects of the occasion; the warmth and dignity of the Chinese; the splendor of the Forbidden City, Chinese history and culture; the heroic stature of Chou En-lai; and the intensity and sweep of our talks combined to make an indelible impression on me and my colleagues.

These forty-eight hours, and my extensive discussions with Chou in particular, had all the flavor, texture, variety and delicacy of a Chinese banquet. Prepared from the long sweep of tradition and culture, meticulously cooked by hands of experience, and served in splendidly simple surroundings, our feast consisted of many courses, some sweet and some sour, all interrelated and forming a coherent whole. It was a total experience, and one went away, as after all good Chinese meals, very satisfied but not at all satiated.

We have laid the groundwork for you and Mao to turn a page in history. But we should have no illusions about the future. Profound differences and years of isolation yawn between us and the Chinese. They will be tough before and during the summit on the question of Taiwan and other major issues. And they will prove implacable foes if our relations turn sour. My assessment of these people is that they are deeply ideological, close to fanatic in the intensity of their beliefs. At the same time they display an inward security that allows them, within

the framework of their principles, to be meticulous and reliable in dealing with others.

Furthermore, the process we have now started will send enormous shock waves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility. It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan. It will have major impact on our other Asian allies, such as Korea and Thailand. It will increase the already substantial hostility in India. Some quarters may seek to sabotage the summit over the coming months.

However, we were well aware of these risks when we embarked on this course. We were aware too that the alternative was unacceptable—continued isolation from one-quarter of the world's most talented people and a country rich in past achievements and future potential.

And even the risks can be managed and turned to our advantage if we maintain steady nerves and pursue our policies responsibly. With the Soviet Union we will have to make clear the continued priorities we attach to our concrete negotiations with them. Just as we will not collude with them against China, so we have no intention of colluding with China against them. If carefully managed, our new China policy could have a longer term beneficial impact on Moscow.

With Japan our task will be to make clear that we are not shifting our allegiance in Asia from her to China. On Taiwan we can hope for little more than damage limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty even while it becomes evident that we foresee a political evolution over the coming years. With our other Asian allies we will need to stress both our continued bonds and our hope that reconciliation between us and the Chinese will serve the cause of regional peace. And in India, after the initial shock, our China moves might produce a more healthy relationship.

For Asia and for the world we need to demonstrate that we are enlarging the scope of our diplomacy in a way that, far from harming the interests of other countries, should instead prove helpful to them.

Our dealings, both with the Chinese and others, will require reliability, precision, finesse. If we can master this process, we will have made a revolution.

145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 16, 1971.

128839/Tosec 156. White House—Please Pass San Clemente for Secretary Rogers. Subject: President's Announcement: ROC Reaction.² Refs: A. Taipei 3470; B. Taipei 3491.³

1. ROC Ambassador Shen, acting under instructions, called on Assistant Secretary Green in action parallel to that taken by Acting Foreign Minister Yang with Ambassador McConaughy (Ref tels). As instructed, Shen lodged strong protest and expressed profound regret at act that should "hardly be described as a friendly act." He said it would have consequences not only for both our countries, but for whole free world. He said ROC wants to know what transpired in Peking between Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Expressing concern about where we go from here, Shen asked whether the announcement was the decision referred to when the President on June 1 said that a decision regarding UN representation would be made in about six weeks.

2. Green responded that this announcement could not reasonably be called an unfriendly act. The President had said that it would "not be at the expense of our old friends," which meant the ROC. Green said the visit was motivated by a desire to find some way to ease the tensions which had so long existed in East Asia without letting down our guard or undercutting our friends.

3. As for other points raised by Shen, Green suggested that they might be discussed with Secretary Rogers who would be glad to see Shen at 11:00 a.m. Monday, July 19. Shen accepted with thanks. Green stated firmly that the President's announcement does not affect our friendship and relations with the ROC. He affirmed that our defense

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHICOM-US. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Tokyo, Hong Kong, USUN, the White House, and San Clemente. Drafted by L. R. Starbird (EA/ROC) and approved by Green.

² Initial ROC reaction to the President's announcement, including the first official statement, made by Vice President Yen, is in telegram 3493 from Taipei, July 16; *ibid.*, POL 1 CHICOM-US. A report on public demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy is in telegram 3570 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*, POL 23-8 CHINAT, and media reactions are detailed in telegram 3571 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*, POL 1 CHICOM-US. McConaughy wrote: "Reaction to President's announcement indicates pattern of restraint on part of GRC and has involved numerous expressions of desire and necessity for maintaining good working relations with US." (Telegram 3572 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*) Rogers met with Shen on July 19, as reported in telegram 130330 to Taipei. (*Ibid.*, POL 17 CHINAT-US). They discussed Kissinger's trip and Chinese representation in the UN.

³ Telegrams 3470 and 3491 from Taipei, July 16 and 17, detail McConaughy's meeting with Yang. (*Ibid.*, POL 1 CHICOM-US)

commitment continues. He said he thought the Secretary might be able to throw some light on Chirep when he saw Shen.

4. Shen said Taipei was upset at this development. He had just learned of Premier Yen's statement from the ROC UN Mission. It too expressed profound surprise and regret. Shen said that the US had chosen a very unusual way to show its friendship for the ROC—by accepting an invitation from the leader of a rebel regime which usurps the mainland. He expressed appreciation for Green's reassurance that the US continues to stand by the ROC and intends to maintain its defense treaty commitment. He noted, however, that this had not stopped the US from having high-level dealings with what the ROC regards as a rebel regime. He pointed out that restoration of its control over the mainland remains an ROC objective.

5. Green said he could only emphasize that tensions and wars in East Asia had continued for a long time, that the people of the world were sick of it, and that we feel a real effort must be made to tackle the difficult international problems. This would be a long journey, it would require a great effort, and we do not know what the results will be. Certainly, we shall need to keep our guard up. But the ROC should realize that this move has met with great approval throughout the world and that this places great pressure on Peking to respond.

6. Shen expressed deep concern over the lack of prior consultations. He observed that the US did consult on the question of recognition of Outer Mongolia. He, therefore, found it difficult to understand why we had not consulted on this far more important development. He stressed the importance of this aspect by saying that if he himself found this hard to understand, how much more difficult will it be for the officials in Taipei. With some annoyance he asked whether the lack of prior consultations could be considered normal diplomatic practice and he again wondered aloud where we would go from here.

7. In response Green reiterated that this move was not an unfriendly act and that it was wrong to view it as such. He said we understood the problems and difficulties posed for the ROC, and we do not sacrifice our friends; in fact our record was second to none in the world in that regard. We have an obligation to the people of the United States and of the world to seek peace, but it would not be peace at any price. It will probably be a long journey and its outcome is not assured. It took great courage to accept the risks involved in starting it. But a start was necessary and it has been now made. We hope this effort succeeds because much is riding on it.

Irwin

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 17, 1971, 0130Z.

129656. For Ambassador McConaughy. Subject: Letter to President Chiang From President Nixon.

1. You are authorized to deliver following personal message from President Nixon to President Chiang at earliest opportunity:²

Begin text: I deeply regret that I was not able to inform you at an earlier date of the substance of my announcement of July 15.

The steps which I have recommended were taken because I believe that it has become imperative in this age to attempt to break down barriers of hostility and suspicion that have grown over the years and could threaten the peace of the world. The people of free Asian nations should be the first to benefit from efforts to lower tensions in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

I recognize that these actions are disturbing to the Republic of China. In seeking to reduce tensions in the world, however, I wish to assure you that the United States will maintain its ties of friendship with your country and will continue to honor its defense treaty commitment to the Republic of China. I am proud of my long personal association with you and I know the American people will continue to cherish their friendship with the people of the Republic of China. *End text.*

2. We propose to keep contents of this message confidential, but we have no objection if GRC were to acknowledge publicly President Chiang had received a message from President Nixon regarding his desire to maintain continuing friendship with the GRC.

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received on July 16 at 9:48 p.m. Drafted by Charles T. Sylvester (EA/ROC), cleared by Colonel Kennedy at the White House, and approved by Green.

² McConaughy reported that he personally handed the message to Acting Foreign Minister H. K. Yang at 1 p.m. on July 17. Yang said he would relay the message to Chiang. (Telegram 3495 from Taipei, July 17; *ibid.*, POL 15–1 CHINAT)

147. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 19, 1971.

One effective line you could use in your talks with the press is how RN is uniquely prepared for this meeting and how ironically in many ways he has similar character characteristics and background to Chou. I am just listing a few of the items that might be emphasized.²

- (1) Strong convictions.
- (2) Came up through adversity.
- (3) At his best in a crisis. Cool. Unflappable.
- (4) A tough bold strong leader. Willing to take chances where necessary.
- (5) A man who takes the long view, never being concerned about tomorrow's headlines but about how the policy will look years from now.
- (6) A man with a philosophical turn of mind.
- (7) A man who works without notes—in meetings with 73 heads of state and heads of government RN has had hours of conversation without any notes. When he met with Khrushchev in 1959 in the seven hour luncheon at the dacha, neither he nor Khrushchev had a note and yet discussed matters of the greatest consequences in covering many areas.
- (8) A man who knows Asia and has made a particular point of traveling in Asia and studying Asia.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, President/Kissinger Memos, HAK/President Memoranda, 1971. Confidential. Printed from an unsigned copy. A covering note, attached but not printed, from Haldeman to Kissinger reads: "P. suggests you cover these points with Scali also—but do not show him the memo." Haldeman reiterated many of these points in a similar memorandum to Kissinger, March 14, 1972. (Ibid., Box 817, Name Files, Haldeman, H.R.)

² In a conversation on July 22, Nixon and Kissinger again discussed the President's personality and views on relations with China. Nixon declared: "Let me say that on the China thing though, as I'm sure you realize Henry, there's no one who has less illusions about this initiative than I have. I know exactly that all this euphoria [about] Chinese-American relations, I know everyone in China. We're doing the China thing to screw the Russians and help us in Vietnam and to keep the Japanese in line, get another ball in play. And maybe way down the road to have some relations with China." Kissinger responded: "I told them [a group of conservative congressmen], Mr. President, this group this morning, that I sat through 73 meetings with foreign leaders with the President. Both in terms of style and general approach, it so happens you have been, he is the best resource we have for dealing with these people." He added: "I made the point, I said now, that tough, unemotional, precise, is precisely the President. I said most Americans come back from summit meetings with a sense of euphoria by social occasion. I said that can't happen because he doesn't have any social occasions, he works all the time." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, July 22, 1971, 3:49–5:05 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 543–1)

(9) A man who in terms of his personal style is very strong and very tough where necessary—steely but who is subtle and appears almost gentle. The tougher his position usually, the lower his voice.

You could point out that most of these attributes are ones that you also saw in Chou En-lai.

As a matter of fact, one of the ways that you could subtly get this across is to describe Chou En-lai and to go into how RN's personal characteristics are somewhat similar.

148. Minutes of the Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting¹

Washington, July 19, 1971, 8:47–9:52 a.m.

ATTENDEES

Mr. Laird	Dr. Nutter
Mr. Packard	BGen Hayes (pending Dr. Wilbur's arrival)
Mr. Froehlke	Mr. Shillito
Mr. Beal	Dr. Tucker
General Westmoreland	Mr. Buzhardt
Governor Chafee	Mr. Wallace
Admiral Zumwalt	Mr. Baroddy
Dr. Seamans	Mr. Johnson
General Ryan	Mr. Solomon
Admiral Moorer	Dr. Walske
General Chapman	Mr. Friedheim
Lt General Vogt	Dr. Heilmeier
Dr. Rechtin (for Dr. Foster)	BGen Pursley
Mr. Cooke	RAdm Murphy
Mr. Henkin	Colonel Furlong
LGeneral Taber (for Mr. Kelley)	Colonel Boatner
Mr. Moot	

[Omitted here is discussion of Laird's recent trip to South Korea and Japan, manpower issues, and legislative affairs.]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Office Files: FRC 330 76 0028, Chron, 16 June 1971. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel James G. Boatner, USA. Laird also held his regular meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 19 at 2:30 p.m. Although the minutes of this meeting have not been found, the talking paper prepared for Laird cover many of the same points as the staff meeting minutes. The talking paper states that "The price which Peking may demand for normalizing U.S.–PRC relations is a return by the U.S. to essentially a pre-World War II posture in Asia, with minimum presence and influence." (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0197, 337 Staff Mtgs (JCS), 1971)

5. *China Initiative*

Mr. Laird felt that too many people were reading too much into the possibilities that would evolve from the President's proposed trip to China. Many of these implications will be of great concern to the Department of Defense, and Mr. Laird cautioned that there will be a tendency for many groups to assume that the war in Southeast Asia is over. Mr. Laird stressed that it is important to relate the China initiative to the principles of the Nixon Doctrine, ie, strength, partnership, and negotiation. Mr. Laird said that in his experience, many people would tend to put too much faith into the outcome of one meeting. He mentioned that the Chinese could make some last minute demands which would make it very difficult for us in Southeast Asia. Mr. Laird said that the theme, from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, should be first that this is just one move in our overall efforts to negotiate an era of peace and second, that we must remember it is important to maintain strength during this period of negotiation. Dr. Nutter gave an analysis of our possible new relationship with the People's Republic of China. He cautioned that it was very early to offer anything other than the very tentative analysis. He reminded the group that Peking has been conducting a diplomatic offense for over a year. Dr. Nutter also mentioned that a meaningful dialogue had developed on the subject of trade and travel after the President's foreign policy report of February 1971.² Dr. Nutter pointed out that Peking will seek a reduction of our military presence in the Western Pacific as a price for cooperation. Dr. Nutter cautioned that this may well have a very fundamental impact on the balance of power in that part of the world. He mentioned that various preliminary studies on the implications of this new situation had already been started by ISA, DIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East and Southeast Asia.]

² "Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy," February 25, 1971, in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

149. Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Paris, July 19, 1971.

At 0830 on 19 July 1971 I called without prior announcement at the Residence of Ambassador Huang Chen in Neuilly, not far from my own home. I had left my car some distance away and arrived on foot. I was obviously expected and let in at once. I was initially received by the Ambassador's Secretary, Mr. Wei Tung. After tea and sweets, the Ambassador arrived accompanied by his First Secretary, Tsao Kuei Sheng.

The Ambassador said he had returned from Peking the previous evening. He complimented me on my discretion in coming early to residence rather than to chancellery where "police and newspapermen were watching." He said that he was glad to talk to a "colleague" as he, too, was a general.

The Ambassador said that Dr. Kissinger had done great work in Peking and he was a man who knew the value of discretion. I then handed him the message and the background briefing and requested that he transmit them to Prime Minister Chou En-lai with all possible speed and security.² He said that he would do so at once.

The Ambassador then said that when Dr. Kissinger had been in Peking he had indicated that he (HAK) might come to see the Ambassador in Paris. He asked that if this were to occur, he would appreciate being advised in advance through me and I could arrange the interview. If Dr. Kissinger had questions to ask, he would appreciate being advised two or three days in advance so he could transmit these questions to P.M. Chou En-lai and thus have the answers when he saw Dr. Kissinger.

He then said that the Chinese side had a message that they wanted to get to Dr. Kissinger at once. They read this slowly in English and I wrote it down and read it back to them. It is attached herewith.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² See attachment below.

³ Attached but not printed. The message reads: "Over a period of time, a number of U.S. political figures have eagerly made requests for visits to China. Now that the announcement of July 16, 1971, has been issued, it will be difficult for the Chinese Government to further put off the consideration of these requests. In its contacts with them, the Chinese side will naturally expound its fundamental position on Sino-U.S. relations, the question of Indochina, the Far East question and the world situation, but will not mention the specific statements by Dr. Kissinger in the Peking talks." Nixon made the announcement on the evening of July 15 (U.S. time), which was July 16 in the PRC.

He said he knew I had translated for President Nixon on many occasions and knowing that my hobby was subways (this is correct), he hoped I would see the new Peking subway when I went to China.

After this demonstration of biographic expertise, more tea, extreme cordiality throughout, I was given telephone numbers 624–9002 and 624–9003 to reach them whenever I wanted. We agreed that we would each use the code name JEAN over the phone.

He again complimented me for coming to his residence rather than the chancery and said he was happy to have this direct channel of communications. He walked me to the door and reiterated that he would send what I had given him to Prime Minister Chou En-lai at once.

Faithfully

Dick

P.S. I made plain that no one in the U.S. Embassy in Paris was aware of the existence of this channel. They said they felt it was best that way. My stay at their Embassy lasted nearly an hour. Several times they made references to their industrial backwardness. This could indicate a future request for industrial know-how.

Attachment⁴

President Nixon expresses his warm appreciation for the courtesies that Premier Chou En-lai and the Government of the People's Republic of China extended to Dr. Kissinger during his visit to Peking.

The President has received Dr. Kissinger's reports of the visit and his talks with Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials with great interest. He wishes to reaffirm all the understandings that were arrived at in these conversations and to assure the People's Republic of China that the United States Government will adhere to them scrupulously. The President hopes that the People's Republic of China will understand the bureaucratic complications that Dr. Kissinger outlined, and he reaffirms the procedures which Dr. Kissinger suggested for handling these problems.

The President has approved an interim visit to Peking prior to his own. He will send Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Bruce in order to work out the detailed arrangements for the President's subsequent visit to China. Within the next six weeks the United States Government will

⁴ No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the message reads: "Classified phone for hand carry by Fazio to Walters, 7/16/71."

propose, through this channel, possible dates for both the interim visit and the President's visit to Peking. The President warmly looks forward to his meetings with the Chinese leaders.

Dr. Kissinger wishes to add his own personal gratitude for the extremely gracious and hospitable manner in which he and his associates were received in Peking. He wishes to thank Premier Chou En-lai and all the other Chinese officials who made his journey so important and memorable.

Enclosed is a copy of Dr. Kissinger's July 16, 1971 background briefing of the press in California which he thought would be of interest to the Premier.⁵ This is the only official statement that will be made by the U.S. Government on Dr. Kissinger's visit to Peking.

⁵ Background briefing given by Kissinger and Ziegler on the morning of July 16 at San Clemente. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files—East Asia, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972)

150. Message From the United States Government to the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai¹

Washington, July 20, 1971.

In line with their understanding of keeping him informed of contacts affecting the People's Republic of China, Dr. Kissinger wants to call Premier Chou En-lai's attention to the following: (1) On July 19 the Soviet Ambassador called on Dr. Kissinger to inquire about the Peking talks. Dr. Kissinger told him that no matter concerning the Soviet Union was discussed. In reply to a question, Dr. Kissinger stated that the Chinese side expressed no concern over or interest in the possibility of Soviet military pressures against them. The Soviet Ambassador inquired whether the President would be prepared to visit Moscow before Peking. He was told that while the U.S. maintained its acceptance of a meeting with Soviet leaders, Presidential visits would take place in the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Haig forwarded the message under a separate covering letter to Walters on July 20. (Ibid.) Walters delivered this message to the PRC Ambassador to France on July 21. (Walters' letter to Haig, July 22; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 10 and 11. In many of his reports, Walters uses the name "Kirschman" to refer to Kissinger.

order in which they were announced. (2) [1 line of source text not declassified] (3) With respect to the message transmitted by General Walters, the Premier must understand the need to insulate Sino-U.S. relations from U.S. domestic politics. To the degree that these relations or related subjects become subject to partisan statements, the President's freedom of action is inhibited. (4) Dr. Kissinger will be in Paris secretly on July 25/26 and will be prepared to meet the Chinese Ambassador on that occasion to receive Premier Chou En-lai's reaction to these messages or any other matter of mutual concern.²

² Another message, also attached to Haig's July 20 letter, "to be put orally by Walters" reads: "It may be useful to begin discussing the technical side of the public visit Dr. Kissinger is planning for Peking in late September/early October; for example, the Chinese ideas on where the plane might originate—is Okinawa acceptable, direct flight from Alaska, Chinese navigators, length of stay, participants at meeting, etc. The Ambassador might give answer when he sees Dr. Kissinger." Walters' July 22 letter to Haig indicated that he relayed this message. (Ibid.)

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, July 26, 1971, 4:35–5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Chen, Chinese Ambassador to France
 Tsao Kuei Sheng, First Secretary of Chinese Embassy
 Wei Tung—Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Paris
 Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger apologized for being late for the meeting, but he had been delayed at another appointment.² Ambassador Huang welcomed Dr. Kissinger on Chinese soil and commented that he foresaw that Dr. Kissinger would be late. He noted that he had seen Dr. Kissinger at General DeGaulle's funeral and had almost said hello. Dr. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Chinese Embassy. Attached was a draft summary memorandum for Nixon and a July 30 short covering note by Lord. Kissinger indicated that he did not wish to forward the summary to Nixon. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 12.

² Kissinger was also meeting with DRV representatives in Paris. See *ibid.*, volume VII.

responded that he in turn had seen the Ambassador, but refrained from introducing himself because of the excitement it would have caused, particularly for the Soviet Ambassador. He said that he had pleasant memories of his trip to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that he had wanted to meet the Chinese Ambassador while in Paris so as to make arrangements for future contacts.

Ambassador Huang then presented a verbal message from his government which read as follows: "The Chinese Government agrees to an interim visit to China by Dr. Kissinger for the latter part of October. Owing to understandable reasons, it would not be appropriate for Mr. Bruce to come to China."

Ambassador Huang then said that he had another verbal message which stated that when Dr. Kissinger comes to China in the latter part of October, the special U.S. aircraft should take off directly from Alaska to land at the Shanghai airport. For further details, the Chinese would advise the U.S. concerning further contacts.

In response to Dr. Kissinger's query about why Shanghai was suggested Ambassador Huang replied that he could only transmit the message as he received it, and that this was what he had to say.

Dr. Kissinger said that he was sure that Prime Minister Chou En-lai remembered that it was his suggestion that there be an interim visit, and thus the United States had accepted *his* proposal. Dr. Kissinger had told the Prime Minister that Ambassador Bruce was the one man of our ambassadorial group in whom we had total confidence, and if Dr. Kissinger was not able to go to China, Ambassador Bruce would be able to speak for the President. He had explained to the Prime Minister at the time that Ambassador Bruce would have left the negotiations in Paris. In fact, he was leaving the next week. Dr. Kissinger understood the view of the Chinese government concerning this occasion, but it would be in the two countries' mutual interest if this were not a permanent view. For the United States hoped Ambassador Bruce could be used to maintain contact with the Chinese government on the occasions that Dr. Kissinger couldn't do so himself.

As for the technical side of the interim visit, General Walters would be in touch with Ambassador Huang, Dr. Kissinger continued. The U.S. would require specific information as to where the meetings would take place, who would participate, and the approximate size of the delegations on both sides, as well as the length of the visit. However, Dr. Kissinger added, there was plenty of time for these matters and they didn't have to be settled for several weeks. He did wish that Prime Minister Chou En-lai would read what he had told him about Ambassador Bruce, since it was important that the two sides keep contacts that don't become public.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had a couple of other matters to discuss. First, the U.S. was aware of the fact that the Chinese Nationalists were organizing and would intensify a campaign, together with other countries, against the meeting that has taken place in Peking and against the meeting that has been planned between the President and Chinese leaders. Part of this campaign was to describe Dr. Kissinger as a communist agent. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he could only say that the communists were not paying him very well. Ambassador Huang laughed and said that was ridiculous. Dr. Kissinger responded that it was of no concern to the Chinese and that it was his problem.

Dr. Kissinger stated that there was a second problem that could concern both countries. There was a systematic campaign to tell the press things that were allegedly discussed between Prime Minister Chou En-lai and himself in order to embarrass both sides. He wanted the Chinese to know that the only things which the U.S. had told the press were in his background, a copy of which he had given the Chinese, and anything else they read did not come from the United States Government.

Secondly, Dr. Kissinger said, the U.S. would continue to inform the Chinese of any conversations in which the PRC is mentioned that the U.S. might have with any other socialist country. And if anything should be said to the contrary, the Chinese could be sure that it was not true.

Finally, in any contact the U.S. Government would have with the press, it would reserve with the greatest restraint any commentary upon the PRC. The U.S. would consider it helpful, given the delicacy of the U.S.–Chinese relationship, if this were done on a reciprocal basis, but in any event the U.S. will do it. Ambassador Huang said this presented no problem on this side; it remained to be seen how the U.S. was able to do it. The Chinese would take care of their side.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that the American press was beside itself at this moment, particularly Mr. Joseph Alsop who was writing endless speculation on what happened in Peking. Ambassador Huang commented the Chinese had already read some of his articles. Dr. Kissinger said that none of the U.S. side had talked to Mr. Alsop, and that's what makes him angry, that and the fact that Dr. Kissinger had gone to Peking without his permission. It doesn't matter what the United States did, Mr. Alsop did not recognize the PRC. Ambassador Huang commented that other Americans have attitudes like him. Dr. Kissinger replied that this was a problem, that the U.S. had major opposition from right-wing groups. Ambassador Huang noted that this was one of the difficult problems for the U.S. Curiously enough, Dr. Kissinger said, it was best if the left wing were not encouraged to say too much by the Chinese. The best way to keep the right-wing groups under control was if the U.S. Government could assure them that its

policy was an independent one. Ambassador Huang responded that he was prepared to report to his government what Dr. Kissinger had told him. Dr. Kissinger said he was very grateful.

During some tea and pleasantries, Dr. Kissinger said that he would let Ambassador Huang know through General Walters when he was coming to town secretly. If Ambassador Huang had any messages for him, he could then let him know, and they could meet. Ambassador Huang agreed with this procedure, and the meeting then concluded.

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 27, 1971, 12:05–12:31 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

Dr. Kissinger's Discussions with Ambassador Shen on the President's Visit to Peking

After a brief exchange with Ambassador Shen about the cuisine in Peking and the weight he had put on there, Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted Ambassador Shen to know that nothing in his tenure in the White House had been more painful to him than what had occurred (the secrecy over Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking and the announcement of the President's visit). He was saying this not as a diplomat but as a genuine friend. There were no people who had deserved what had happened less than the ROC, because they were our loyal friends. What had happened had been brought into play by general necessities, and had nothing to do with Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that we were under no illusions as to what we were up against on the PRC side. He had told the President that in Moscow we were up against thugs, and that in Peking we were deal-

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, September–December 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to Kissinger's record of schedule, the meeting lasted from 12:05 to 12:31 p.m. (Ibid., Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) A 2-page memorandum of talking points, prepared by Holdridge on July 26, is *ibid*.

ing with fanatical maniacs; of the two, it was hard to tell which was worse. Certainly we were not beginning an era of love, but we may have to go on a line which was not parallel to one followed by the ROC which would require some wisdom on the part of all of us. But we would not betray old friends, or turn anyone over to communism to ease our problems.

Dr. Kissinger noted that he was being attacked all over for being a hard liner, but if his record (and that of the President) were looked at closely, it could be seen that every effective military program with respect to Taiwan was done during this Administration. We would stand by our friends. With respect to recent developments, we simply had to respond to other problems not connected with Taiwan, and had to do what we did. This didn't ease Ambassador Shen's problems, but he, Dr. Kissinger, wanted the Ambassador to know his sentiments, and to feel some of the mood and feelings on our side. He hoped that Ambassador Shen would keep this in mind.

Ambassador Shen said that he appreciated what Dr. Kissinger had said. In addition, assurances from the President would be helpful. Dr. Kissinger declared that assurances were cheap and that he wanted to express his sentiments in terms which would be more valuable than formal assurances.

Ambassador Shen asked if Dr. Kissinger could speak about some of the things which he had discussed with the Chinese in Peking, for example the question of "two Chinas" and the U.S. position on China's Security Council seat. Dr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Shen that the PRC representatives had stated their full position on Taiwan's being a province of China, a position which Ambassador Shen must have known from the newspapers. We took the position which we had always taken, and had said that we would not oppose any peaceful solution which the ROC and the PRC worked out; we had also said that we had a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC and hoped that they wouldn't use force against Taiwan.

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that with respect to the UN issue, we knew that they would oppose our position, and we had not gone into it because it was being handled separately. The question of the Security Council seat simply did not come up one way or another—they simply wanted the whole thing, which we had said was not possible. There was no separate discussion about their getting the Security Council seat, and of the ROC staying in the General Assembly. So contrary to what Ambassador Shen would have read in the newspapers, there were no deals made about Formosa, and also contrary to what the newspapers had said, we didn't go to them for the meetings, that is, take the initiative. This was not a case of our going to them and having them say that we had to give up Taiwan and the Security Council

seat. There were no conditions, and what Secretary Rogers had told Ambassador Shen about the talks in Peking was essentially what the situation had been.²

Ambassador Shen noted that he had just had a session the previous day with Secretary Rogers, together with his colleague on the ROC UN delegation in New York, Ambassador Liu.³ This had been a very useful discussion. Dr. Kissinger said his judgment was that if we were to take the position Secretary Rogers had discussed with Ambassador Shen, the PRC would be violently opposed. They would stick for nothing less than their getting the entire China seat. The present formula which the Secretary had discussed with Ambassador Shen was never discussed in Peking, much less accepted by them. He again expressed the guess that the PRC would oppose our position.

Ambassador Shen asked, did the discussions in Peking therefore focus on the President's trip? Dr. Kissinger replied affirmatively, adding that things were in a very preliminary state. We had not reached any substantive points, and rather were exploring technical details. Ambassador Shen wondered if the date and the month for the visit had been set, to which Dr. Kissinger replied "no." He had told them that we might make a suggestion sometime in September. Of course they could make one of their own at any time. The visit itself, though, would probably be considerably later. Dr. Kissinger said that off the top of his head, the very earliest date was December, but he considered that it probably could not be as early as that. We did not want to sit in Peking and have them hold us up with a whole series of propositions; we wanted to know what they would want before going there.

Ambassador Shen asked, would the ROC be kept informed about these arrangements, as was the case for the Warsaw talks? Dr. Kissinger replied that we would certainly try to do so—who would this information go to in the ROC? Ambassador Shen stated that only President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo would be informed. Dr. Kissinger declared that on that basis, we could do it. Ambassador Shen explained that he had a private channel to President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo via the Foreign Ministry: the Deputy Foreign Minister.

Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger for his impressions of how Chou En-lai had looked—was he in good shape? Dr. Kissinger said that Chou En-lai had seemed to be in very good shape, and had impressed him as being very intelligent.

² See footnote 2, Document 145.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 382. Rogers was attempting to obtain ROC support for the U.S. position that would oppose the expulsion of the ROC, while accepting the admittance of the PRC to the United Nations.

Ambassador Shen recalled that he had met Chou during the war years in Hankow and Chungking. He agreed that Chou was a very intelligent person. He went on to ask if Chou En-lai had appeared to be worried about the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger observed that he guessed relations with the Soviets had been on Chou's mind. Of course, the Chinese had not survived for three thousand years as an independent people by telling foreigners what they thought. This reminded Dr. Kissinger of a story concerning a Westerner who had been called to a police station for some reason in a provincial Chinese village. A Chinese bystander, seeing the Westerner, had wondered if he was a foreigner from the next province. Another villager had said, "no, he was a foreigner from the North." Finally, a third villager had said that the Westerner was a *foreign* foreigner. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Shen where he was from. Ambassador Shen said that his home was Shanghai, on the coast.

Dr. Kissinger reverted to the subject of the Soviet Union, saying that Ambassador Shen must know that the question of the various great powers surrounding the PRC was no doubt of some concern to them. Ambassador Shen then wondered what, in Dr. Kissinger's opinion, Chou En-lai hoped to get out of the President's visit? Dr. Kissinger gave as his personal evaluation, since the Chinese hadn't told him this, that they basically believed the Taiwan problem was an historical one and not a military one which would settle itself over a period of years, and were more concerned over great power relationships, that is, over not being carved up. They were more interested in the US in this context than they were with respect to Taiwan and the US relationship with it. What did Ambassador Shen think?

Ambassador Shen remarked that he knew the people in the PRC were worried about the Soviets and Japanese, but not about the U.S. They saw that the U.S. was withdrawing from the Far East, although they didn't know if this was partial or total. Dr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that it was not going to be total. Continuing, Ambassador Shen said that those in Peking knew that the U.S. had no designs against them. The U.S. message had gotten through, and they knew that they had more serious problems with the Soviet Union and Japan. Dr. Kissinger commented that this was his analysis, too. Ambassador Shen surmised that the people in Peking also hoped to improve their position with respect to the Soviet Union via the U.S. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he did not know what they wanted vis-à-vis the Russians, but he personally believed that we should keep cool on this and see where we were going.

Referring again to the recent events, Ambassador Shen stated that the initial shock in Taiwan had been terrific. Dr. Kissinger should understand, though, that the official reaction had been quite restrained. Dr.

Kissinger declared that this had been a tough thing for the ROC, but Ambassador Shen should believe that it had been tough for us, too. They hadn't had an American President before who liked Taiwan so much as our present President. As for himself, although he had never been to Taiwan, his friendships with senior officials there were very close.

Ambassador Shen expressed the view that the things discussed during the President's visit would raise more serious problems in Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger assumed that the President would restate the U.S. position on Taiwan again, but the Ambassador could be assured that there would be no concessions. Ambassador Shen wondered if this, then would spoil the visit, to which Dr. Kissinger replied that he doubted it. Ambassador Shen thought that the Chinese in Peking felt that time would take care of the issue.

Dr. Kissinger said that time was not on their side—we were not going to Peking to turn Taiwan over to them, and if they didn't understand this, then human language was not capable of containing it.

Ambassador Shen noted that Huang Hua, the new PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, had been four or five classes ahead of him in Yenching University in Peking. Was he the man with whom Dr. Kissinger would deal in arranging the visit? Dr. Kissinger replied that he didn't want to discuss this point. However, Ambassador Shen was Chinese enough to know that the most obvious place is not always the one picked.

Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Shen discussed briefly Chou En-lai's origin and educational background. Chou En-lai had been born in Anhui Province, but considered himself as being from Tientsin, where he has been educated. He was a graduate of Nankai University in Tientsin.

In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger observed that one thing had struck him while in Peking—even 25 years of communism had not been able to destroy the elegant Chinese mannerisms. Perhaps these had been better before, but they were still good.

153. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

154. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

A New China Policy and the Search for Peace in Asia

The President's continuing efforts to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, most recently evinced by his dramatic announcement of July 15th, have won wide support at home and abroad. The Department of Defense is ready to assist in every possible way in these efforts of great significance to the peace and security of Asia and the world community.

To permit the Department of Defense to provide the most effective support of the President's efforts, we must be cognizant of, and participate in, the planning concerning politico-military matters of major concern to this Department.

Because of the continual emphasis in the various media of official expression in the People's Republic of China on United States military deployments in East Asia as a manifestation of hostility toward the PRC, it is anticipated that this subject will be of central concern in considerations affecting normalization of relations between the US and the PRC. Such matters as the size and nature of our future military presence on Taiwan, adjustments in our political and military relationships with other nations in Asia (particularly Japan), alternative means for accomplishing essential military functions which adjustments in our strategic posture may require, reassessment of certain aspects of the Military Assistance Program for Taiwan, and the requirement for training of additional China specialists in the Services are among the areas of potential concern. Timely and adequate consideration of these and related matters, not only by this Department but also by all agencies

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Colonel Paul Murray (ISA). An early draft was returned to ISA on July 23, as Laird wanted a more explicit and definitive memorandum. (Memorandum from Pursley to Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Armistead I. Selden, Jr.; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 74 0115, China, Rep. of, 1971, 000.1) The final draft was forwarded to Laird's office on August 3. (Memorandum from Selden to Laird; *ibid.*) According to a memorandum for the record prepared by the NSC staff, Kissinger, at a meeting on July 28, gave a brief overview of his meetings in the PRC to Laird, Pursley, and Admiral Murphy. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Kissinger, Sec. Laird, Gen. Pursley, Adm. Murphy and Gen. A. Haig, July 28, 1971)

and individuals involved in planning our future course in Asia, appears essential to the President's efforts to lessen tensions and normalize relations between ourselves and the People's Republic of China.

In anticipation of some of the major concerns which must be addressed, I have taken the following steps to survey Defense assets, analyze our current strategic posture, prepare for certain adjustments that may be required in this posture, and assure this Department's responsiveness to possible future requirements:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to provide their views concerning, first, the estimated impact on US security interests of the removal of the US military presence from Taiwan and second, the alternative means for providing for the essential functions relating to US and allied theater posture in the event such military presence was removed from Taiwan. I expect to receive and analyze the Chiefs' response shortly.

2. In view of the significance of certain intelligence functions performed on Taiwan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also been asked to include this dimension in their assessment.

3. The Defense Intelligence Agency has been directed to inventory language capabilities and China expertise in the Services in anticipation of expanded requirements for qualified personnel.

4. We are undertaking a reassessment of certain aspects of the Military Assistance Program for Taiwan, as well as addressing a possible requirement for SIOP-related adjustments.

In addition to such *anticipatory* concerns and others of a *reactive* nature in response to specific requirements which may be levied on the Department as planning proceeds, I feel strongly that the Department of Defense has major participatory interests in support of the President's undertaking. For instance, I believe that recent developments have added to the importance of securing a favorable resolution of the future status of the Micronesian Trust Territories and lend a new urgency to the next round of negotiations on this subject.

Most important in the near time-frame, of course, is the effect on Southeast Asia. We must look not only at the feasibility of some form of diplomatic breakthrough in Laos, but also at the possibility of significant progress in Paris or elsewhere regarding Indochina as a whole. We may also wish to consider urging Saigon to take new initiatives (trade, mail, etc.) to normalize contacts between the two Vietnams.

Finally, my just-concluded trip gave me the opportunity to see the concern of Japanese leaders that they will be left behind or by-passed by US-PRC negotiations. I remain convinced that maintenance of a relationship of trust and cooperation between our country and Japan is of the utmost importance, requiring full, frank, and timely discussions on a continuing basis. The possible removal of the US military presence from Taiwan makes our Japanese bases, especially on Okinawa, almost indispensable.

These are some of the concerns of the Department of Defense as the President addresses the challenge of normalizing our relationship with the People's Republic of China. I urge that the President call on the Department for the support we stand ready to provide in any manner most useful to him.²

Mel Laird

² Froebe forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on August 28 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger's reply, drafted by Froebe on September 10, reads in full: "I have noted the Department of Defense's various points of interest described in your memorandum of August 13 regarding our planning of U.S. efforts to improve relations with the People's Republic of China. I appreciate very much your offer of the Department's support as we move forward toward normalizing relations with Peking. I assure you that the Department of Defense will be kept apprised of and consulted on these matters whenever appropriate." (Ibid., Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)

155. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

My August 16 Meeting With the Chinese Ambassador in Paris

I saw the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, before my meeting with the North Vietnamese, and we covered a good deal of ground in our session which lasted one and three-quarters hours.² Ambassador Huang was much more expansive than in our first encounter

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed is the 11-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting held in the PRC Embassy in Paris on August 16 from 9:05 to 10:45 a.m. It was attended by Ambassador Huang Chen, First Secretary Tsao Kuei Sheng, Secretary to the Ambassador Wei Tung, Kissinger, Lord, and Walters. The meeting was arranged through Walters during his August 9 meeting with the PRC Ambassador to France. Haig's August 8 instructions to Walters, and Walters' report on the meeting are *ibid.*, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 15, 16, and 17.

when he was rather stiff though friendly. His performance this time may have been due in part to our prior notification to the PRC of our cool reply to the Soviet Union's proposal for a five power nuclear conference, which the Chinese have also rejected. Following are the highlights of my meeting with the Ambassador.

Your Trip to China

—After we discussed several other subjects, I proposed February 21, 1972, or March 16, 1972 (with a slight preference for the former), as a starting date for your visit to China of up to seven days. I said that we would, of course, leave it up to the PRC to select a date.³

—As for my interim visit, Ambassador Huang led off our meeting with an oral message which specified that Chou En-lai would personally conduct the discussions during my visit to Peking; said that I would land in Shanghai so as to pick up a Chinese navigator to take us to Peking; and asked us for our views as to agenda and procedures.

—I replied that I envisaged a visit of up to four days and suggested that it begin October 18–20, because I had to be in Washington for Tito's October 28 visit. I said we would make a specific proposal about the agenda once the time was set, and asked for their views on when we should publicly announce this interim trip.

Our Relations with the Soviet Union

—I told the Ambassador that we had made good progress and were near agreement with the Soviet Union in the negotiations on accidental nuclear war and Berlin. I outlined the major provisions of the accidental war agreement, stressed that we had kept out all references to third countries, and said that we were prepared to sign a similar agreement with the PRC.

—As a result of this progress, and as I had foreshadowed to Prime Minister Chou, there was now a good possibility that you will meet with the Soviet leaders. I reaffirmed that this would take place *after*

³ The recommendations for the trip were the result of discussions among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman on August 11. The proposed dates and length of the trip were determined by Republican presidential primaries scheduled for early 1972, the Soviet summit, and the expectation that the time needed for translation would slow the talks. The trip to the USSR was an important consideration. Nixon agreed with Kissinger's statement that "so what I [Kissinger] think I ought to do is to tell their Ambassador in Paris on Monday that I don't know anything specific, but as negotiations develop and succeed, we will in be in no position then to refuse the invitation, but we can put [it] after Peking and we intend to put it after Peking." Kissinger continued: "So, the only part of the game plan it changes is that instead of holding the Peking date, we'll agree on that now, but not announce it until I come back." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, August 11, 1971, 9:10–11:40 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 561–4)

your Peking visit and said that we would give the PRC a week's advance notice of any public announcement.

—I suggested that the Soviet Union's strategy was to outmaneuver the Chinese, seeming to come closer to us because they could offer more than the Chinese. I said that we understood this strategy, and would not let it affect our new policy toward the PRC. I added that you would discuss our Soviet relations when you were in Peking and that we would be meticulous in keeping the Chinese informed of subjects which concerned them.⁴

South Asia

—I outlined our policy toward the South Asian continent and stressed that we were attempting to separate the problems of refugees and economic assistance where we wanted to help, from the political issues, specifically the question of East Pakistan.

—I emphasized that we face a very difficult domestic situation but that we would refuse to humiliate Pakistan and would strongly discourage others from attempting to do so. While we recognize that India had a problem with refugees, we would not be a party to its attempts to exploit this situation to settle Indian scores with Pakistan.

—I explained the up-coming Williams mission to coordinate relief and consult with Pakistan to develop a program which will allow a maximum number of refugees to return home and thus deprive India of any pretext for intervention.

—I said that we had told India that we would cut off economic aid if it started military action.

—Ambassador Huang, clearly acting on instructions, said that India in its efforts to create Bangla Desh "is obviously interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan and is carrying out subversive actions."

⁴ After receiving instructions from Haig on August 5, Walters met with Huang Chen on the morning of August 6 (Paris time) and presented the following message: "The President wishes to call the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the following matters: The U.S. Government has not replied formally to the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers. It is transmitting an oral communication to the Soviet Foreign Ministry through the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow along these lines. The subject of nuclear disarmament is worthy of serious consideration. A conference would require careful preparation and agreement among the five powers as to what subjects were feasible for discussion. The views of non-nuclear states should be considered. All five powers must be willing to attend. It is not anticipated that a formal reply will be made." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 13 and 14.) A New China News Agency (*Hsinhua*) release, August 7, contained a statement from the PRC Government rejecting the Soviet proposal. (Printed in *Beijing Review*, August 13, 1971, p. 5)

—I asked Huang to use China's influence with Pakistan to keep it from starting military action. I suggested to Peking that it encourage Pakistan to be more imaginative politically and psychologically so as to allow the return of the refugees.

—I told Huang that we would understand the furnishing of military equipment by the PRC to Pakistan (they are doing it anyway).

—I repeated that we would do nothing to embarrass Pakistan publicly and that we welcomed any views that the PRC might have on this situation.

Other Subjects

—I told Huang that you would see the Emperor of Japan during his re-fueling stop in Anchorage on September 26, and that this was pre-empting an official visit by him or by you to Japan. In addition, I said that Prime Minister Gandhi had accepted your invitation, extended in April, to visit the U.S. starting November 9, with her acceptance perhaps designed to balance off the effects of the Soviet/India Treaty of Friendship.

—Ambassador Huang said that the PRC stood by the agreement we reached in Peking that neither side had an interest in reopening the Warsaw talks. This channel, in Peking's view, would continue to exist in name only, being used perhaps for transmittal of bureaucratic documents. This Chinese position, which I said exactly matched our understanding, was in response to a message we had sent Peking last week. We had noted that Tad Szulc's interview of PRC Ambassador Huang Hua in Ottawa had suggested the re-opening of these Warsaw talks. (It appears that Huang Hua's position was inaccurately conveyed by Szulc.)⁵

—I gave to the Ambassador for his transmittal a courtesy note to Huang Hua which gives him my telephone numbers in case of emergency, while making clear that Paris remained the primary channel and that this was strictly a contingency in case we could not contact the Chinese in Paris quickly.⁶

⁵ Szulc met with Huang Hua in Ottawa on August 4. Green and Robert McCloskey met with Szulc the next day. Szulc reported to them that Huang Hua thought that the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw would continue. On August 6 Rogers forwarded Green's report on this conversation to Nixon and sent a copy to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers Unlabeled Folder) On August 9 Walters delivered a message to the PRC representatives in Paris that reads in part: "The difficulty of instructing Ambassadors and keeping the contacts secret and the danger of confusion of channels would make reopening of the Warsaw channel inadvisable prior to the President's trip." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

⁶ Attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 18.

Comment

This was a useful session. We are building a solid record of keeping the Chinese informed on all significant subjects of concern to them, which gives them an additional stake in nurturing our new relationship.⁷ We laid out our South Asia policy and made clear that we are not colluding against their ally. We have now foreshadowed the potentially unpleasant combination of a Moscow Summit and visits by the Emperor of Japan and Prime Minister Gandhi in a way that should make these events at the same time palatable and a reminder that we are not so eager with the Chinese that we will shy away from those countries which they dislike. The Chinese in turn were meticulous in their plans for my interim visit and their views on the Warsaw talks.

⁷ During his August 11 meeting with Kissinger and Haldeman, Nixon summed up his approach to developing relations with the PRC and other nations:

"They [the Department of State leaders] do not think big. Henry is, I mean, he's probably a little off the wall, and I know that in these NSC meetings, I am too at times. The earlier ones we've had. Henry and I would take, we both talk about long-range strategy and philosophy and so forth. And Bill gets very impatient with this philosophy. In all honesty, what are we going to do, he says. He doesn't understand that you must not talk about what you're going to do outside of a framework of philosophy. You've got to talk philosophy; you've got to be a great mosaic and you put in the pieces. And State is not thinking in mosaic terms. The Communists do. The Chinese do, the Russian do. We must. The British used to. They don't anymore, because they aren't a power any more. And the British are only thinking about how much they're going to get and whether or not whipped cream goes with their strawberries, going to be higher or less and that sort of thing. They're down to the piddling little goddamn things which are not worthy of a parliament. But that's all they've got to talk about. But we've got big things to talk about, and we're going to play it. But on Bill, we'll handle it well." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, August 11, 1971, 9:10–11:40 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 561–4)

156. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

September 13 meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris²

I met with Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, for almost two hours on September 13 before my other session, primarily to lay the groundwork for your trip to Peking and my interim visit. This meeting, the third that we have had, was once again extremely cordial.

Announcement of Trips

The Ambassador read an oral note from Peking, the full text of which is attached at Tab A.³ In response to our messages of August 16 and September 1 the Chinese made the following points:⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² According to the memorandum of conversation, the meeting was held from 8:45–10:40 a.m. at the PRC Embassy in Paris. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 19. Attendees were identical to the August 16 meeting in Paris; see Document 155.

³ Attached but not printed. The note's contents are essentially recounted in the following three paragraphs. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 20.

⁴ Apparent reference to the August 16 meeting in Paris. On September 1 Walters met with PRC Ambassador Huang Chen. Based on instructions received from Haig on August 31, Walters informed the Chinese that an Accidental War Agreement would be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on September 20 and that the United States hoped to announce Kissinger's and Nixon's upcoming trips to the PRC on September 20, 21, or 22. Walters also explained that the United States wanted to make these announcements prior to the visits of the Japanese Emperor who was scheduled to meet Nixon in Alaska on September 26 and other state visits in late September. On September 3 Walters and the Chinese met again, and Walters passed on a message concerning future negotiations with the Soviets regarding incidents at sea. Haig's instructions and Walters' reports on these meetings are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 19–21.

—They propose a four-day visit to Peking to make concrete arrangements for your trip. This should begin on October 20 (Peking time). I accepted this as it matched our proposals for length and timing.⁵

—The Chinese proposed announcing my visit on October 14. I made clear why we had suggested September 21 or 22: in addition to making the necessary arrangements for my travel, we preferred to announce my trip before Gromyko came to the U.S. on his annual visit to the UN. I explained that we did not want our announcement with the Chinese to look like a reaction to Gromyko's visit, during which the Soviets might well pin down your trip to Moscow, now that the conditions for it have been met in various negotiations. I said that I would have to check with you regarding the October 14 date for the announcement and asked them to let us know if they had any different views (i.e. moving it up) as a result of this discussion.

—The Chinese proposed that the date of your trip be fixed during my visit rather than being included in the October announcement. I did not dispute this, but pointed out that given the complexity of your schedule we would want to know if they had any date in mind other than the two we had given them (February 21 and March 16); that it would be very difficult to arrange another completely different date; and that we would hold open the two alternatives we had suggested pending my trip to Peking. The Ambassador thought that this problem could be easily solved during my visit.

—I said that we would respond to the Chinese proposals and suggested text for an announcement within the next few days.

—*Comment.* I believe the Chinese think that setting a date now for your trip would have overtones of collusion. They prefer to have a date fixed as a result of my trip so that they can say it was for that purpose. I see no problem in waiting until late October and giving the interim trip a concrete outcome. Thus I think we can accept the text of the proposed Chinese announcement.

⁵ On September 13 Haig instructed Walters to inform the PRC that the 4-day visit beginning October 20 and the Chinese version of the trip announcement were acceptable, but that the United States hoped the announcement would be made on September 23, 24, or October 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) The Chinese informed Walters on September 22 that the announcement would be made on October 5 because "the United States will, around September 23, put forward to the United Nations General Assembly its draft resolution designed to create 'Two Chinas' which the Chinese Government firmly opposes." (Attachment to Walters' memorandum for record, September 23; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 24 and 25. On September 22 Bush submitted the U.S. draft resolution for consideration by the General Assembly. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 18, 1971, p. 425–427) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. V, Document 412.

From their point of view a late date for the announcement puts it beyond their national day (October 1) and that of the Nationalists (October 10), and cuts down on the period of speculation. They are, of course, unaware of our October 12 announcement.⁶ We have complex scheduling problems, and I want to discuss personally with you our response to the proposed date of October 14.

Preparations for Peking Trips

In order to get the Chinese to do advance thinking, to pave the way for my trip, and to begin to shape a successful outcome for your trip, I gave the Chinese some technical questions and substantive suggestions.

—On the technical side, I explained and handed over lists of questions which I had gone over with Bob Haldeman and a few others on the White House Staff. I suggested that my party would number about 10 people, both substantive and technical. I explained the responsibilities of each of the latter (advance man, press, White House Communications Agency, Secret Service). I said we were prepared to begin the technical advance work later, but it was preferable to get going on this during my visit. I added that we believed that a minimum of 100 to 150 press were needed for your trip and asked for their views both as to minimum and maximum numbers. They seemed clearly taken aback even by the minimum number. For this reason I did not raise the issue of the ground station.⁷

—I outlined the topics that the Prime Minister and I should cover concerning your visit, including: the length (up to seven days); itinerary (Peking and perhaps two other stops); party composition (small working group); and agenda (subjects that Chou and I covered plus more technical issues like trade and exchange programs). I said that private meetings between Chou and me would be necessary for particularly sensitive subjects and that similarly you would want private sessions during your visit.

—Among the subjects Chou and I should discuss are the concrete results that could emerge from your trip. I gave as illustrations periodic special envoys between our two countries; a return visit by Chou to the U.S.; agreements we have already made with the Soviet Union such as accidental war and hot line communications; and various types of cultural, scientific, and other exchange programs.

—The Ambassador commented that we certainly had thought of everything concerning these trips, a specific indication of the fact that they seem genuinely impressed by our meticulousness.

⁶ At a press conference on October 12, the President announced plans for a Soviet-American summit in May 1972. (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1, 1971, p. 473)

⁷ Apparent reference to communications equipment required for Nixon's visit.

Other Topics

—*Romania*. I summarized our policy that I had outlined to the Romanian Ambassador and that you would reaffirm personally to him: that the U.S. has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania, that we would not contribute to a collusion that would allow another great power to infringe on these principles, and that we would make clear that pressures for military action are not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.

—*Pakistan*. I briefly indicated the new assistance we were contemplating for Pakistan, i.e. arranging for debt relief of \$75 million and providing 75 percent of the \$250–300 million that would be needed for relief in East Pakistan.

—*Taiwan*. In view of intense press speculation (in particular concerning the UN question), I said that we stood by all that I had said on this issue to Chou when I was in Peking.

—*Kissinger Trip to Japan*. I noted that the Japanese press speculation of my visiting Japan was wrong and that I had no such plans.

157. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Indications of Possible Tense Situation in Communist China and Implications for your Visit

Within the last ten days we have received a number of indicators pointing to a possible tense situation in Communist China.² This situation could relate either to Chinese relations with the USSR, since there have been some unusual [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—General, July–October 1971. Top Secret; Umbra; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² See *ibid.*, Boxes 35 and 36, President's Daily Briefs, September 1971. The Department of State was also concerned and sent a telegram to all diplomatic posts requesting information on developments in the PRC. (Telegram 175874, September 24; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM)

on Soviet side of the border, or too some kind of a political problem in China affecting the top leadership. The key indicators are:

—Since September 12 there has been a suspension of almost all Chinese military aircraft flight activity. The only military flights have consisted of a few naval bomber missions, defensive fighter reactions in the Taiwan Strait area to Republic of China flights, and flights by two military transports, one carrying a Korean press delegation.

—Also since September 12, the members of the top Chinese military hierarchy have not appeared in public. (They could have been witnessing China's first ICBM test which took place on September 10, though; Government leaders such as Chou En-lai and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei have been noted carrying out their usual activities.)

—Agence France Presse reported on September 21 in an item originating in Peking that the traditional October 1 National Day parade has been cancelled this year.

—The AFP report has been backed up [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] saying that National Day observances all over China would not be held "because of a sudden change with respect to a certain situation had occurred" and "the whole country is now carrying out urgent war preparation."

These indicators occur against a backdrop of unusual [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on the Soviet side of the border. The Soviets have had a nationwide military exercise underway since September 15 involving, among other things, [*4 lines of source text not declassified*]. This came at the time of our Cambodian operation, and could have related to advance Chinese notice to the public that an important announcement was to be made by Mao Tse-tung. Mao in fact did issue a statement at that time extolling the revolutionary situation in Indo-China, but the Soviets could have assumed that the Chinese were about to take some form of military action.

Alternative Explanation

There are a number of alternative explanations which can account for the indicators outlined above. These are:

—The Chinese genuinely fear that a war with the USSR may develop. Although the date of the Chinese air stand-down and the beginning of the Soviet military exercise do not coincide, the Chinese may have had some indications [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] involving units along the border that something was about to begin. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] Fear of a Soviet attack could have caused the Chinese to take precautionary military moves and to call off the National Day parade.

—The situation is related in some way to domestic Chinese political considerations. Previous stand-downs of military flights were ordered during such periods in the Cultural Revolution as the fighting which occurred between two military factions in the city of Wuhan in July 1967. Presumably the Chinese wanted to be able to sort out the location and activities of their air units. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] there are some signs that the radical leadership faction within the

Party which has opposed the more moderate course of people such as Chou En-lai has not been completely defeated. The radicals could have used the news of your visit to mobilize a counterattack against the predominant leadership in Peking.

—Mao Tse-tung is dead or is seriously ill. Since he would be expected to be present at the October 1 National Day ceremonies, his death or incapacitation could account for the cancellation of the parade. On the other hand, except for a few reports that posters of Mao are being taken down (something which I believe has been going on anyway in Peking in order to return to a more normal atmosphere), there is nothing to suggest that anything has happened to Mao. He has not appeared publicly recently, but he has met such high-ranking visitors as Burma's Ne Win within the last month or so.

—Conceivably, Mao's chosen successor, Lin Piao, may be ill or dead. He, too, would be expected to appear at the National Day parade, and his inability to do so might cause the parade's cancellation. With Lin Piao out of the picture, there might be some problems among the military in choosing his successor as China's most senior military leader.³

—Another factor in the cancellation of the parade might be the regime's desire not to allow the thousands of people, or for that matter foreign visitors, to be in Peking during a crisis. If radical elements are attempting to stage a comeback, they might count on elements within the crowd to support them. Of, if a war situation is developing, the regime would not want foreign visitors in Peking.

Implications for Your Trip

The various interpretations which would be placed on events as we know them up to now and their implications for your planned trip are:

—*The PRC is really worried about a Soviet attack.* This would in part explain why they have wanted to keep the visit announcement so close to the event itself. This thesis also is supported by the fact that they gave so much advance notice of the stand-down of the October 1 events. If this turns out to be the real explanation, I do not believe that it will adversely affect your initiative; indeed it might help and make the trip more, not less, likely as a counter to Soviet pressure.

—*Mao has died.* In this event there are two possibilities. If Mao did not really run the PRC in recent months and Chou did and was able to consolidate his power, then the trip most certainly would be on. If

³ By early November, U.S. officials confirmed that Lin Biao had died in an airplane crash in Mongolia on September 12, as reported in Holdridge's November 6 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. II, November–December 1971) Another report is telegram 7477 from the Consulate in Hong Kong, November 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM) On November 12 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms that reads as follows: "The President has directed that there should be no comments by U.S. Government officials, whether on a background basis or otherwise to the press or public concerning internal political developments in the People's Republic of China, notably the apparent purge of Lin Piao." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 285, Department of State, Vol. XIII)

Chou did not hold the power or was unable to consolidate it, then the odds are strongly against the trip. If the problem is the demise of Lin Piao, but leaving Mao and Chou in power, your trip should not be affected.

—*A revolutionary group has taken power.* If this has happened, anti-Soviet hostility would not be mitigated but the coming to power of such a group would certainly be accompanied by a resurgence of isolationism and anti-Americanism. China would turn inward again and be set back immeasurably. In these circumstances the trip would certainly be off.

—*Mao could have been taking over power again after having been pushed out as he did once before.* This possibility seems less likely but if it turns out to be the situation, I believe they would want the trip to go forward as an evidence of strength and vindication of Mao's policy.

—*We could be seeing the completion of a purge of anti-Chou people* undertaken to hold the line within the power structure for your visit. If so, the visit would certainly go forward.

Note: A late AFP report from Paris dated September 22 quotes the PRC Embassy there as declaring that Mao Tse-tung is in excellent health. The Embassy added that the cancellation of the National Day parade "is a very normal thing and is due only to a decision to change the way of celebrating the national holiday." The planned visit of a PRC Government delegation to France will proceed as planned.⁴

⁴ On September 24 Kissinger and the President discussed the possibility that internal conflicts in the PRC might prevent the October visit. Kissinger said: "I don't exclude, I think there's a ten percent chance, but it isn't impossible, that the Chinese may want to get the visit, cancel the visit somehow or another, and that they'll want me there, you know, to have a pretext for doing it, saying we couldn't agree. I think there's a very, there's almost no chance of their doing that." After further discussion, Nixon decided: "We'd just be stoic about it. What the hell, if it happens, it happens. The Russians may screw us on theirs." Nixon also asked Kissinger about the parade's cancellation. Kissinger replied, "Mysterious. I have absolutely no way of knowing. But I think Chou En-lai is on top, whatever else is happening. And they have given a briefing, in Hong Kong, for example, at that Communist bank. They gave a briefing and one question was if Mao has died, would the President's visit still take place? The answer was Mao is alive, but even if he should die, the President's visit would take place, since it is in the interests of world peace, and the invitation was extended by the Chinese Government and not by any individual. So that's the party line that they've put out there. They may be purging Madame Mao. They are definitely attacking what they call the May 16th group, the extreme right wingers, left wingers, whatever you call them in that context." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, September 28, 1971, 5:51–6:42 p.m. Oval Office, Conversation No. 579–15) In a September 24 memorandum to Kissinger, Walters also expressed concern that the PRC might break off talks with the United States (Ibid., NSC Files, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 26.

158. Message From the United States Government to the People's Republic of China Government¹

Washington, undated.

1. As agreed by the Chinese side the U.S. will release the announcement of Dr. Kissinger's return visit at the White House on October 5, 1000 Washington time. There will be no press conference but a few technical background questions will have to be answered. It would be very desirable to have the Chinese views about the composition of the American group by then. The transcript of the background press briefing will be transmitted to the Chinese side immediately after the briefing is given.

2. While detailed arrangements and agenda can be left until Dr. Kissinger's arrival, it is important for the Chinese side to understand that the effectiveness of the discussions depends on their being conducted along the lines Dr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Huang on September 13: restricted meetings conducted by Dr. Kissinger and one aide on the U.S. side; broader meetings for more general expositions and subsidiary political issues; and technical discussions. The composition of the Chinese group for each meeting is of course entirely up to the Chinese side.

3. As for the discussions during President Nixon's visit to China, the President fully stands behind the announcement of July 15 as well as the conversation between President Chou En-lai and Dr. Kissinger. This was reaffirmed in the U.S. oral note presented July 19; in President Nixon's press conference of August 4; and in President Nixon's answer to a question at the Economic Club of Detroit on September 23: "What I am trying to do is open a dialogue and move towards more

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. On September 28 Kissinger gave the message to Walters who was in Washington, along with instructions to inform the PRC on September 29 that he would have another message on October 1 detailing the results of the Kissinger–Gromyko talks. Walters delivered this message orally on October 2, then passed along the short overview of the talks with Gromyko and made further technical arrangements for Kissinger's trip to the PRC. (Instructions to Walters, September 28, and Walters' memoranda for record, September 30 and October 4; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Documents 27–29. Based on instructions that he received on October 9, Walters met with the Chinese on that date and relayed a joint Soviet-American statement slated for public release on October 12. Walters also informed the PRC representatives in Paris that they were the first country to be notified of the Soviet-American summit. (Instructions to Walters, October 9, and Walters' memorandum for record, October 10; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) Further meetings were held on October 13, 14, 15, and 16 to prepare for Kissinger's visit. (Walters' memoranda for record; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Documents 30–35.

normal relations.” Dr. Kissinger on September 13 indicated to Ambassador Huang that the agenda of his July meeting with Prime Minister Chou En-lai could serve as the basic agenda for President Nixon’s visit as well. Premier Minister Chou En-lai will remember that Dr. Kissinger was explicit about what was and what was not possible, and in what time frame. The President affirms these understandings once again. At the same time, certain subsidiary measures are desirable, not as a substitute for the main agenda but to contribute to a climate in which the principal objectives can be realized. This is not a diversion, but rather constitutes an attempt to facilitate the progress in Chinese-U.S. relations which many have an interest in preventing. For its part, the U.S. side stresses that the improvement of Chinese-U.S. relations is a cardinal element of President Nixon’s foreign policy which will be carried out energetically and in good faith. Progress requires a degree of mutual confidence.

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 15, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

James Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China
Henry Chen, Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT

Questions from the Chinese Ambassador Concerning Mr. Kissinger’s Visit to Peking and the Situation in the UN

The conversation began with Mr. Kissinger explaining to Ambassador Shen the itinerary which Mr. Kissinger and his party would follow from Washington beginning October 16—Hawaii, for a little rest and a review with the technical staff of matters of interest to them, then Guam, followed by Shanghai and Peking. Ambassador Shen

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. According to an October 21 covering memorandum from Froebe, Kissinger did not want the memorandum of conversation distributed outside the NSC. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office from 4:33 to 5 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellaneous, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

commented that Shanghai was his home town, and that Mr. Kissinger should say, “hello.”

Mr. Kissinger said he knew how painful an event this trip was for the Ambassador, though the Ambassador must have known that the second visit was an inevitable consequence of the first. When Ambassador Shen asked if Mr. Kissinger could say anything about the trip which had not been mentioned in the press, Mr. Kissinger assured him that there was much less in it than met the eye. This was an abnormal situation, otherwise Mr. Kissinger wouldn't have dreamed of going himself. The things which had to be settled were the agenda items, the technical arrangements, and the date for the President's visit. He would see Ambassador Shen after his return, and would tell the Ambassador about the trip then. He was quite sure, though, that there would be nothing much to tell. The Chinese Communists would probably raise the Taiwan question, in fact it would be incredible if they did not, but we would not change our position and there would be no concessions with respect to Taiwan. We could not prevent them from telling us their position and would hear them out, but whatever they said would not affect our position. Taiwan was not on the agenda.

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger said that he was certain that when the Chinese Communists talked about normalization, getting control of Taiwan was what was on their minds. However, Ambassador Shen could be sure that there was no change in our position, there would be no withdrawal, no recognition of the People's Republic of China, and so forth. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that he would be amazed if Taiwan were not raised by the Communists even though it was not on the agenda for this trip—he had never met a Chinese Communist official who didn't talk about Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen assumed that the subject would also come up when the President went to Peking. Mr. Kissinger remarked that he would know more about it after he had been to Peking, where he would have had an opportunity for a full exchange of views. Our Taiwan position was not negotiable as far as we were concerned. Mr. Kissinger added that he didn't know if they would raise the question, but psychologically, he felt strongly that they would. Ambassador Shen agreed, noting that that's what they always were talking about. What about the normalization of relations? Mr. Kissinger noted that we had never defined this term. What *we* meant by it was a more normal relationship. We had no intention of establishing diplomatic relations for the foreseeable future, though we might have a few people in Peking from time to time.

Ambassador Shen asked how long this situation could be expected to prevail—six months, or for the next year, or what? Mr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that he was talking about the remainder of

this term of the President. He assumed that what he was saying here would be kept strictly confidential. Ambassador Shen said that he would report through “our man,” and not through the normal side.

Ambassador Shen referred to the President’s proposed visit to Moscow next May. Did Mr. Kissinger think this would reduce or increase the Chinese Communist interest in the President’s visit to Peking? Mr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what he, as a Chinese, thought. According to Ambassador Shen, the result of the announcement of the President’s Moscow visit would be a reduction in Chinese Communist interest in the President’s visiting Peking. They wanted to get the greatest mileage out of the visit, and if the President was going to Moscow in May, this might follow fairly closely on his visit to Peking. When would the President, in fact, be going to Peking? Ambassador Shen remarked that the Chinese Communists would ask a lot of questions—he himself would do the same. Mr. Kissinger observed that it might be his fate to have both Chinas hating him.

Ambassador Shen asked, did Mr. Kissinger have any news from Peking about what was going on there? Mr. Kissinger replied that we had received three contradictory reports: one that Lin Piao was sick; one that Lin Piao was ill; and one that Lin Piao had been on the plane which went down in Mongolia. What did Ambassador Shen think? Ambassador Shen replied that he would choose the middle option—Lin Piao was ill. Mr. Kissinger said that he thought the same, although all our reports were fourth-hand, and we had no direct reports.

Ambassador Shen wondered how big an area would be covered in the agenda—would Asian questions of a broad nature be touched upon? Mr. Kissinger declared that we would try to confine the agenda to bilateral relations. We couldn’t negotiate about our friends; for example, we couldn’t discuss Korea. Ambassador Shen expressed some surprise at this, wondering if some indirect reference might not be made to Korea or Taiwan. What else would there be to talk about? Mr. Kissinger indicated that the general evolution of the world situation would certainly be talked about, and agreed to a suggestion from Ambassador Shen that the relaxation of tensions would also be a subject for discussion. There would, in addition, be the subject of cultural and other exchanges.

Ambassador Shen asked, would the subject of the off-shore islands come up? Mr. Kissinger termed this an interesting point, although it had never been mentioned by the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Shen surmised that this probably was because they thought that Taiwan was now within their reach, “so why bother about the off-shore islands?” What about the subject of the U.S. treaty relations with the ROC? Mr. Kissinger stressed that the Ambassador should have absolutely no doubt that we would reaffirm the treaty relationship.

Ambassador Shen queried Mr. Kissinger as to whether anything new had come up in Peking's relationship with Moscow. Mr. Kissinger declared that we couldn't notice anything. Something might be going on, but if there, was, we couldn't notice it. Ambassador Shen cited a report from Hong Kong to the effect that the Chinese Communists had moved troops from Kirin to the region of the Amur River, and also from Shensi in northwest China toward the border with Inner Mongolia. Mr. Kissinger observed that, so far as we could tell, the build-up of Soviet forces was continuing. He had not followed the movements of the Chinese Communist forces, but their weight obviously was toward the north, and not toward Fukien. Ambassador Shen expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists may have taken units out from this area—a regiment here, and a division there. Mr. Kissinger said he felt that the ROC didn't have anything to worry about in the form of a Chinese Communist attack within the next two or three years. He did not believe the Communists could manage an army outside their borders.

Reverting to the topic of the President's visit to Moscow, Mr. Kissinger observed that our judgment of the impact of the announcement of this visit was similar to that of Ambassador Shen's. It certainly had not been received with undiluted joy in Peking, but we had gone ahead anyway. It had the advantage of putting the President's visit to Peking into a better perspective.

Responding to a request from Ambassador Shen for an evaluation of the UN situation, Mr. Kissinger told the Ambassador that the President had personally talked to the Italian and British Foreign Ministers about the Chirep issue, so we were personally putting ourselves behind our resolutions.² What was Ambassador Shen's judgment? We had received conflicting reports about the way the vote stood. Ambassador Shen said that he had talked to his Foreign Minister that day, who had felt a little better following a talk with Secretary Rogers.³ However, quite a few UN delegations had noted that the President had not personally spoken out. Mr. Kissinger retorted that this was not true; the President had spoken to the Israelis, the Italians, the Irish, and the

² Nixon met with Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro in the White House on October 11. A record of the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XLI.

³ Rogers, De Palma, McCloskey, and Murphy met with Chow, Ambassador Liu, and Frederick Chien in New York on October 5. (Reported in Secto 71, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 73 D 323, Secretary's Participation in UNGA, vol. II, memcons) Rogers, Pedersen, De Palma, and Murphy met with Chow, Liu, and Chien again on October 14 in New York. (Telegram 3549 from USUN, October 15; *ibid.*, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) In the latter meeting, Rogers stated that he still expected the United States to prevail on the "Important Question" vote. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. V, Document 419.

UK. Moreover, the other day he had received a delegation of 350 Congressmen. According to Ambassador Shen, the President's remarks had been very brief, and left an impression that they were not positive enough.⁴ Ambassador Shen hoped something more could be done to make the U.S. stand more positive. The issue was coming up the following Monday, the debate might last for two or three weeks, and a positive word from the President would do the trick. It would dispell all lingering doubts about the sincerity of the U.S. in supporting the ROC position.

Mr. Kissinger declared that if Ambassador Shen would give us the name of a delegation whose support the ROC needed, he had no doubt that the President would speak to this delegation. We were working among all uncommitted delegations, such as the Israelis, the Irish, the British, and the Italians. As far as the British were concerned, we did not expect to get their vote, but were telling them to keep quiet in their contacts with other countries.

Ambassador Shen said that he still felt that a word from the President would be desirable. Many delegations were holding off in making their decision until the time came for them to cast their vote. The show was not over until these votes were really cast—the ROC had had some experience about this in previous years. Mr. Kissinger noted that he was leaving the next day, but would talk to the President before his departure. Continuing, Ambassador Shen again asked for a positive statement from the President, saying that no one could then ever suggest that the U.S. was simply just going through the motions.

Mr. Kissinger indicated that he had personally talked to five delegations, to which Ambassador Shen referred to the President's having used a quotation to the effect that a 5,000 mile journey began with the first step. He himself felt that a journey of this length had to be completed with the last step, and that no stone should be left unturned. Mr. Kissinger again said that he would speak to the President on this subject.

Ambassador Shen raised the question of whether, if we got through the UN issue this year, we would need to fight it all over again next year. Mr. Kissinger thought that we would have to go through a fight every year unless we came to an understanding with Peking. Ambassador Shen asked, did Mr. Kissinger feel that Peking would

⁴ On October 13 Nixon met with a delegation of House members who presented a petition to "Save the Republic of China's UN Seat." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) During his September 16 news conference, Nixon had announced that the United States would support the PRC's admission into the UN General Assembly and Security Council, while opposing any effort to expel the ROC. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 950–951)

enter the UN if the dual representation resolution passed? Mr. Kissinger said, “no.” This was his personal judgment, although the Chinese Communists had not discussed this with him. Ambassador Shen referred to a speech by the Australian Ambassador expressing a little more optimism about what Peking would do. What was Mr. Kissinger’s sense about this? Mr. Kissinger replied by asking the Ambassador if it would be bad for the ROC if Peking did, in fact, come in. Ambassador Shen’s response was that if Peking came in, the whole ROC approach to the UN would have to be changed—a change in tactics would be necessary. Mr. Kissinger expressed the belief that Peking wouldn’t come in unless it could get the ROC out, and was more interested in this goal than in taking its place in the UN. Ambassador Shen wondered if this, in Peking’s thinking, might be tied to getting Taiwan, and Mr. Kissinger declared that this was his judgment.

Ambassador Shen speculated that if the dual representation resolution passed, and the Chinese Communists didn’t come in and the ROC remained in the UN, this would provide the ROC with added assurance as to its UN position. Mr. Kissinger agreed that this would be a great gain. It would be a good development if we won and they didn’t come in. Ambassador Shen went on to note that if Peking had a seat in the General Assembly and a place in the Security Council and then didn’t come in, there would be an anomalous situation. Their position couldn’t be one-half valid and one-half invalid, and wouldn’t they be throwing themselves open to questions so far as their membership was concerned. Mr. Kissinger felt that this was an interesting point.

Ambassador Shen remarked that some of his people had said that the ROC should speak up first (on the question of whether the ROC would stay in the UN if Peking entered), while others said that they shouldn’t take the initiative in speaking up. Mr. Kissinger said he personally thought that the ROC should keep quiet, and let the Chinese Communists speak up. He saw nothing to gain by showing reasonableness. The ROC’s enemies didn’t care about this. James Reston wanted the ROC out of the UN no matter how reasonable it was. Being in or out of the UN was not important, what our enemies wanted was for us to give up our defense relationship. And although the ROC had been unhappy with us the last six months, it would find that it could count on us. Ambassador Shen observed that the real crunch was coming.

The discussion briefly turned to the weather in Peking this time of year (“beautiful” according to Ambassador Shen) and the circumstances under which Mr. Erlichman had shown up at a dinner in the Chinese Embassy by mistake which was being held for a group of “old China hands” who were not necessarily supporters of the Administration. According to Ambassador Shen, Mr. Erlichman had enjoyed the affair immensely.

Mr. Kissinger concluded by stressing to the Ambassador that no task was more painful for him than the things we were now doing. All his friends on Taiwan would tell the Ambassador that he, Mr. Kissinger, didn't want to be doing this, and would certainly do nothing to sacrifice our central interests. This was a painful period. Mr. Kissinger also explained briefly the necessity for his staying on in Peking for the length of time scheduled; this was to assure that none of the members of technical staff got into trouble. Or, if they did get into trouble, Mr. Kissinger would be there to take care of the situation. He assured Ambassador Shen that he would speak to him very soon after his return from Peking.

160. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) and the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Pursley)¹

Washington, October 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military Equipment to the Republic of China

In the future, White House approval should be obtained for any transfers of major items of U.S. military equipment to the Republic of China (such as F-5Es or M-48 tanks), whether through grant MAP, FMS credit or cash sales, commercial sales, as Excess Defense Articles, or through any other means. A memorandum giving a full description of the proposal should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in each case.

Alexander M. Haig Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Confidential. In an October 19 covering memorandum to Haig, Froebe wrote, "This we believe is necessary in order to judge the advisability and timing of the transfer [of weapons] in terms of its probable impact on the plans for the President's China trip and our efforts to improve relations with Peking."